The war between Russia and Ukraine and the multi-front crisis in the Middle East have both attracted sustained attention from the international community in recent years. Yet, these two crises cannot be viewed as entirely separate developments, given the significant implications of the complex web of relations among Israel, Russia and Ukraine on the outcome of both scenarios.
Russia-Israel relations
Russia-Israel relations have been shaped by pragmatic political calculation on both sides. This strategic choice was evident in the way Israel reacted to Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and has acted ever since. Benjamin Netanyahu’s government has issued statements of condemnation and provided Ukraine with humanitarian assistance. Still, it has refrained from supplying Kyiv with direct military aid (at least officially) and from joining the Western sanctions against Moscow.
This semi-neutral stance on the Russia-Ukraine conflict becomes more striking when Iran is factored into the geopolitical equation. On the one hand, Tehran and Moscow have been long-standing allies, and this mutually reinforcing relationship has not wavered despite both countries being engaged in costly military conflicts in recent months. In fact, in such tough times, their military and political cooperation has intensified. This became official with the signature of the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Agreement between the two countries on January 17, 2025 (entering into force on October 2, 2025). Besides substantial internal production, in recent years Russia has been Iran’s sole weapon supplier. Independent investigations have reported, for example, that a secret €500 million arms deal was concluded for Iran to acquire advanced shoulder-fired missiles and that Russia has secretly helped Iran develop supersonic cruise missile technology. The relationship also flows in the other direction, with the Kremlin relying on Iranian arms to be able to keep its operations in Ukraine going. It is estimated that Tehran sent Moscow long-range one-way attack drones (model Shahed-136, whose technology Russia has begun to replicate and to produce domestically) and Fateh-360 ballistic missiles.
On the other hand, Iran is Israel’s archfoe, as the Israeli government sees it as the leader of the “Axis of Resistance”. In June 2025, the two countries engaged in a brief direct military conflict, the Twelve-Day War, at the end of which indirect confrontation resumed. Today, the Islamic Republic represents Israel’s (and the US’s) main regional adversary.
Despite Moscow’s close ties with Iran, Netanyahu’s government has continued to walk a tightrope, being very careful not to undermine its relations with the Kremlin. What makes such a relationship so vital for Israel?
Until the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria on December 8, 2024, the possibility of conducting military operations against pro-Iranian targets within the Syrian territory near the Israeli border was one of the main reasons behind Israel’s decision to maintain a good relationship with Russia, the regime’s long-standing patron, which controlled the airspace over Syria. Israel’s non-interference in the Russian campaign in Ukraine helped convince the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, not to hinder the Jewish State’s operations and expansion into Syria.
US, Turkey and recent schifts
Yet Assad’s fall did not render Russia irrelevant to Israel. Although Moscow’s military footprint in Syria was significantly reduced, it remained a potential counterweight to Turkey’s growing influence in the country. Indeed, the new de facto President of Syria, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his party, the Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, have enjoyed strong support from Turkey, which aims to expand its influence in the country. A more contested Syria, even with a weak Russia, is preferable to Israel than leaving it fully under Ankara’s control.
Furthermore, Turkey and Israel are not exactly on good terms. The Turkish President, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, has taken up the role of one of Israel’s major international opponents. Since mid-October 2023, he has denounced the blatant violation of international law in Gaza. The relationship between the two countries deteriorated further following the Israeli government’s unanimous decision to respond to Erdoğan’s repeated accusations of genocide by recognizing the Armenian genocide, a decision particularly sensitive to Ankara.
Secondly, President Donald Trump’s return to the White House altered US-Russia relations. The hostility that characterized the Biden presidency was replaced by a completely different approach: Trump has repeatedly warned of his intention to reduce support to Ukraine and to strengthen ties with the Kremlin. This détente has reduced the pressure on the Netanyahu administration to go beyond nominal support to Ukraine and has made its position towards Moscow more defensible. If Israel navigates this complex interplay of alliances effectively, it could gain additional diplomatic leverage over regional and international actors.
In addition, how the international community responds to Russia’s territorial acquisitions by force could have implications for the Middle East. The Ukrainian case could set a precedent: either de jure or de facto recognition of Russian expansion would lend more credibility to Israeli claims over occupied territories in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon and Syria.
On its part, Russia has not shied away from criticizing Israel’s behavior in the Middle East. The Kremlin has been more reluctant than other global powers to express its support to Israel, instead siding with the Palestinian people and with Iran. Delegations from both Hamas and the Houthis were received in Moscow after the outbreak of the war, amid rising criticism.
