Assessing the Geopolitics of Pope Francis
Francis, as the first Latin American Pope and the first non-European Pope of the modern age, was expected to bring a new approach to the geopolitical views of the Vatican. According to most analysts, he did, with a significant reorientation of the Holy See’s global relations. The main novelties of the past twelve years can be addressed in three different layers: the internal geopolitics of an increasingly global Catholic Church; the relations with other faiths and other branches of Christianity; and the global political and geopolitical effects of Pope Francis’s words and deeds.
Starting from the inner equilibria of Catholicism, Francis was faced with the difficult task of coming to terms with an increasingly global and internally diverse Church. His take on this issue was an attempt at decentralizing the Church and shifting its center of gravity from the north of the world – especially Europe – towards the global south. His project was focused on the peripheries (in his own words, not only in geographical, but also in existential terms), to give them voice, but also to use their energy to revitalize European Catholicism itself. His idea, inspired by the Argentinean “Theology of the people”, of popular movements as a tool for social justice and to fight ills such as individualism, inhuman capitalism, and climate change, was quite innovative for the modern Church and had powerful political consequences.
This decentralization of Catholicism was also visible in Francis’s appointments. When comparing the pool of electors for the 2013 and the 2025 conclaves, we see that the majority of voting cardinals no longer belongs to Europe (significantly, the number of Italian cardinals has nearly halved), while the number of cardinals from the south (Latin America, Africa, Asia and Oceania) has increased from 30% to 46% – a needed revision, considering that over 60% of world Catholics currently live in those continents. As highlighted by experts such as Petr KratochvĂl, this process of decentralization, with increasingly powerful regional conferences of bishops, is, however, a growing challenge to Rome’s effective management of the Church and to its cohesion. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the empowerment of the peripheries intersects with other divides within contemporary Catholicism in complicated ways, particularly the liberal-conservative cleavage. Indeed, while in many cases the new prelates from the south put forward social justice-oriented agendas similar to that of Pope Francis, they can also represent conservative points of view, such as Cardinal Sarah’s position on the celibacy in the clergy, or Cardinal Turkson’s take on Islam.
As for interfaith relations, Bergoglio will undoubtedly be remembered as a Pope of interreligious dialogue, aiming at narrowing ancient divides, according to his motto of “building bridges rather than walls”. In this context, two events stand out. The first was the meeting in Abu Dhabi with the Grand Imam of the Al-Azhar, and the joint signature of the “Document on Human Fraternity for World Peace and Living Together” on 4 February 2019.
This was part of Pope Francisâs friendly attitude towards the other Abrahamic religions, which was also aimed at enhancing the protection of Christian minorities at risk in some Muslim-majority countries. This rather positive attitude towards Islam, together with Francis’s open stance towards migrants, has, however, raised suspicions not only among some conservative wings of the Church, but also among right-wing leaders and governments both in Europe and in the Americas. This also shows in Francis’s complicated relation with Judaism: While he had enjoyed warm and friendly relations with Jewish communities since his time as a prelate in Argentina, more recently his stance after the October 7, 2023 attacks, and his attention for the plight of Palestinians in Gaza, raised concern and, at times, anger in Israel and among some Jewish communities in the West.
The second outstanding interreligious event of Francis’s papacy was the historical meeting in 2016 with Patriarch Kirill of the Russian Orthodox Church, which bridged a millennia-old schism. Also in this case, especially considering that the meeting took place in Cuba, interreligious dialogue mixed with geopolitical strategy. As in the case of the relations with Islam, moreover, an improvement in the relations with the Christian Orthodox world was also seen as a tool to facilitate the protection of Christian minorities in countries like Syria, which at the time were under Russia’s influence. Francis also tried to use his improved relations with Kirill and the Russian Orthodox Church to play the role of a mediator in the Ukraine crisis after the Russian invasion, but unsuccessfully, since both of his attempts at meeting Kirill again and at visiting Moscow were hampered.
