The Kremlin and Pope Francis: the pragmatic emergence of aligning interests

These days, it is hard to hear President Vladimir Putin speak highly about a leader of a Western-based institution. But this is what Putin did when he spoke about the passing of Pope Francis. On the very same day of his death, the Russian leader said the country will always remember that the late Pope had “a highly positive attitude” toward Russia. He also said that Francis had “done a lot of good not only for his flock, but for the world at large.”

Putin knew Francis personally, like many world leaders. He met him at least three times, during brief but publicly amicable visits to the Vatican – in 2013, 2015, and 2019. They also spoke on the phone, though the last publicly known call happened in December 2021, just months before Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine.

Apart from the Kremlin, Francis’ tenure marked a rapprochement with the Russian Orthodox Church.

In 2016, Francis became the first Pope in history to meet with its head, Patriarch Kirill. Their meeting in Havana, which happened after the first stage of the Ukraine crisis had already been in full swing for about two years, turned out to be a major historic, even if largely symbolic, breakthrough. The two church primates signed a joint declaration, marking one of the highest points in the bilateral relationship since the Great Schism of 1054.

Russia’s cautious simpathy with the late Pope tells a lot about both the current state of the Kremlin, its ideology, and the situation within the Catholic Church.

Over centuries, Russia’s relationship with the Holy See has been complex. The idea of Moscow as the protector of true Christianity (the “Third Rome”, the second being Constantinople) was one of the main pillars of the Russian state. But in recent years, a new twist has occurred as the Kremlin appeared more inclined to treat the Catholic Church as a potential ally in a nest of enemies – as a fundamentally conservative institution that has positioned itself as being above the imminent and opportunistic politics of today in favor of broader, transcendental values.

The Kremlin clearly approved and took advantage of the Pope’s message that Russians and Ukrainians are “brothers, cousins,” something that enraged some people in Ukraine. Shortly after the Russian invasion, the Pope said that NATO was “barking at Russia’s gate” and therefore the war in Ukraine, even if it was in his words “a painful and shameful occasion for all humanity,” was not completely unprovoked.

In March 2024, the Pope called on Ukraine to negotiate “before things get worse.” Speaking of the war, he said that “the stronger one is the one who sees the situation, who thinks of the people, who has the courage of the white flag, to negotiate.”

And in 2023, speaking with young Russian Catholics, the Pope called on them to never forget their heritage. “You are the heirs of great Russia: great Russia of saints, rulers, great Russia of Peter I, Catherine II, that empire – great, enlightened, [country] of great culture and great humanity.”

Indeed, Francis never singled out Putin as the main perpetrator of the war. In a 2022 interview, he said that “it is not necessary that I put a name and surname,” and even suggested that it was not Christian Russians but Chechens and Buryats who committed the cruelest acts of violence in Ukraine as part of the invading army. “Generally, the cruelest are perhaps those who are of Russia but are not of the Russian tradition,” he said.

The Pope’s comments were very much in line with what Putin has been saying too – that Ukrainians and Russians are brothers, if not one people; that there is no other way to resolve the conflict but through reconciliation (albeit on Russian terms); and that a third party (NATO) is responsible for the war.

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In Ukraine, the Pope’s perceived ambivalence about the war caused a lot of dismay. Unlike in Russia, Ukraine has a Catholic minority of about 10 percent. Most of them live in Western Ukraine, known for its widely popular anti-Russian sentiment even before 2022 or 2014. Over centuries, Ukrainian Catholics were the staunchest defenders of Ukraine’s distinctiveness from Russia.

But Francis’ stance had deep roots. One clear reason why Francis avoided crossing Russia’s red lines was that he wanted to position himself above the conflict, maintaining open channels both with the Kremlin and the Ukrainian government in Kyiv – a long-lasting tradition of the Church. Putin has been very sensitive to comments made about him and Russia. Amid universal condemnation in the West, even a neutral position toward Moscow effectively turned into a pro-Russian one.

But more importantly, the late Pope was trying to reflect global political shifts. The future of the Catholic Church does not lie in the West; it lies with countries of the Global South: in Asia, Latin America, but most of all Africa, the fastest-growing region of Catholicism in the world.

This is where the Vatican’s and the Kremlin’s interests collide. Russia under Putin has also been trying to recalibrate its position vis-à-vis the West. Following the Soviet collapse, Moscow tried to join the West, but then its elites could not accept the position of a junior partner. It then tried to cohabitate with the West, but then the relationship ruptured over Ukraine, which both Russia and Western countries wanted to pull to their side. Today, Russia and the West are enemies.

With the Catholic Church, the transition has been much more gradual, but clearly whoever becomes the new Pope, he will need to position the Church in an increasingly fragmented and chaotic world where the center of gravity shifts away from Western capitals. And here, Moscow’s and the Vatican’s interests will again align.