Tel Aviv, Tehran, Washington, and the failure of multilateralism
The Netanyahu government made yet another perilous gamble, this time with military action against its archfoe Iran. This comes in the context of indiscriminate Israeli bombing and the weaponization of starvation in Gaza having pushed even the European Union (EU) to soften its traditionally overly cautious rhetoric towards Tel Aviv – too late, of course, to alter facts on the ground – and against the backdrop of negotiations for a new and possibly improved US-Iran nuclear deal aiming to write a new page in the nuclear diplomacy chapter which US President Donald Trump himself had closed in his first term. Israel opted for open confrontation with Iran in an unprecedented military attack on its nuclear facilities; the Rubicon analysts worldwide hoped would never be crossed. Twelve days into mutual missile strikes, and in the wake of Washington’s entry into the conflict with US bombing of Iran’s three main nuclear sites, the last red line that had yet to be crossed, the conflict might have reached its final act.
Uncertainty surrounds the temporary ceasefire agreed to by both Israel and Iran and announced by Trump hours after Iranian retaliatory strikes on an American base in Doha, Qatar. In the wake of assertions by the Chief of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that no tangible proof pointed to the fact that Iran was developing nuclear weapons in the first place, it is hard to stop the mind from wandering to the memories of senseless wars past and the nose from picking up the heavy scent of a not so veiled Israeli push for regime change that Trump directly alluded to in a social media post twisting his MAGA slogan into MIGA: Make Iran Great Again.
The unfolding events raise more than one urgent question: Have we learned anything at all from history or are we doomed to recycle its darkest chapters, with only the names and borders changed, and more pressing yet, what happens when everything that was not supposed to happen already has? Where do we go from here and what space is left for diplomacy?
Strategic deflection and diplomatic derailing
On 13 June, Amnesty International published an analysis of satellite imagery of Israel’s razing of Khuza, in the southern Gaza Strip, which the watchdog described as “fresh evidence of Israel’s genocide against Palestinians in the occupied Gaza Strip.” In the early hours of that same day, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu launched a series of missile strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, succeeding in strategically diverting international attention from the last stage of the destruction of Gaza and derailing ongoing nuclear talks between Iran, the US and the E3 (Britain, France and Germany). From German Chancellor Friedrich Merz to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, to French President Emmanuel Macron to High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (HRVP) Kaja Kallas, no one missed the opportunity to express support for Israel, with statements varying from reiterating Israel’s right to self defence, to stressing the imperative of preventing Iran from achieving the bomb in light of its longstanding destabilizing role in the region.
Israel could have not thrown a better PR-proof lifevest to EU leaders scrambling to find new ways to avoid following through with a shift in tone of European capitals’ and Brussels’ own relationship with Tel Aviv over the genocide in Gaza, than giving them the chance to rally against a threat as easily marketable as an allegedly nuclear weapon-wielding Islamic Republic of Iran. France’s Macron, who has been vocal about the need to recognize the state of Palestine, later pivoted, toughening his tone vis-à-vis Israel, noting its strikes on targets unrelated to Iran’s nuclear program heightened the risk of escalation of violence in the region, and reiterating the need to revert to the path of diplomacy following a meeting between the E3, HRVP Kallas and Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi in Geneva on June 20. Following calls by the UK and Kallas for Iran to return to the negotiating table, Araghchi noted in a post on X that “To Britain and the EU High Rep, it is Iran which must “return” to the table. But how can Iran return to something it never left, let alone blew up?”
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Little attention was given by any of these EU leaders to the fact that Israel had launched a preemptive strike, in violation of international law, IAEA Chief Rafael Grossi’s statement in following days highlighting that no conclusive evidence was found in support of the assumption that Iran was developing nuclear weapons, or the very real considerations of regional spillover and escalation of violence to neighboring Iraq, a Lebanon still on its knees or a Syria still in the weeds of transition.
