Saudi Arabia and the US: Aligned on Syria amid uncertainty on Gaza and Iran

There is no doubt that what occurs in Gaza and the outcome of the US-Iran nuclear talks are crucial for Saudi Arabia and, more broadly, for the interests of the member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). However, political developments in Syria are also prominent in their calculations. In fact, Syria is the only regional file where Saudi Arabia – with all the GCC states – and the US are currently on the same page: this alignment opens promising cooperation prospects in a country which is decisive for the containment of Iranian influence in Middle East, and for the security of Israel’s neighbourhood.

Regarding Gaza, the Saudi-American political divide looks remarkable. The US administration seems to have adopted a blank check approach to the Israeli government in the Strip, having tabled as its presumed contribution to peace-making the proposed “Riviera Plan” (which implies the forced displacement of the Gazawi population), while tolerating the new annexations of West Bank territories by Israel. The Saudi kingdom rejects these plans and still supports the traditional “two states solution”, based on the Arab Peace Initiative drafted by Riyadh in 2002.

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On Iran, ongoing nuclear talks see the US and Saudi Arabia officially agreeing on a diplomatic solution with Tehran. But the situation is extremely uncertain given the obstacles toward any meaningful agreement between the Trump administration and the Iranian government: what is also hard to predict is Israel’s reaction in case of a deal, or in case of diplomatic failure, since Netanyahu has never taken off the table the military option. While the Saudis aim to prevent any hypothesis of airstrikes against Iran’s nuclear sites due to its concerns for the stability of the Gulf region, the Americans have not ruled out the military option either. Furthermore, the GCC states are aware that two important Gulf security issues, namely missile proliferation and the activity of Iranian-backed militias in the region, will not be specifically addressed during bilateral talks between the US and Iran. Although the Tehran-led “axis of resistance” is now significantly weaker than before, potential breaches to Saudi national security remain.

Conversely, on Syria, there are no friction points between Saudi Arabia and the US. Moreover, intra-GCC competition for deals and influence in Syria produces a positive stimulus aimed at limiting both Iran’s and Türkiye’s influence, thus minimizing past ideological rivalries between the Sunni monarchies. In the first part of the Syrian civil war (2011-2013), Qatar supported the Muslim Brotherhood while Saudi Arabia backed some Salafi forces; between 2023 and 2025, the UAE and Saudi Arabia resumed diplomatic relations with the Assad regime – unlike Qatar.

In the GCC states’ perception, the new Syria going through the current transition looks like a place where the “Tehran wall” extending from Lebanon to Iraq has just fractured almost to the point of collapsing, paving the way for a risky, but also fascinating, possibility to support a different power balance within the country. In this context, the Salafi-jihadi risk continue to exist, posing a threat to the Saudi goal of regional stability  and should not be underestimated: it is related to the political role of Hayat Tahrir Al Sham (Ahmed Al Sharaa’s armed movement), and to the possible territorial expansion of ISIS to the extent that it is still operating in the Syrian desert (Badiya) and in the northeastern areas (Jazira) of the country.

The Saudi crown prince and prime minister Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud played a bridge role between Syria and the US, accelerating American steps vis-à-vis the Syrian transition authorities: not accidentally, the unannounced meeting between President Trump and interim president Al Sharaa occurred in Riyadh (May 14), and coincided with the US announcement of sanctions removal on Damascus. To a certain extent, Mohammed bin Salman opened the way to the restart of US-Syria relations, which resulted in the appointment of an American Special Envoy to Syria and the reopening of the US ambassador’s residence on May 29.

Since the fall of Bashar Al Assad in December 2024, Saudi Arabia and the GCC states have increasingly engaged in Syria. This has occurred despite the persistence of risks and major uncertainties regarding the country’s future, and the sectarian tensions between the stronger militias and both the Alawi and Druze minorities. The first visit abroad of both the new Syrian acting foreign minister and interim president Al Shaara was to Riyadh – he has visited all GCC states, with the exception of Oman so far.

The GCC states are exerting their leverage on Syria’s need of financial resources to entrench economic and political alliances with the new leadership in Damascus. As a case in point, Saudi Arabia and Qatar paid off the Syrian debt with the World Bank (US$15 million), also committing to pay the salaries of state employees over a three-month period. Qatar decided to provide natural gas supplies to Syria through Jordan (the Arab Gas Pipeline) to tackle electricity production shortages in the country.

After Trump announced that sanctions would be lifted, the Emirati global ports operator DP World signed an initial agreement (US$800 million) with the Syrian interim government to develop the port of Tartus, which includes the operation of a multipurpose terminal, plus cooperation for the establishment of industrial zones, free zones, and dry ports in internal areas. The GCC states are also working to defuse Syria’s tensions with neighbours: the Syria-Israel deconfliction talks, started in May and focused on military issues in the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights, have been mediated or facilitated by the UAE, according to Reuters, although the Emirati government has officially  denied it.

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For Saudi Arabia, the decision to re-enter the Syrian political landscape is based on soft power and geopolitical reasons. First, Riyadh has the possibility to promote Arab influence, championing Arab unity on the country’s future. In the last twenty years, Syria was greatly influenced by Persian culture, and is currently under pressure from both Turkish and Israeli interference in its own territory. On this backdrop, greater Saudi influence in Syria would at least prevent the rebuilding of Iran’s leverage, while also containing the rising Turkish and, to a lesser extent, Israeli presence. Furthermore, Riyadh is interested in keeping in check the threat emanating from the remnants of ISIS in the east, and this can be pursued by stabilizing the country through economic and political backing.

All these geopolitical goals are shared by the US, which would favourably see Syria joining the Saudi-led Arab orbit, with Riyadh and the Gulf monarchies bearing the multifaceted ´burden` of Syria’s transition. Amid uncertainty in Gaza and with Iran, the Saudi-US alignment on Syria represents, at this stage, a ´good enough` starting point for the regional interests of the GCC states, even though it requires caution and additional efforts.