Europe’s Russian Dilemma: clash or cooperation?
The last few weeks were marked by intense diplomatic activity, highlighted by the first Peace Summit on Ukraine being held in the Swiss city of Lucerne on June 15-16, and Russia outlining the conditions that must be met for Moscow to initiate peace negotiations with Ukraine just a day prior. Yet there was little hope, if any, that these efforts would be followed by a peace treaty, the commencement of substantive peace talks or even a ceasefire of some sort.
A peace with few options
In response to Mr. Putin’s proposition, Italian Prime Minister Meloni stated: “It doesn’t seem particularly effective to me as a negotiation proposal to tell Ukraine that it must withdraw from Ukraine.” Indeed, President Putin has unequivocally dismissed any prospects of a peace process that meets Ukraine’s conditions regarding territorial aspects. The four Ukrainian regions he demands Ukraine relinquish remain under only partial Russian occupation, following Russia’s contentious annexation claims in 2022.
China, while claiming neutrality in the crisis, opted out of the Lucerne conference due to its failure to satisfy Beijing’s requirements, which included the involvement of Russia – who was not even invited. While refraining from openly criticizing the Swiss summit, Beijing has informed developing countries that the summit will result in the continuation of the conflict.
However, the Ukrainian-Russian War did not start in 2022, and the Ukrainian people have already been enduring the realities of armed conflict for a decade. As declared by European Commission chief Ursula von der Leyen, “freezing the conflict today with foreign troops occupying Ukrainian land is not an answer. It is a recipe for future wars of aggression.” With the same terminology, but a totally different view on the ways to resolve the conflict, President Putin asserted that Russia seeks not a mere ceasefire, but the full resolution of the conflict in Ukraine: “We are not talking about freezing the conflict, but about its final end.”
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In this evolving new world order, where Russia’s war against Ukraine represents a broader confrontation against the West, the European Union’s stance towards Russia must be strategically calculated. Given the recent shifts in the continental security setup driven by the Russian leadership, should the future relationship between the EU and Russia be one of direct conflict or cautious collaboration – at least leaving open the possibility of future re-engagement?
Russia has always been European… until now?
In contrast to the prevailing trend, modern Russian leadership has consistently identified itself as European. Starting in the seventeenth century, Russia made concerted efforts to align with European culture and values, integrating into the European state structure. Peter the Great was determined to modernize Russia and transform it into a formidable naval power. His distinctly European vision materialized in 1703 with the establishment of a new capital on the shores of the Baltic Sea – Saint Petersburg.
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This European orientation persisted even in the twentieth century, under the contradictory identity of the Soviet Union. Although Soviet communism was strongly opposed by postwar Western Europe and the United States, it was actually a product of Western influence molded by the ideas of Karl Marx. Soviet leaders, dreaming of a global communist revolution, held Germany in special regard and assessed their own modernization efforts by Western standards. One intriguing outcome of life in the Soviet Union was the development of a strong attraction to the Western world. This fascination persisted despite the severe restrictions on travel outside the country, which paradoxically intensified the allure of Western culture and ideals among the population.
In the early 2000s, Putin projected a vision of the Russian Federation firmly headed towards democratization, actively cultivating closer ties with the West. Even with the initiation of the second invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian President did not aim for a persistent rupture with the West. In its quest to overcome the label of “regional power”, the Kremlin forced its hand hoping for a swift military operation, reminiscent of the 2008 Georgian invasion. Russia embarked on this path with the initial hope of leveraging military action to prompt negotiations and secure a favourable agreement with the West – with whom relations were then generally friendly – thereby enhancing its global stature.
These aspirations were dashed by the resolute resistance of Ukraine and the unexpected widespread Western support for Kyiv’s sovereignty. Unable to find common ground with the West or resolve the Ukrainian crisis, Putin pivoted to make anti-Westernism a cornerstone of his domestic policy. Portraying the West as a source of moral decay – a narrative that could be welcomed in many parts of the so-called “Global South” – the Russian leadership accused Western governments of ruthlessly pursuing a strategic defeat of the Russian Federation.
The Kremlin’s Orwellian echo
The current Russian public media landscape is dominated by aggressive attitudes, apocalyptic images and pervasive hate speech reminding the dystopic society portrayed in Orwell’s 1984, all the while promoting animosity against Western societies. Describing the experience of listening to today’s Russian public debates as painful would be an understatement. They echo themes reminiscent of Nazi propaganda by appealing to primal basic needs and pleasures, offering a sense of belonging and superiority, and dehumanizing others to the point where violence becomes normalized. The speeches of today’s Russian leaders reiterate themes of historic humiliation, effectively absolving responsibility while promoting a sense of dominance and superiority among its audience.
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During an interview led by Russia’s foremost propagandist Vladimir Soloviev, Sergei Karaganov, a prominent hawkish expert on Russian foreign policy, declared: “Europe is the source of all human misfortunes.” He continued, “Thank God we have outgrown our idiotic, in my opinion, views of countries that the West disliked. For many years, I was amazed why we participated in sanctions against Iran and North Korea, but that was a remnant of our sense of inferiority, a desire to be like them, which stemmed from the 60s, 70s, and 80s. Now the situation is different.” One might easily argue, however, that the values embodied by the North Korean and Iranian regimes will hardly resonate with the Russian population, which since the 1990s has experienced a taste of freedom and emancipation.
