EU and Turkey: a relationship in search of new pillars
New Geoeconomics #8
In 2025, the relationship between the European Union and Turkey remains complex and delicate, shaped by a dense intersection of internal political developments in the country and shifts in the international landscape. As President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan further consolidates his control domestically, Ankara is adopting an increasingly assertive foreign policy stance, with marked involvement in strategic theaters such as Syria, Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean. At the same time, Russia’s growing aggressiveness and the increasing unpredictability of US foreign policy render Turkey’s role in European security ever more central and difficult to overlook.
For the EU, this situation revives a longstanding structural dilemma – one well understood in Ankara: to what extent is Brussels willing to make the defense of democratic principles and the rule of law subordinate to geopolitical and strategic considerations? After years of tension and mutual misunderstandings, the relationship between Brussels and Ankara has undergone a progressive transformation, which is likely to continue in the years ahead. This evolution is driven by a global context in constant flux, marked by regional crises, the redefinition of international balances, and shared challenges. However, the persistence of numerous uncertainties on crucial issues makes the bilateral relationship highly unstable and difficult to manage for both sides.
Symbolic of this tension was the arrest of former Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu in March on corruption charges. A leading figure in the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and widely regarded as Erdoğan’s main challenger in the 2028 presidential elections, İmamoğlu was removed from the political scene at a time when the current President – despite having exhausted the two terms allowed by the Constitution – appears intent on running again, hinting at another constitutional revision.
This episode, accompanied by fresh waves of repression against journalists and activists, has sparked significant protests both inside and outside the country and has reignited longstanding concerns in Europe. What is at stake is not only Turkey’s democratic trajectory, but also the fragile rapprochement process between Brussels and Ankara – built around strategically important dossiers such as the Ukraine crisis and post-Assad Syria, both central to a broader geopolitical contest involving the United States, Russia and China.
Despite the gravity of these developments, the EU institutions have reacted in a restrained manner, limiting themselves to expressions of “concern” and “attention”. This measured response reflects a bilateral relationship historically marked by alternating phases, but one that has steadily deteriorated since the failed coup attempt of July 2016. Since then, Turkey’s EU accession process –formally launched in 1999 – has effectively stalled, culminating in a de facto freeze in 2018 due to democratic backsliding, tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean, and deep divergences over fundamental rights and the rule of law.
The European Commission’s October 2024 progress report once again highlighted how the current presidential system in Turkey has reinforced executive power concentration, significantly weakened institutional checks and balances, and curtailed political pluralism. Nonetheless, these trends do not appear to have substantially undermined Erdoğan’s domestic popularity or his standing on the international stage.
Indeed, the Turkish President continues to be an active interlocutor for major EU institutions. Meetings with leaders such as Ursula von der Leyen, António Costa and Kaja Kallas confirm an ongoing dialogue on key issues ranging from economic cooperation to the energy transition and irregular migration control. In addition, diplomatic relations with EU member states remain strong, as demonstrated by the recent 4th Italian-Turkish intergovernmental summit held in Rome on April 29th, where Erdoğan discussed security, energy and defense industry matters with Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni.
While the challenges and frictions in the EU-Turkey relationship are evident (including the frozen accession process, territorial disputes with Greece and Cyprus, Erdoğan’s independent foreign policy and the often instrumental handling of migration), it is equally clear that opportunities exist to revitalize this strategically handicapped relationship. At the same time, a shift in perception is emerging within the EU: Ankara is no longer viewed (or at least not solely) as a potential candidate for EU membership, but rather as a necessary partner, strategic on key dossiers such as migration, energy transition, and defense and security cooperation.
This transformation is reinforced by objective data: Turkey is the EU’s fifth-largest trading partner, while the EU is Ankara’s main export market. Moreover, Turkey has the second-largest army in NATO and a strategically crucial geographic position between the Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean. Its role has grown even more prominent following developments in Syria and Ukraine, where Turkey has sought to position itself as a mediator and leading player in US-supported negotiations. In this context, Erdoğan has shown interest in joining the “coalition of the willing” proposed by France and the United Kingdom to provide security guarantees to Ukraine, using this as leverage to promote a closer defense partnership with Brussels.
However, an excessive reliance on Turkey’s strategic role risks creating an asymmetric dependency that exposes the EU to the ambiguities of Erdoğan’s leadership. Unresolved tensions in the Aegean and domestic issues concerning the rule of law set structural limits on a mutual interest based solely on geopolitical calculations. For this reason, clearly defining the nature of the EU-Turkey relationship is essential to guide future strategic choices.
This is a necessary step, especially given the chaotic global context, which demands a renewed dose of pragmatism: From sub-Saharan Africa to the Caucasus, from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea, Ankara is present in numerous regional crises and interacts with global powers in an unstable, multipolar environment. Within this scenario, Brussels and Ankara are called upon to build a relationship based on shared interests and joint management of regional vulnerabilities.
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La Turchia tra Israele e Iran nello scenario mediorientale
However, an approach that systematically subordinates democratic values to strategic conveniences risks undermining the sustainability of the relationship. An alternative “European path” – not necessarily aimed at full membership, but grounded in enhanced cooperation frameworks – could offer an opportunity to promote deeper convergence on issues such as democracy, the rule of law and justice. From this perspective, the EU could link tangible progress (e.g., modernizing the customs union or liberalizing visas) to internal reforms in Turkey, thereby strengthening its negotiating leverage.
Ultimately, while pragmatism may be the most realistic way to overcome the current impasse, it should not come at the expense of the EU’s founding principles. The real challenge for Brussels and Ankara lies in building a solid partnership, based on shared interests, but also on a minimal common denominator of values. Only in this way can a lasting relationship be consolidated – one capable of withstanding the instabilities of the international context.
Read more on related topics in New Geoeconomics #8
