At the recent Ankara summit, Allies reached an agreement on the shifting to Europe and Canada of the burden for Euro-Atlantic security, took stock of the growing defense budgets and procurement, confirmed their support to Ukraine, and managed the unavoidable drama brought by the personality of the US president. Not a bad result, in light of the unresolved crisis over Greenland and the ongoing war in the Gulf, although cracks and problems remain and will have to be managed.
Managing the fallout of the Iran war
As with other international summits involving Donald Trump, much of the attention has been captured by his criticism of single allies and/or the Alliance as such, particularly as Europeans refuse to get involved in the ill-designed conflict he is pursuing against Iran.
There was a real risk the rift over this war could derail the whole summit, but at the end of the day all members agreed on a single sentence in the final communiqué that restates the common ground and thus contains the fallout of the Gulf conflict on European security: “Allies reiterate Iran must never have a nuclear weapon and call on Iran to fully respect freedom of navigation in the Strait of Hormuz.” How to achieve these two goals remains a rebus, particularly after Trump inadvertedly gave Iran such a concrete leverage through its ability close the Strait. But it is a rebus that sits outside NATO’s core business to ensure Europe’s collective deterrence and defence against Russia and the allies shielded this top priority from the Iran issue. Primum vivere, deinde philosophari.
A stronger Europe in a stronger NATO, so what?
Such collective deterrence and defense will be more and more a European responsibility, as allies negotiate the timing, extent, features and conditions of a reduction of the American military presence in Europe. This is an existential issue for NATO, as the Alliance works on the assumption that the security of Noth America and of Europe cannot and should not be decoupled, and US capabilities in the Old Continent turn this assumption into a reality.
The Trump administration made such committment extremely transactional, and more subject to personal perceptions, feelings, volatility, fondness and aversion of the US president vis-avis his counterparts. However, the structural character of transatlantic security, embedded in the economy, geography, history, national and international institutions still play a relevant role in the interplay with the political leadership. As a result, a real strategic bargain took place since the 2025 Hague summit that has been preserved in Ankara, albeit in a very tense and unusual way: on how much, how, when and where European and Canadian capabilities will replace some US capabilities, in order to preserve an amount of conventional American presence in NATO and its extended nuclear deterrence.
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Albeit counterintuitive, a NATO with less US and more Europe makes the American presence more sustainable, not only for the Trump administration but for the large portion of US electorate and public opinion which share the view that allies have been too much free riders and for too long. Hence the Ankara communique’s motto “a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO” codifies the agreement on what has been discussed over the last couple of years under the rubric of “European pillar of NATO”, “Europeanization of NATO”, “NATO 3.0”, “transformed NATO” or “Europe-led NATO”. So what? The summit gives a political mandate for continuing the transatlantic negotiations linked to the force posture review announced by the Pentagon, to make the former compatible with an appropriate level of collective deterrence and defense that will increasingly be on Europe’s shoulders.
Obviously, the gathering in Ankara did not solve such a complex and crucial issue, as cracks and prolems remain on the table. First, both Trump and part of its administration are still seriously considering the option of an abrupt withdrawal regardless of the risks it creates for Europe vis-a-vis an aggressive Russia. This is a red line for the rest of the allies: NATO cannot work at operational and strategic levels under a certain threeshold of Washington’s military committment, and the extended nuclear umbrella cannot be credible without thousands of US troops in Europe within the range of Russian missiles, bombs and drones. The reduction has to be partial and limited. Moreover, both Trump and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth have from time to time been using the threat of a huge and/or immediate withdrawal to coherce allies on other dossiers, whether the use of military bases for the war against Iran or the Greenland issue. But the results of such cohercion have been so far mixed and limited, as allies have stuck to their red lines on Greenland and avoided a direct involvement in operations against Iran. This cohercion is likely to continue, and to complicate the negotiations on the amount and kind of American military committment in NATO and particularly in Europe.
On the other hand, Europeans continue to struggle to fill the gaps to be left by the US at tactical, operational and strategic levels. Furthermore, some conventional capabilities are simply out of reach in the short term, such as integrated air and missile defense, long range strike, strategic airlift or access to space, and allies will have to coordinate significant investments into joint project if they want to reduce their dependence on Washington on these capabilities. Last but not least, US extended nuclear deterrence, including but not limited to tactical nuclear weapons deployed on the territory of five NATO allies, constitutes a key issue requiring a strategic reflection in Europe bearing in mind both the necessity to complement and hedge, but also the strong impulse of non-proliferation.
The Ankara summit seems to have brought the negotiations and reflection on conventional and nucleare deterrence and defense back to a structured process within the NATO format, which helps to manage tensions and disagreements on US military presence in Europe while keeping the core article 5 of the Washington Treaty sufficiently credible.