Following Israel’s attack on Iranian nuclear sites and killing of top Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Generals and nuclear scientists, US Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated that while not involved in Israel’s “unilateral” action against Iran, Washington was advised by Tel Aviv that the latter considered said action “necessary for its self-defense.” Rubio also very clearly stated that “Iran should not target U.S. interests or personnel.” Conveniently, the US had already evacuated all non-essential personnel in the region in the days leading up to the Israeli attack. Meanwhile, G7 leaders meeting in Canada offered Israel unambiguous political cover, reaffirming Israel’s “right to defend itself,” and stressing that “Iran is the principal source of regional instability and terror,” and “can never have a nuclear weapon.”
Israel’s attacks against Iranian nuclear facilities, which took place a few days before US and Iranian negotiators were set to meet in Oman for the sixth round of negotiations of a potential new nuclear deal, came at a moment when some experts assessed that the foundations for a sustainable nuclear agreement were arguably stronger than they were in 2015. Unlike the original Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), the current negotiations have shifted from rigid multilateralism to more agile bilateral engagement and, critically, now include the backing of Gulf powers like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), who once opposed such a deal. Their support reflects a broader regional pivot toward de-escalation and long-term stability. Against this backdrop, Israel’s attack reads less as a defensive imperative and more as a deliberate effort to sabotage a deal it has consistently opposed – even at the risk of plunging the region into renewed volatility.
The Crescent Under Pressure
As Israel and Iran exchange missile fire, Iraq finds itself in an all-too-familiar bind – caught in the crosshairs both geographically and geopolitically. With its airspace formally closed since the beginning of the strikes but nevertheless routinely violated by Israel, prompting Baghdad to once again lodge a complaint to the UNSC, Iraq struck a deal with South Korea for a new air defense system. Deeply entangled with both Tehran and Washington, Iraq’s balancing act, featuring Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani focus on ensuring Iran-backed militias in Iraq restrain from actions that could potentially drag the country into the conflict, risks becoming unsustainable if Israel and Iran continue on this path for long, and if Trump’s calculations lead to another US strike against Iran.
The government, still reliant on US military presence while close with Iran, issued formal condemnations of the Israeli strikes, warning that such actions threaten to ignite the entire region. Iraq’s top Shiite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani echoed that fear, warning of regional chaos should Iran’s leadership be targeted, while Muqtada al-Sadr’s supporters – responding to his explicit call – staged mass protests across the country. In Najaf, the presence of Iran’s Consul General at Friday prayers offered a symbolic gesture of Shia solidarity that did not go unnoticed. Nevertheless, contrary to the often reductive portrayal of Baghdad as a mere proxy of Tehran, the Iraqi government has consistently reiterated its desire to stay out of the conflict, and its commitment to engage all sides in pursuit of de-escalation, building onto a commitment to regional diplomatic efforts and the consolidation of a mediating posture that Iraq has been actively pursuing in recent years.
In Lebanon, which has witnessed near daily ceasefire violations by Israel since the cessation of hostilities agreement between the two came into force on 27 November 2024 , Hezbollah has so far refrained from joining the confrontation, initially stating that a direct intervention by the US might alter that calculus. In the wake of Washington’s decision to strike the Iranian nuclear sites of Fordow, Natanz and Isfahan with bunker buster bombs, it is safe to say it has not. The group’s current posture is likely shaped by concern over Lebanon’s precarious internal situation which makes not diving headfirst into a broader conflict it will likely not be able to sustain a simple matter of survival.
Similarly, Ahmad al-Sharaa’s post-Assad Syria, no longer under Tehran’s fist, (but now under Ankara’s) has also avoided involvement in the unfolding Israel–Iran confrontation, maintaining a cautious silence. Yet signs of volatility clearly emerge beneath the surface. For instance, the efforts by some remnants of Syria’s former regime to secure external backing to revive armed groups aimed at confronting Israel, albeit disorganized and militarily insignificant, clearly point to the underlying fragility of the new Syrian state. In light of similar instances, it is not hard to grasp just how destabilized Damascus could be by a protracted confrontation between its former patron Iran and Israel, which is making more headway into the Golan Heights, by the day.
Ceasefire on Paper, Regime Change in Mind
Despite President Trump’s announcement that Israel and Iran had agreed to a ceasefire, made just hours after Iran retaliated for US strikes on its nuclear facilities, the situation remains far from resolved. Iran had repeatedly warned that a direct attack by the US would mark a point of no return, yet its response was limited to a missile strike on a previously evacuated American base in Qatar, which Tehran had given Washington advance notice of and which resulted in no casualties.