Indeed, Russia suffers from an inferiority complex which, as psychology teaches, often manifests as a forced attitude of superiority towards others. Articles discussing the neobuchaemost’ or a perceived learning difficulty of the Western leadership to learn from history illustrate the image of Russian mental superiority and strength that the establishment seeks to propagate. However, it appears that the Russian leadership itself (at least publicly) has neglected a crucial lesson from history: while hard power can secure immediate victories, it is soft power that ultimately wins the war. The Russian Empire and later the USSR managed to annex European territories such as Moldova and the Baltic states, but these regions consistently challenged their dominance and now serve as prominent advocates for resistance against Russia in the West.
But the Russian propaganda was never intended to be based on real facts, rather, it aimed to build a population disinterested in truth and sceptical of its value. One year ago, I wrote in this magazine that the Russian people face a significant conundrum: “They are willing to endure the sacrifices associated with the prospect of a prolonged conflict, even if not necessarily ideologically supportive of it.” One year after publishing that article, it appears that the population is indeed backing the war. However, this support is not driven by ideological conviction but rather by the pervasive influence of propaganda, backed by an ongoing attempt to promote a Russian identitarian shift.
EU’s geopolitical challenges in balancing Russia’s cultural shifts
Despite facing sanctions, the Kremlin remains resolute in its military engagement and Russia’s military industry is planning to grow through integration with non-Western economies. However, the key obstacle to Putin’s agenda of distancing Russia from the West lies not only in economic or military realms, which are significant challenges in themselves, but also in deeply ingrained cultural factors.
For over three centuries, Russia’s deep integration and emulation of Western culture have been fundamental to its societal and intellectual evolution. A modern Russia that turns its back on the West risks abandoning a crucial aspect of its historical and cultural identity, reshaping Russia into an entity disconnected from its historical roots. This trajectory not only alienates Russia from Europe but also places it in a subordinate relationship with other global powers, notably China.
The “limitless friendship” with China stemmed from a position of weakness, not a profound desire to align closely with the People’s Republic. It was the result of a perceived zugzwang position that Russia found itself in, constrained to move despite every available option could only worsen its situation. The lingering inferiority complex mentioned by Karaganov has not vanished; instead, it has compelled Russia to align itself with the global antagonistic forces, where it may ultimately face harsh lessons from the powers driving anti-Western contestation in the international political arena.
In this context, the Western leaders are now confronted with a dual challenge: they need to counteract Russia’s geopolitical intentions in Ukraine while also laying the foundation for a more cooperative and less confrontational relationship with Russia in an increasingly polycentric world.
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To achieve this, unity among Western nations in supporting Ukraine is crucial and extends beyond military efforts. Ukraine needs to evolve into a strong, democratic, and prosperous nation integrated with the West. This long-term goal is necessary for Russia to accept its present borders.
Second, the EU must start acting as a global geopolitical superpower by developing a unified and coordinated strategy while bolstering its military build-up and deterrence capabilities. The strongman figure haunting the Russian population also pervades its leadership and, as history teaches, Russian expansion halts when faced with strong-willed and action-oriented governments.
Third, Western policymakers need to help the Kremlin in shifting its perspective on the Ukrainian conflict from a zero-sum game to a variable-sum game, where participants’ gains are not fixed, and one party’s success does not necessarily imply the other’s loss. If the time is right, the Western leadership could craft a set of alternative proposals for peace talks aimed at supporting Russia’s soft power in cultural, political, and foreign policy realms. These proposals should be strategically designed to allow Russia to enhance its global standing in certain acceptable domains, thereby creating room for concessions in other contentious areas. Such an approach aims to find a pathway to end the war without compromising Ukraine’s sovereignty, ultimately benefiting the entire continent and acknowledging Russia’s longstanding aspiration to be recognized as a global power integrated into the Western community—a desire that has been a driving force behind Russia’s initiation of conflicts and wars.
Europe’s new Russia strategy
Pushkin’s heirs are a proud people, strongly connected with their Russian identity. Rather than a problem, this represents a significant opportunity in today’s context. The Kremlin’s decision to emphasize anti-Westernism as a cornerstone of its domestic policy contrasts sharply with public sentiment. Despite the pervasive propaganda that the population is subject to, the prospect of establishing a distinct Asian nation is still in its early stages and, if viable at all, would require a long time before getting crystalized in the population’s minds and souls. Instead of a shift towards the East, what Russia needs is to embrace a national narrative rooted in a clear identity within sovereign borders, devoid of imperialistic undertones.
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In this context, there is a pressing need for Europe to build a new long-term Russia strategy that acknowledges Western missteps since the conflict’s onset, such as delayed military aid to Ukraine providing crucial preparation time for Russia, and the lack of a clear plan for the conflict. Moving forward, this strategy should articulate a comprehensive framework aimed at motivating Russia to prioritize the cultivation of a robust national identity and the enhancement of its soft power, rather than pursuing additional territorial expansion.
This, coupled with the development of strategic autonomy, the strengthening of its military capabilities, and the enhancement of its economic security, will allow Europe to assert its role as a powerful geopolitical entity while firmly upholding its core principles. Such an approach is essential for attaining lasting peace in Eastern Europe and across the continent.