The magic of numbers
The credibility of collective deterrence and defense and the implementation of burden shifting can only happen if non-US allies continue on the path of a robust increase of defense spending over the short, medium and long term. This is the deep-rooted reason for the summit’s focus on procurement and industrial production, including the industry forum held the day before heads of state and government arrived in Ankara.
The other important reason is the magic of numbers, especially in Trump’s eyes: showcasing how much Europe and Canada increased their defense budget, as well as listing 50 billion dollars in plans and signed contracts – including with US companies – strongly appeal to a president that since the 2024 electoral campaign insists allies have to “pay their bills”. These numbers are instrumental in convincing the Trump administration to maintain a substantial military presence in Europe. And the figures reflecting the trends in core-defense spending are indeed impressive: the average percentage of GDP invested in this basket moved from 1,96% in 2024 to 2,31% in 2025 and an estimated 2,53% in 2026. In absolute terms, non-US allies spend in 2025 roughly 139 billion euro more than in 2024, as purposedly underlined by the Ankara communique.
Other numbers have to be cautiously assessed, cum granu salis. In the Hague, allies committed to reach the following spending targets by 2035 in two categories: 3,5% of GDP on the aforementioned core defense and 1,5% on defense and security-related issues, including “to inter alia protect our critical infrastructure, defend our networks, ensure our civil preparedness and resilience, unleash innovation, and strengthen our defence industrial base.” One year later, NATO statistics account for 1,45% of GDP already spent in 2025 on the second basket.
Obviously, this is mostly an accounting of pre-existing budgets, not new investments. Whether for criticial infrastructures, civil preparedness and resiliecne or innovation, this NATO basket righly considers – in conceptual terms – a broad perimeter of national security, enabling – in financial terms – to easily reach the 1,5% target 10 years before the deadline, the very same moment it was established: the magic of numbers. It should be noted that the data are an average, inevitably hiding some diversification among countries. For example Italy accounted in 2026 only for 0,7% GDP on security expenditure, but probably it will not be a problem to include further elements in this basket up to 1,5% GDP.
The support for Ukraine: a half-full glass
The magic of numbers partly applies also to NATO’s support to Ukraine. In Ankara, allies agreed to “pledge €70 billion in military equipment, assistance and training for Ukraine and affirm their sovereign commitments to sustaining at least equivalent levels in 2027”. The communique also thanks the EU for the Ukraine Support Loan, but falls short of explicitely stating that the NATO pledge includes the 90 billion euros already granted by the European Union to Kyiv trough that loans for 2026-2027, which should thus not be seen as an additional effort.
Financial aid is not the only positive result of the summit. The June G7 meeting already agreed in principle to give Ukraine the licenses to produce military equipment designed in Western countries: an important shift to make supplies for Ukrainian armed forces larger, faster and more predicable. Building on that shift, Trump in Ankara went further by announcing his decision to allow Ukraine to build US-designed Patriot missile defence systems. There is a significant shortage of those systemsa cross the board, as many have been used up (wasted, most allies would argue) in the Iran war, in addition to those used in Ukraine, and the American production capacity has not made the quantum leap necessary to refill the Pentagon’s stockpiles and supply the allies already procuring Patriots. Ukraine has demostranted the autonomous ability to produce drones on a large scale, but also to design its first missile, therefore it has the potential to significantly contribute to the Patriots’ production if this cooperation will be properly designed and implemented.
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Last but not least, the Ankara declaration states that “Ukraine contributes to transatlantic security, and Allies stand united in our unwavering support for Ukraine in defending its freedom, sovereignty, and territorial integrity”. This is a remarkable achievement, given that President Trump agreed to sign this statement despite his frequent and friendly conversations with Vladimir Putin, including a phone call a few days before the summit that was described as business-like. The jury is still out on whether Washington will manage to mediate, as the president promised since day 1 of his second administration, a peace deal between Moscow and Kyiv, and on which terms. For sure, more that four years after the (second) Russian invasion Ukraine has become increasingly able to autonomously produce the means to defend itself and strike deep into Russian territory. Non-US allies have compensated the reduction in American military and financial aid and hold the line of a just and lasting peace for Ukraine. The Kremlin has not moved away from its unacceptable conditions for a deal. As a result, unfortunately the war is set to continue, but Russia is unlikely to win and Trump has little leverage to force Ukraine to surrender. Against this backdrop, the Ankara summit consolidates NATO’s support for Kyiv, whether it is lukewarm from Washington (and others, including Budapest and Prague) or deep-rooted as in many other capitals.
In conclusion, NATO after Ankara is still the most effective framework to organize Europe’s collective deterrence and defense by keeping the US onboard, provided Trump sticks to the political bargain that has just been confirmed and other allies walk the talk of a stronger Europe in a stronger NATO.