On April 12, 2026, Hungary will go to the polls for parliamentary elections that could bring an end to the undisputed leadership of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán. Orbán’s tenure has lasted nearly 16 years and has been marked by four consecutive terms. The electoral campaign has been shaping up as a direct contest between Orbán, with his Fidesz party, and Péter Magyar, a former member of the same party who has led the Tisza party since 2024.
Over these many years in government, Orbán has become a symbol of the populist, conservative and euroskeptic right within the EU – the country is a full member since 2004, but not of the eurozone. The concentration of power in his hands has taken place gradually and in a complex manner, particularly through constitutional changes that have affected several areas: from the independence of the judiciary and the media to the restriction of minority and migrant rights in the name of the defense of so-called Christian and European values. This has made Orbán a key reference point for the right at both the European and global levels, from Donald Trump’s America to Vladimir Putin’s Russia. In this sense, the 2026 elections represent not only a crucial moment for Hungarian domestic politics but could also mark a turning point for the evolution of the radical right on a global scale.
The domestic scenario and the weakening of the Orbán system
In this context, the Hungarian elections and their outcome can be analyzed on two levels: an internal one, concerning developments in Hungarian domestic politics, and an external one, related to the country’s foreign policy and its relations with the European Union. At the domestic level, in 2024 Hungary was shaken by large protests that led to the resignation of the Hungarian President Katalin Novák, after she granted a pardon to around 25 people, including the Deputy Director of the Bicske orphanage, which had been involved in a scandal concerning sexual abuse of minors.
The scandal also struck at the ideological apparatus of the Fidesz party. In 2020, the party had once again amended the Hungarian Constitution, specifying that the family is composed of a mother and a father. In practice, the law prevented adoption by same-sex couples and was presented as a measure aimed at protecting children, as argued by the then Minister of Justice, Judit Varga. Varga herself later resigned following the scandal, but her figure remains important for understanding the Hungarian political context. In addition to being considered a staunch supporter of Orbán, Varga is also the former wife of Orbán’s main political challenger, Péter Magyar.
Indeed, this moment marked the beginning of Magyar’s rise, which started with a series of revelations. Through an audio recording that he later released, a corruption case was revealed that allegedly involved high-ranking figures close to Orbán and his party, including Pál Völner, the former State Secretary for Justice. These revelations led to widespread public outrage and various public protests, with tens of thousands of Hungarians taking to the streets. This movement, catalyzed and led by Magyar, was directed against Viktor Orbán’s government. Magyar was uniquely positioned to bring forward such revelations precisely because he had been part of the ‘Orbán system’ for years, deeply embedded within the government’s political sphere. His political narrative later developed around the idea that defending the Hungarian nation should go hand in hand with the anti-corruption and ‘anti-politics’ rhetoric directed against an elite perceived as generally corrupt.
The Hungarian election in the international context
Another fundamental level of analysis for the Hungarian elections is that of foreign policy and the future of Hungary within the European Union. The Hungarian elections, in fact, are receiving significant attention, first and foremost from the country’s EU partners, but also from Russia and the United States, both of which see in Viktor Orbán a solid ally within the Union.
Orbán has presented himself as one of the European leaders most opposed and hostile to the EU’s support for Ukraine following the Russian invasion. This position has led to a distancing of Hungary even from Poland and to a gradual rapprochement with Russia, not only on the political level but especially on the economic one. Hungary does not have particular cultural or religious ties with Russia, but under the leadership of Viktor Orbán a pragmatic alignment has developed, especially in the energy sector. Since the beginning of the invasion, imports of Russian crude oil by Hungary and Slovakia (another EU member, also in the eurozone) have generated around €5.4 billion in tax revenues for the Kremlin. Hungary has become increasingly dependent on Russian oil and gas: its reliance on Russian crude rose from 61% before the invasion to 86% in 2024.
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The war in Ukraine and the European Union’s position in supporting Kyiv are also instrumentalized on a symbolic and electoral level. During Orbán’s electoral campaign, the fear of a possible direct involvement of Hungary in the conflict has repeatedly been used. Indeed, the country has been exposed to forms of hybrid disinformation, often spread through channels close to the Fidesz party. According to an investigation by Balkan Insight, in recent months Orbán’s party has used AI-generated videos depicting dramatic war scenes, with the aim of instilling fear among the population and reinforcing an anti-European narrative, without highlighting Russia’s responsibilities and crimes during the conflict.
