The Israeli-Palestinian conflict has been sidelined in the run-up to the upcoming Israeli elections. Few parties have bothered to address the issue in their campaigns, as it is unlikely to win them votes. In fact, it has been dismissed as a minor military issue compared to more pressing concerns, such as the potential renewal of airstrikes on Iran, the resumption of hostilities in Lebanon, and the long-term, growing rivalry between Israel, Turkey, and Syria. However, when Israeli parties do address the issue, they tend to present different arguments for the West Bank and Gaza, depicting the two territories as independent entities facing distinct scenarios – as if their destinies were not linked and directed toward long-term reunification. From an Israeli perspective, the Palestinian issue has morphed from a political matter into a “security” concern entrusted to IDF commanders and the political echelon, despite ongoing electoral disputes over who will occupy these positions in the years to come.
On the Palestinian side, the fact that the President of the Palestinian National Authority recently postponed elections to September 2027, following a 20-year political vacuum, does little to break the deadlock. Instead, it feeds the claims of opponents who argue that the Palestinians lack unified representation and are neither democratic nor willing to reform their own governing institutions.
Consequently, while EU institutions and member states largely signal their commitment to the Trump-led Board of Gaza as the most viable plan to date – with notable exceptions – they are simultaneously reinforcing their commitment to a two-state solution that will lead to the establishment of a Palestinian state. The reality, however, is that Gaza and the West Bank are not on a trajectory to become part of any state anytime soon. The fact that no European chancelleries are pressuring either Israel or the Gaza Board regarding reconstruction already indicates a degree of skepticism about the ability to turn diplomatic statements into facts on the ground without Israel’s approval. This is also why the activities of the Gaza Board have been put on hold until the next Israeli election produces a clear winner – a process that could take many months. If no majority is attainable, the initial 28-day mandate given to an appointed prime minister could easily lead to a second mandate of the same length, followed by a third round of attempts by the Knesset to choose a leader within its majority. In a highly divided and polarized society like Israel’s, this time-consuming process could easily drag on until January 2027. However, this assumes that a “creative” majority can be achieved, which is not reflected in current electoral projections. Otherwise, a new round of elections will be inevitable.
The outcome of the post-October 7 elections will help clear up misunderstandings with the international community: the two-state solution and the Oslo Accords’ approach (1993 and 1995) are dead and buried. What may replace them is either a continuation of the “status quo plus” (building facts on the ground) or what Israelis term the fulfillment of a “decisive plan,” which hinges on the annexation of Judea and Samaria, the dismantlement of the PA, and, in its more extreme versions, the forced remigration of Palestinians from Gaza toward Egypt, Jordan, and any other compliant country.
In any scenario, the West Bank and Gaza will follow divergent paths and remain isolated from one another. This is a core feature of all plans for Palestine: to sever ties by imposing different living conditions and political statuses on various groups, making physical contact impossible and ultimately fracturing political identities. The common aim is to break Palestinian collective solidarity, even though Israeli politicians disagree on the most effective means to achieve it.
Let us begin by reviewing the most prominent plans for the West Bank. In July 2025, the Israeli Knesset approved a proposal to annex the West Bank by a wide margin (71–13), with several opposition factions also voting in favor. While Yesh Atid and Blue and White walked out of the vote at the time, while Ha-Demokratim and the Arab parties (Ra’am and the Joint List) voted against the resolution, the projected composition of the new Knesset suggests a very different scenario this time. The Blue and White party has dropped out of the race, and Yesh Atid has merged with Naftali Bennett’s faction into the Beyachad party, shifting it to the right and publicly dropping its opposition to the settlement enterprise by taking him on board. Among the Zionist parties that make up the vast majority of the Knesset, only Ha-Demokratim opposes annexation. This makes annexation a likely priority for the new government, given its widespread support (97 seats).
Plausible scenarios therefore include creeping apartheid – achieved through the partial annexation of major Israeli settlements close to the West Bank (comprising 4–10% of the territory), an option favored by centrist parties – or outright apartheid, achieved through the annexation of the entire 60% of the West Bank formerly designated as Area C, supported by a broad bipartisan spectrum of political forces from both the current government (Likud, Otzma Yehudit, and Tziyonut Datit) and the opposition (Yisrael Beytenu, Beyachad, and Yashar). Conversely, government and opposition parties address the issue of settler violence differently: the former play it down, portraying it as a marginal phenomenon involving a few wayward youths from broken homes, while the latter – particularly the leading party Yashar under the leadership of former General Gadi Eisenkot – highlight it as a law-and-order issue, calling for the full re-establishment of state authority within Israeli-administered territories.
As for Gaza, while all Israeli parties agree that the Trump 20-point plan is currently unfeasible, they differ in their approaches to it. The opposition parties, primarily Yashar and Beyachad, want Israel to rejoin the Gaza Board to influence its decisions and demonstrate a more cooperative attitude toward the US, thereby mending their ties in the Special Relationship. However, Beyachad and Yisrael Beytenu remain dissatisfied with the security architecture designed by the Board of Peace. They emphasize that changes are required because the International Verification Committee, responsible for decommissioning Hamas’s weapons, cannot defer to Qatar and Turkey as trustee parties. Moreover, renewed cooperation and Israeli involvement within the Peace Board would be positive developments, but they would not rule out a new war against Hamas. Indeed, Gadi Eisenkot recently announced his intention to resume a full-scale war in the so-called “Red Zone” – the 38% of the Strip still under Hamas control – to eliminate the threat and achieve what Netanyahu apparently failed to do.
