The Gulf States after the Iran war and the NATO Summit
The United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait, the four members of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), NATO’s partnership with the Gulf states, have been invited to join the NATO summit in Ankara, Türkiye, of 7-8 July, 2026. This is not only a news item, but a significant political message.
After the Iran war generated threats and vulnerabilities that are likely to last, NATO and the Gulf states acknowledge that their partnership, based on practical cooperation rather than on structured commitments, can strengthen win-win resilience in a shared neighbourhood. There is indeed more room than before for increasing Gulf-NATO collaboration activities on maritime security, counter drone capabilities and defence industry, without altering institutional formulas. In this process, the growing European role within the Alliance is a potentially new factor
A new perspective on the Southern Neighborhood, at last
The path to the Ankara summit marked a change in tone for NATO members, as Defense expenditures and Ukraine are at the top of the agenda, with however a separate meeting with Gulf partners. It has been a long trajectory that has accelerated with the “NATO 2030” Reflection Group and most of all the Expert Group on the Southern Neighbourhood, culminated with the Action Plan adopted in 2024 by leaders at the Washington Summit.
Three elements certainly facilitated the decision to invite the Gulf states. The first is the venue, Ankara, as the capital of the only Islamic member state of the Alliance and the logical geographical connector between the “NATO core” and its Arab partners. The second element is related to the ICI partnership with the Gulf states, whose process was launched in Türkiye, at Istanbul, in 2004. The third is the rapid rise of Gulf-Türkiye defense industry ties. In 2023, Saudi Arabia signed a deal with Turkish Baykar company to localize drone manufacturing; Qatar – which hosts a permanent Turkish base – signed a similar agreement in 2026; the UAE acquires Baykar’s drones despite regional competition. At the summit, Ankara hosted the NATO Summit Defense Industry Forum, the first NATO’s high-level event on transatlantic defence production, investment and innovation, convening members and partners’ policymakers and industry leaders.
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However, it would be reductive to frame this invitation only as a polite diplomatic gesture. The Israel-US war on Iran, and the unsolved crisis this has generated in the Hormuz Strait and for Gulf security, has directly impacted not only the Gulf states but also NATO as an alliance.
The recent visits by NATO’s Special Representative for the Southern Neighbourhood, Javier Colomina, in the UAE and Bahrain (9-11 June, 2026) are of significant political value. Colomina reaffirmed the Alliance’s condemnation of Iranian drone and missile attacks against its neighbors, and the solidarity with Gulf partners. The UAE was the most heavily targeted country by Tehran in the first weeks of war, even more than Israel. In Abu Dhabi and Manama, the Special Representative discussed “prospects for further strengthening cooperation in areas such as defence investment, countering unmanned aircraft systems, resilience, and maritime security.” In December 2023, the then Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg paid an unprecedented visit to Saudi Arabia, meeting the deputy foreign minister and, in February 2024, the Saudi foreign minister on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference.
A new strategic awareness after the Iran War
The Iran war has further contributed to increase strategic awareness among NATO members and the Gulf states about the meaning and relevance of their cooperation. Because of the crisis engendered by the US-Israeli operations and Iran’s response, the Alliance is finally seeing the Southern neighborhood not only as a potential source of threat due to instability and terrorism, but also as an interconnected region for economic security and supply chains, where partnerships can support NATO’s stability and resilience.
The Gulf states now fully realize their own security requires improvements on counter-drone systems, maritime security and protection of critical infrastructures: NATO’s expertise can be of support in these areas. During the Iran war, Tehran has adopted multidimensional warfare against its Arab neighbors: drones and missiles attacks, plus the blockade of the Hormuz Strait. From a political point of view, Iran has emerged from the conflict stronger and bolder than before, establishing a new “threat order” in the Gulf to the detriment of the monarchies. The Iranians have still the upper hand on the Strait; the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding is vague and does not include missile and drone proliferation, nor the proxies issue, while it provides significant economic relief (especially oil exports and financial benefits) to the Islamic Republic.
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This adds to the silent confidence crisis between the Gulf states and US. Their alliance is steady and unavoidable: but Washington prioritized Israel’s military plans starting the war, thus indirectly putting the Arab monarchies in the eye of the storm. Then the US failed to protect its longtime allies and to fully restore deterrence vis-à-vis Iran, choosing at last to sign the Memorandum while the Hormuz Strait, vital for most of the Gulf states’ economies, was still closed.
Given this picture, the Gulf states need stronger defence capabilities and more reliable partners: practical cooperation with NATO can play a role in fulfilling at least some of these goals.
The Gulf states’ trajectory as NATO partners
More broadly, Gulf states’ interest for a capability-centered partnership with NATO stems from their long-term ambition to increase their defence autonomy. This is triggered by the American decreased commitment to Middle East security and, more recently, also by the complexity of US-Gulf relations after the Iran war. The stronger role Europe is trying to play in the Alliance, because of Readiness 2030 and Washington’s make-or-break pressing for the 5% target, also explains Gulf states’ evolving stance on NATO. The Arab capitals of the Gulf have come to view European states and the EU as strategic partners, and see that Europeans’ military and financial involvement in the Alliance is going to rise.
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The Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia which, like Oman, opted out from the ICI partnership since 2004 (even though participating in some military education and training activities in the ICI framework), has perceived for decades NATO as some sort of “US minus entity”. Added to Gulf states’ preference for bilateral, state-to-state relations, this explains their traditional low interest in the Alliance.
But things evolve. Since 2010s, due to the regional turmoil of the Arab uprisings (2011), Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia” (2011), the war in Yemen and the Houthis’ asymmetric threat (since 2015), and the shock of the Iranian attack on Saudi Aramco (2019), the Gulf states have gradually embraced military reform paths to make their armed forces more capable and more autonomous from US protection.
Therefore, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait have started to invest in defense capabilities, not only in highly-sophisticated equipment: local defence industries, maintenance, repair and overhaul, and, most of all, in military education and technical expertise at national level, as well as some advanced technologies.
Against this backdrop, NATO’s defence expertise has increasingly looked appealing to the Gulf states: the ICI has survived precisely because it is a practical initiative tailored on each partner’s military needs, without structured commitments. In 2017, the opening of the NATO-ICI Regional Centre in Kuwait fit exactly into this approach, prioritising training and confidence-building.
The Gulf and Europe: growing threats from the neighborhood, more troubles with the US
In the wake of the Iran war, growing NATO-Gulf states awareness regarding their role in building strategic resilience in the neighborhood, and the increasing political and military weight of European members within the Alliance, have become parallel paths which can support each other.
The Gulf states are looking to strengthen partnerships that are complementary to the US; at the same time, the more active European states are searching for partners willing to share the financial, industrial and security burden of their rearmament plans.
This is ultimately the backdrop of a stronger, renewed and realistic NATO-Gulf partnership. The Ankara Summit tests this possibility, as Gulf and European states face growing threats and troubled relations with Washington.