On the international level, Vladimir Putin is not Orbán’s only ally; Hungary also benefits from the support of a broad network formed by right-wing movements, ranging from the German Alternative for Germany (AfD) to Marine Le Pen’s National Rally party, including Italian PM Giorgia Meloni and some of her political partners in the Italian government, as well as the European political circles that follow the MAGA line of Donald Trump. The American President fully supports Orbán’s policies, viewing Hungary as a reliable partner, including in its defense of Benjamin Netanyahu. The Hungarian Prime Minister has indeed expressed clear dissent regarding the arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court against the Israeli leader.
Energy crisis and global wars in the electoral campaign
The Middle Eastern context, with the attack on Iran waged by the US and Israel, has had an impact on the political debate in Hungary already ahead of the elections. Viktor Orbán has attempted to shift the focus of the electoral campaign away from internal issues, such as corruption and the rule of law concerns raised by the opposition, toward questions of foreign policy and security. In particular, the Hungarian prime minister decided to raise the level of national security alert and to increase border controls, reframing the electoral debate around the issue of security, an area in which Fidesz traditionally presents itself as the strongest political force.
Alongside security, the issue of the energy crisis has also become central. The crisis affecting many countries of the European Union has pushed Orbán to call for a reduction of sanctions against Russia, arguing that those are now pointless and self-harming, after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. The issue of energy security has therefore become closely intertwined with that of national security, turning into a key element of the electoral campaign.
In this context, a suspected sabotage episode involving the TurkStream gas pipeline, which connects Russia to southeastern Europe through Serbia and supplies Hungary, has also emerged. Serbian authorities discovered near the city of Kanjiža two backpacks containing explosives and detonators only a few hundred meters from the pipeline. According to Serbian security services, there had been prior intelligence about a possible sabotage plan targeting the energy infrastructure. For Orbán, this recent event quickly became a tool within the electoral campaign, linking the issue of the energy crisis with that of national security ahead of the upcoming elections. For Magyar, this case represents a false flag and a provocation orchestrated to boost Fidesz in these final days of the electoral campaign.
This accusation is further reinforced by the close alliance between Orbán and Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who, among the various Western Balkan countries seeking EU membership, is one of those closest to Moscow’s orbit.
A possible change of course?
Since its accession in 2004, Hungary has posed a major challenge to Europe. Following its entry, the country initially embodied a process of both European Union integration and democratization. However, under Viktor Orbán’s government, this process has stalled, if not actually reversed, towards what many observers describe as a ‘hybrid’ regime. The Hungarian question arguably represents one of the greatest challenges for contemporary Europe: Not only do external pressures (such as Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin) exist, but also internal dynamics embodied by the rise of euroskeptic right-wing parties in several EU countries that are challenging the stability and cohesion of the European Union. In this context, Péter Magyar could represent a potential turning point, despite being, as previously noted, a former insider of the Orbán system. For Tisza, alignment with the European Union and NATO remains a cornerstone, though the party maintains several points of convergence with Fidesz as well, particularly regarding immigration and, partially, the Ukrainian issue.
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While Magyar’s positions are far from being considered pro-Russian, he opposes a fast-track accession process for Ukraine into the EU; however, unlike Orbán, he does not rule out its potential future membership. In an effort to distance himself from the government’s stance, Magyar has nevertheless maintained his opposition to sending weapons to Ukraine, attempting to strike a difficult balance between pro-European demands and the risk of being portrayed as ‘pro-war’ by government propaganda.
In the Hungarian system, the political confrontation also takes the form of a territorial and generational divide, in which Orbán finds a solid stronghold in the peripheries and rural areas, in contrast to large cities such as Budapest, which have traditionally been more supportive of the opposition. Not surprisingly, the capital has been subject to a process of gerrymandering: following the electoral reforms of 2011, which still constitute the institutional core of Hungary’s electoral system, constituency boundaries have been redrawn several times in ways favorable to the governing Fidesz party. In a city traditionally leaning toward the opposition such as Budapest, for example, the number of constituencies has been reduced from 18 to 16.
Magyar, by contrast, has tried to place much greater emphasis on young voters, a generation that for most of their lives in Hungary has experienced only Fidesz in power. The radical changes introduced by Orbán, analyzed in this article, therefore raise important questions about what a possible victory by Magyar in the elections could represent.
However, even if Magyar will win the election, the main question remains whether Magyar can really represent a catalyst for change capable of dismantling the system built by Orbán over the last 16 years. Th A two-thirds parliamentary majority is in fact required to fundamentally change the so-called “cardinal laws” at the core of its illiberal framework. ,.
Even a victory based on political alliances would be complex for the Tisza party, which would find it difficult to form alliances with left-wing parties such as Democratic Coalition (DK) or the Greens. An alliance with the far-right Mi Hazánk would be even more unlikely, as it would risk aligning Tisza with Fidesz.