The real bone of contention, and the factor effectively preventing Trump’s 20-point peace plan from getting off the ground, is that Israel will never withdraw the IDF before Hamas is fully demilitarized, either by choice or by force, as part of their new pre-emptive war strategy. Consequently, experts at the Israeli Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), who are considered close to the opposition, have drafted an alternative plan. Through thorough studies, they have demonstrated how some of the Board of Peace’s demands can be reconciled with key Israeli strategic interests, proposing a differentiation track that divides the Strip into red, orange, and green zones. This effectively supports the long-standing division of the Strip into three autonomous areas. The “Red Zone,” or Hamas-controlled area, will be “Gaza at war,” where the IDF retains the right to intervene militarily in the event of threats. The Green Zone – the area already conquered by the IDF and comprising the largest part of the territory – will remain under Israeli control as a bargaining chip for future negotiations until a comprehensive agreement is reached. Finally, the Orange Zone will become a human laboratory in which only those Gazans who reject their alliance with Hamas, embrace Zionism, and undergo deradicalization will be permitted to settle. This group will be led by the Executive Board of the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (i.e., the Peace Board’s subcommittees) rather than the PNA, making reunification with the rest of the Palestinian nation highly unlikely.
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In summary, the two scenarios for Gaza are either the continuation of the “status quo plus” – featuring the resumption of settlement construction in the Green Zone, often referred to as “the return to Gush Katif” (the rebuilding of settlements evacuated in 2005 by Ariel Sharon’s Kadima) – or the acceptance of a revised Board of Peace plan that grants the IDF full maneuvering capacity as an “overriding security force,” occasionally coordinating with International Security Forces (ISF).
In any case, the legacy of October 7 will be that Hamas, alongside the most right-wing government in Israeli history, succeeded in their shared aim of dismantling what Einat Wilf, an ideologue of the Israeli Right, defines as the ideology of “Palestinianism.” This is the logic whereby Palestinians are considered indigenous to the land, entitled to their fair share of it, and thus justified in claiming a right of return for those who fled or were expelled in previous wars. As a representative of a disillusioned Israeli labor left that no longer exists in large numbers, she acknowledges that Palestinians are currently suffering, yet believes they are doing so for a greater good: defeating Zionism and driving Jews out of the region. This is why the legacy of the Six-Day War (1967) – occupying land in exchange for future negotiations – cannot be reversed by any Israeli government until the Arab world accepts that the Israeli state is here to stay. Naturally, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) is viewed as the primary enemy. Blamed for perpetuating the status of Palestinian refugees for over 70 years, it now faces an exceptional financial crisis that threatens to collapse its entire humanitarian operation due to cuts in US and Western funding.
In the absence of substantial international pressure and under the best-case scenario, the future of the Palestinians lies with the PELS (Palestinian Entity with Limited Sovereignty), regardless of which government emerges from the October 27 elections. If the opposition wins and Yashar leads it, cooperation and funding for the PA will eventually be restored, as the goal will be to reduce international pressure on Israel and constructively enlist moderate Arab states in the reconstruction process. Under this path, the Palestinian National Authority would retain a role; otherwise, it would be dismantled and replaced by local councils or administrations similar to those of the pre-Oslo occupation period (1967–1994). Legislation that officially endorsed widespread support for the settlement enterprise – such as the “Property Law Revamp” (a series of sweeping measures repealing Jordanian-era restrictions on land ownership, making it much easier for Israeli citizens to purchase land directly in the West Bank) and the state land expansion policy (whereby extensive tracts of the West Bank have been registered as state property and civilian law enforcement transferred to the Israeli police) – will likely remain in place under the next government.
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Yet, despite the limited range of positive alternatives available to Palestinian citizens at the Israeli ballot box, removing the current Netanyahu government remains fundamental, as any scenario involving the current coalition would lead to a much more dramatic outcome, much faster, and in a far cruder manner than any other option. While it would not significantly impact the likelihood of a Palestinian state emerging, a more rational and less messianic government could improve the humanitarian conditions of the 2,500 critically ill Gazan children and 43,000 adults with life-changing injuries – individuals for whom, at the current rate of approval for evacuation permits, it would take seven years to process. In short, voting for the opposition could at least alleviate the dire conditions faced by Gazans by fostering greater international cooperation on humanitarian aid.
Nevertheless, October 7, 2023, will be remembered as the worst catastrophe in modern Palestinian history: a true second Nakba. The era in which the Palestinian question hinged on core issues like self-determination, full sovereignty, and territorial control has come to an end. However, the collective existence of the Palestinian people remains fundamentally political, and no Israeli government, regardless of its political stripe, is willing to address this challenge. In fact, it is doubtful the PA itself will do so.
Brave Palestinians must therefore rise to the challenge of critically reflecting on how to continue resistance in this new geopolitical context – where armed conflict is no longer viable, but alternative avenues for combating apartheid remain open, such as the fight for equal citizenship within a democratic, one-state system.