About 70 kilometers from the city of Chernihiv, Ukraine, you can reach the Belarusian border. I was on that border in June, in the days of a recent verbal escalation between Kyiv and Minsk over hidden relay stations suspected of providing attack drone support to Moscow.
The last few dozen kilometers on the Ukrainian side are a succession of checkpoints, usually protected by anti-drone nets. The area is heavily controlled by the Ukrainian State Border Guard Service. Anti-tank barriers, barbed wire, excavators digging new trenches: Everything is being optimized more and more every day.
In February 2022, Belarus worked as a launching pad for the Russian invasion of northern Ukraine. It was also through Belarus that the Russian army tried to take Kyiv. If there ever is a next time, the Ukrainian army will not be caught by surprise.
Last July, independent monitors estimated the Russian military presence on Belarusian territory at only some 2,200 troops — a fraction of the tens of thousands massed there on the eve of the 2022 invasion, but a footprint that could be swiftly scaled up again at Moscow’s choosing. In late August, moreover, Kyiv said it had verified intelligence that Russian commanders have been tasked by the Kremlin with planning new ground offensives against Kyiv and Chernihiv — though with no sign, so far, of troops massing to carry them out.
Belarus and Alyaksandr Lukashenka never entered into a war against Ukraine, but it cannot be said that they are at full peace. Since 2022, the behavior of Lukashenka’s regime toward Ukraine has served as a barometer of the war’s progress and of diplomatic maneuvers in the region. When Ukraine shows greater energy and vigor in its defense and counterattacks against Moscow, Minsk seems to become more accommodating toward Kyiv. When Ukraine is more under pressure, Minsk tries once again to flex its (not so strong) muscles. This dynamic, however, is determined not only by the course of the conflict but also by how these developments lead Moscow to pressure Lukashenka to take action against Ukraine. In response to such demands, Lukashenka, at the very least, raises the tone of his rhetoric against Kyiv.
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On the Ukrainian side, one response is to raise the costs of Lukashenka’s vassalage to Moscow, through retaliatory measures, legal proceedings and isolation. Through its demonstrations of resilience in recent years, Ukraine is establishing itself as a key player in regional security and is thus seizing the opportunity to make it clear to its partners that they should not restore Minsk’s standing without first consulting Kyiv.
A conflict considered improbable, but possible at any time
In mid-June 2026, Kyiv accused Minsk of hosting relay stations on its southern border regions, enhancing the maneuverability of drones launched by Russia against Ukraine. In the Chernihiv border area, for example, it is clear how Russian attack drones exploit the very border lines between Ukraine and Belarus, which are often formed by tributaries of the Dnipro River. Drones are, in fact, harder to shoot down over water. Following an ultimatum from President Volodymyr Zelensky to shut down the relay stations, reinforced by the threat of direct Ukrainian action against them, activity at the stations ceased within a few days, but resumed later for at least one of them (according to the Ukrainian military command). Media reports have not ruled out the possibility of deliberate sabotage of the relay stations by Ukrainian forces. The situation of the relays remains fluid and unstable: as recently as mid-September, Kyiv’s border guard stated that Russian drone strikes on western Ukraine had again been partly supported by relays in Belarus.
A direct conflict between Ukraine and Belarus is currently to be considered unlikely. However, forced to learn under fire, the Ukrainian army has made a reactive leap on drones and counter-drone warfare, adapting week by week to a threat that changes as fast as the response. Belarus, by contrast, does not have the strength to engage the Ukrainian army. Its standing force of some 45,000–48,000 is poorly prepared for modern, high-intensity war.
In recent months, however, Lukashenka has staged a number of military maneuvers along the border with Ukraine. In late July, he ordered his special operations units to spread out along the border, and Minsk is forming a new 37th Separate Airborne Assault Brigade near Gomel, directly across from Chernihiv. On August 7th, an air defense drill followed in the Brest region. In mid-September, Lukashenka ordered a sweeping inspection of the entire army, down to its mobilization readiness, to be tested, in his words, under conditions as close as possible to real combat. While these may merely be for show and still do not pose an imminent threat of attack, Minsk seems oriented toward continuing to operate as a hybrid actor, not only against Ukraine but also against Poland and Lithuania — for example, by weaponizing migration.
A dictator with strongly limited sovereignty
Why does Lukashenka still oscillate between conciliatory and hostile public messages toward Kyiv? The answer is simple: Moscow forces him to push the latter. In a sense, Lukashenka cannot really be called a dictator: His sovereignty is strongly limited by the Kremlin, which makes him more of a sub-dictator. The current Russian Ambassador in Minsk, Boris Gryzlov, is a hardcore supporter of Vladimir Putin’s system, placed there to remind Lukashenka of his dependence at every turn.