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However, relations with Israel were never fully severed, despite being scaled back. Like Netanyahu, Putin has played both sides. His objective has been to preserve Russia’s relevance in the Middle East without sacrificing its self-proclaimed identity as the major safeguard against Western colonialism or its economic, political and cultural ties with Israel. The two leaders not only need each other, but they can gain additional mutual benefits from maintaining a functioning relationship.
Ukraine-Israel relations
The pragmatic relationship between Russia and Israel also inevitably affects the latter’s relations with Ukraine. Since February 2022, foreign military, economic, and political aid has been crucial in enabling Ukraine to resist Russian advances and prevent the seizure of territory. In such desperate circumstances, Israel’s refusal to provide direct military assistance to Ukraine’s war effort has had significant consequences for Ukraine and its allies, which have had to bear the burden without Israel’s help.
For over four years, the Ukrainian President, Volodymyr Zelensky, has sought to secure the support of as many members of the international community as possible. He has made several appeals to Israeli authorities for military aid, but they ended up being all in vain, due to the latter’s strategic decision to avoid antagonizing Moscow. This became clear already in October 2022, when, after Russia publicly warned Israel against its supposed abandonment of the non-interventionist approach amid rumors that this was happening, the government of the Jewish State felt the need to reaffirm that it would continue to refrain from providing Kyiv with further assistance.
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Zelensky’s attempts to convince Israel have focused on various points. First, he has tried to leverage the deep historical and cultural ties between the two countries. Although available estimates vary, Israel has a sizeable population of people of Ukrainian origin, which has increased since the start of the Russian invasion. In addition, it is estimated that 30,600 Jews live in Ukraine (in 2025; this number was much higher before the Russian invasion, which prompted many to move to Israel). The country has also historically been home to one of the world’s largest Jewish communities. However, Russia can claim similarly deep ties.
Secondly, he has often likened what Israel and Ukraine have suffered. For example, in the immediate aftermath of shocking events of October 7th, the President of Ukraine expressed his support to Israel, suggesting similarity between the experiences of the two countries. He called Russia “a terrorist state” and Hamas a “terrorist organization”.
Zelensky has also tried to reduce the distance with Israel by building on the common Iranian enemy. Following his logic, defeating Iran is a key objective for both countries as Tehran has supported anti-Israeli proxies in the Middle East and it has supplied Russia with drones and missiles. Therefore, it would be strategically beneficial to work together against the Iranian regime. However, until now Israel has appeared to regard its relationship with Moscow as more valuable than building a stronger military alliance with Kyiv against Iran: a very pragmatic decision that Ukrainians have struggled to accept fully.
The relative power Israel could provide Kyiv with is far from irrelevant, given its highly developed military capabilities. Specifically, many people, including Ukrainian officials, believe that Israel’s most useful contribution could be defensive weapons. Israel has a multi-layered air defense network, comprising different interrelated systems. Parts of this defense architecture have been sold to other countries. Despite the wave of condemnation that was directed at Netanyahu’s government, its technologies have continued to attract international demand (actually, the ongoing war has become a possibility for Israel to show the full potential of its system, which has performed exceptionally well against all the attacks directed at its territory since October 2023, to the world). The most recent buyer was Greece, which, in August 2026, reached a $3.5 billion defense deal with Israel to acquire a multi-layered air defense array. However, to date, Ukraine’s requests since the Russian invasion appear to have been rejected.
Nevertheless, reportedly some Israeli-held defensive missiles have been operating in Ukraine. Israeli officials clarified that these were outdated American systems that were returned to the US after it had decided to decommission them. The US then refurbished the missiles and sent them to Ukraine. Israel thus stressed that this did not constitute a direct Israeli transfer of military assistance to Kyiv.
Developments and constraints
The triangle with the US is extremely relevant, as, albeit in different manners, both Ukraine and Israel are heavily dependent on US aid. Recently, it was reported that Washington’s missile stocks are under stress due to the country’s long-standing involvement in multiple conflicts around the globe. The US government will soon have to address this shortage and cut its support to some of its allies. This could spark a competition between Ukraine and Israel over the remaining US weapons. However, a substantial reduction in military assistance for Israel appears unlikely under the Trump administration. In this scenario, Zelensky has even stronger motivation to keep pushing for direct help from Israel.
Israel continues to walk a fine line between Russia and Ukraine, as it does not want to jeopardize its relationship with Moscow while, at the same time, avoiding overtly supporting Putin’s military campaign. Nevertheless, the situation remains volatile: Even a slight change in the international balance of alliances or in domestic politics (for example, the upcoming legislative elections in Israel) could force any of these actors to reconsider their strategies, potentially reshaping the triangle entirely.