Another hot issue in the relations with non-Catholic faiths was his attitude towards Evangelical Protestantism, which has steadily been gaining ground in the south, especially in Latin America, at the expense of Catholicism. Indeed, the election of Bergoglio itself was likely a sign of attention towards that continent and a first attempt at a remedy. However, despite this strategy, and Francis’s notable travels to the region, this attempt does not seem to have been particularly successful in shoring up the loss of followers to the Protestant congregations. On the contrary, the political consequences of the Pope’s moves might have even backfired against the perception of the Catholic Church in the region.
Indeed, Pope Francis’s strategy of empowerment of Latin America and the other areas of the south through the promotion of social justice and popular movements had deep political underpinnings, also considering that, especially in South America, it meant a close association with controversial left-wing leaders such as Bolivia’s Evo Morales.
Broadly speaking, among the American and European conservative circles, there was a widespread perception of Francis as an anti-capitalist, anti-Western and anti-US religious leader. In Latin America, this idea was the source of an even deeper divide between Catholics and Evangelical Protestants, mostly supporting right-wing leaders such as Brazil’s Bolsonaro. However, it also was so deeply rooted among conservative and ultra-conservative Catholic factions in the US that are close to Cardinal Burke, that it gave rise to fears that it might lead to a fully-fledged schism of the North American Church. One reason for this conviction was Francis’s promotion of issues that were perceived as planks of leftist platforms, such as social justice and climate change. Moreover, as mentioned, his pro-migrant and Islam-friendly attitude was interpreted by the nationalist right and the conservatives as a kind of treason of the Christian identity of the West. For these reasons, the Pope was the target of an almost unanimous criticism (and in some cases even insults) from right-wing populist leaders not only in the Americas (Trump, Bolsonaro, Milei) but also in Europe (Abascal, Salvini, Le Pen, among others).
Another move that raised particular concern in the US was the Church’s rapprochement with China, with the signature of a secret agreement in 2018 aiming at reconciling the schism between Rome’s Church (which at the time was underground in China) and the Catholic Patriotic Association, the state-controlled Church set up by Beijing’s regime in 1957. This agreement â which paved the way for legitimate activity of the Catholic Church in China in exchange for Beijing’s control over bishops’ appointments â was heavily criticized by some prelates (notably Hong Kong’s Cardinal Zen), also because in the strategy of appeasement towards China the Vatican seemed at times to minimize Beijing’s repression of the opposition and human rights abuses in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang region.
This perceived soft attitude towards authoritarian regimes was also detected in the Vatican’s reactions to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. While openly condemning Russia’s aggression, Francis seemed to keep a rather balanced attitude (which was probably also aimed at playing a mediating role) about who was responsible for the crisis. Western leaders supporting Ukraine were particularly puzzled by Francis’s statement about NATO “barking at the door of Russia” as a cause for the conflict.
For all these reasons, while Francis enjoyed warm relations with US President Obama because of their similar views on social justice and environmental issues, his relations with Washington changed considerably after the rise to power of Donald Trump (whose entourage was even accused of plotting a secret plan to topple Francis). As a consequence, at the end of Francis’s term, relations between Washington and the Vatican were on minimum terms. The same was true for relations with Israel, whose right-wing government saw Francis as leaning towards the Palestinian side.
To sum up, at the end of Francis’s papacy, the Catholic Church is undoubtedly more diverse and pluricentric: This could be a resource, as well as a challenge for Bergoglio’s successor, as it might entail centrifugal forces that are difficult to contain. In political terms, his legacy implies a vision of the Catholic Church as a pro-social justice force, aiming for closer relations with emerging powers, and fiercely clashing against identity-driven right-wing populist leaderships, especially in the West.
As a consequence of this stance, the geopolitical effects of Francis’s strategies seem to be mixed. On the one hand, he managed to improve Catholicism’s image in the world at several levels after recent scandals and was very effective in reframing a modern Church focused on social plight and environmental issues. On the other hand, his moves created political controversies with several world powers, mixed results in facing threats for the Church, such as secularization in the West and aggressive Evangelical proselytism in the âGlobal Southâ.