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Belarus indeed relies on Russia for more than 80% of its energy. Russian capital accounts for the largest share of foreign direct investment, and Moscow is effectively its main source of outside financing. Following Western sanctions — imposed first for Lukashenka’s violent crackdown on domestic dissent in 2020, then tightened for Belarus’s role in the invasion of Ukraine — most of its foreign trade now passes through Russia. Potash, Belarus’s main export, is also being rerouted through Russian ports. On June 26th, Lukashenka was summoned — almost as if to report for duty — by Putin (an unannounced meeting, the plane flew over Tver with its transponder turned off). To reaffirm a certain degree of independence, Lukashenka then made a high-profile trip to Beijing to meet with Xi Jinping on June 29th. Geopolitics, however, is a matter of territory: Beijing does not offer Lukashenka an alternative, only diplomatic leeway that cannot replace his material dependence on Moscow.
Kyiv’s friendship with the alternative Belarus
Lukashenka’s diplomatic displays, meant to demonstrate a certain geopolitical independence before Moscow, are also deeply linked to his own internal politics. It is precisely the Russian invasion of Ukraine that the Belarusian government has difficulty handling internally. Support among Belarusians for sending troops into the war was already under 10% in 2024. Meanwhile, the existence of an entirely Belarusian regiment in the Ukrainian army — the Kastuś Kalinoŭski Regiment — shows how deeply the political destinies of the two countries can be interconnected. Kyiv and the Ukrainian government have shown strong support for the Belarusian opposition: In May 2026, Kyiv welcomed Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the exiled Belarusian opposition leader, for the first time in Ukraine. Kyiv also appointed an Ambassador-at-large, Yaroslav Chornohor, to handle relations with the Belarusian opposition — a further step in treating Tsikhanouskaya’s camp as a legitimate interlocutor.
The closeness between Ukraine and Belarus is rooted in a long history that begins with their common origins in Kyivan Rus’, continues through centuries spent together in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and unfolds historically in the shadow of Moscow’s long reach into both nations, from the tsarist empire to the Soviet Union. Unlike the Russians — whom most Ukrainians today consider complicit with Putin and his army — Ukraine is clearly betting on a Belarusian society beyond Lukashenka, ready to collaborate deeply with Kyiv in redefining the region’s equilibrium
Ukraine as an empowered regional actor
The Ukraine of today is much stronger than the one Lukashenka helped to invade in 2022. Whatever the Belarusian President’s bet was, it failed. Not only did Ukraine resist the invasion, contrary to many predictions, it is now considered an empowered regional actor. No matter how the war comes to a temporary halt, with frozen front lines, Ukraine has made an evolutionary leap — even if, currently short of Patriot interceptors, its skies stay exposed to Russian ballistic missiles.
The very idea of a nonexistent Ukrainian nation, pushed by the Russian narrative, has been obliterated by Ukraine’s self-assertion during the war. This also makes Ukraine keen to have a say in its own region vis-à-vis Belarus — all the more so because some Western capitals may already be recalibrating their approach to Minsk. It is true that the same sanctions punishing Minsk are pushing the country even deeper into Moscow’s hold. And the fact that Lukashenka had to look for alternatives in China is quite telling.
This is precisely the dilemma driving the Western debate. Under Donald Trump, the United States initiated a form of rapprochement through envoy John Coale (back in Minsk in mid-September for a new round of talks) and a series of prisoners-for-sanctions exchanges, with the removal of sanctions on potash, banks and the flag carrier Belavia. The issue that fuels Kyiv’s fears is the transatlantic rift: The US is easing sanctions, while the EU is maintaining them (extended through late February 2027). In May 2026, even France broke a four-year silence, with a phone call from Emmanuel Macron to Lukashenka.
Kyiv sees two unacceptable trends in all this. First, the rehabilitation of a regime that is still a co-belligerent in its eyes, which could subsequently facilitate Russia’s rehabilitation as well. Second, a dialogue that fails to take into account the role Kyiv is establishing and intends to play in its own region, where Belarus’s future cannot be discussed without considering Ukraine’s security needs.
Ukraine continues to need decisive help from Europe and the US in its war against Russia, but these past few years have shifted Kyiv’s geopolitical weight, and Belarus is where that shift may show most clearly.