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The choice of Qatar, unprecedented as it marked the first time US interests in the Gulf country were directly targeted, reflected a calculated relatively risk-averse decision by Tehran. Striking Saudi Arabia or the UAE would have jeopardized a thorny normalization process and key economic ties. On the other hand, according to some experts targeting Bahrain or Kuwait risked damaging Iran’s influence among Shiites populations or triggering a US response.
The lack of active support by members of Iran’s once strong Axis of Resistance, the relatively contained reaction to the US entry into the conflict described by Trump as “very weak” and the Islamic Republic’s apparent inability to even negotiate for Tel Aviv to be the first to enact the ceasefire, point to the fact that Tehran is indeed between a rock and a hard place, and it is aware of the risk of taking actions that will prompt an even stronger lashback at a time when it is exposed, lacking material support of even its most ally Russia, and Israel and the US made clear and repeated references to regime change. Beneath the surface of the fragile truce the status of which remains unclear in light of the Israeli strikes on Tehran that followed Trump’s announcement and the barrage of Iranian missiles that hit Tel Aviv and Beersheba in southern Israel around 4 am, lie deeper issues that demand urgent reflection.
The mere fact that preemptive strikes on nuclear infrastructure were considered a viable option, doubtlessly due to the incomparable level of impunity to international law Israel benefits from, and open calls for regime change in Iran reveal a troubling state of affairs: a level of erosion of diplomatic norms, disintegration of multilateralism, and increasing unwillingness or inability of global powers to internalize the lessons of the past that it is hard to see where diplomacy fits, and yet it is the only way forward. Pursuing regime change, whether overtly or through sustained military pressure, is a dangerously short-sighted strategy. It risks triggering a broader regional war and repeating the disastrous misjudgments of previous interventions, most notably the 2003 invasion of Iraq. That effort not only failed to deliver either democracy or stability, but plunged the region into prolonged chaos instead. Applying the same logic to Iran today not only ignores the complex political realities on the ground, including the way powerful neighbors of Iran would respond to the perceived separatist threat posed by Kurdish and Balochi groups in view of a leaderless Tehran, but also underestimates the potential for blowback.”
What now?
The way forward from this precarious moment rests on whether diplomacy can be salvaged from the wreckage or the disintegration of multilateralism will be cemented as the new normal. For Europe, the stakes could not be higher. The EU, which once positioned itself as a diplomatic bridge between Washington and Tehran, now finds itself complicit through lack of action or reaction in the unraveling of the very international order it claims to uphold. And yet, it is precisely Europe, which does not share as fraught a history with Iran as the US and Israel, and which, would likely be the arrival destination of choice of millions of Iranians in a situation in which escalating conflict left them no option but to flee, that would be best placed, together with Gulf states, to push for a framework that prioritizes regional de-escalation, recommits to non-proliferation, and begins to rebuild the credibility of international law.
This, however, requires more than rhetorical support, which the EU is rarely even able to provide on divisive issues given the divergence in tone and word choice among the 27. In order to work towards ensuring this potentially only 12-day stunt which effectively ridiculed international law, the idea of which was already stripped of any substance by events in Gaza, does not in fact consolidate Tehran’s view that the development of nuclear weapons is, in fact, its only security guarantee, the actors involved must offer Iran a verifiable, realistic agreement backed by regional security guarantees and economic incentives. In recent months the most viable option that emerged to this end has been one involving Iran pursuing enrichment through facilities managed by a regional consortium.
Europe must reassert its diplomatic agency by quickly convening high-level talks with Iran and coordinating more closely with Gulf partners and Turkey – anchoring efforts in a pragmatic, regionally attuned strategy. Whether multilateralism lies in ashes or is reborn as a phoenix depends not just on the architecture of future talks, but on the willingness of global actors to assert an alternative path. Failure to do so risks not only the entrenchment of another endless conflict in the Middle East, but also dangerous consequences for other theaters, including in Ukraine.
