Hydrogen and its untapped geoeconomic value for Europe

Every energy infrastructure concentrates both economic value and strategic vulnerability. Future hydrogen networks will accentuate this dynamic by combining capital-intensive physical assets, advanced digital systems, and closer integration with continental power grids.

The idea that hydrogen will usher in a “less geopolitical” energy system than natural gas therefore seems at least partly illusory. Forms of dependence and control may shift, yet competition over access to critical infrastructure, technological standards, and supply routes will not disappear.

From a technical standpoint, vulnerabilities differ across supply chains. For green hydrogen, system security depends on steady renewable power generation, electrolyzer availability, and the resilience of integrated power grids. For blue hydrogen, the critical factors remain reliable natural gas supplies and functioning carbon capture and storage (CCS) infrastructure. Across all configurations, hydrogen demands high standards for managing metal embrittlement, pressure control, storage safety, and continuous plant operations.

European industrial analyses suggest that up to 60–70% of existing gas grids could theoretically be retrofitted to carry hydrogen or hydrogen blends – though not without substantial upgrades to valves, compressors, monitoring systems, and materials. Because of its physical properties, hydrogen diffuses more readily through microfractures and welds, raising the risk of leaks and infrastructure wear.

These physical challenges are compounded by growing reliance on digital control systems. Hydrogen networks will increasingly integrate energy-flow management, real-time monitoring, industrial automation, and cross-border interoperability. That will boost efficiency while expanding cyber exposure, creating systemic vulnerabilities that are hard to contain within national borders.

Europe’s energy sector has already become one of the prime targets for cyberattacks. According to the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA), cyber incidents affecting European energy infrastructure rose noticeably after 2022, underscoring how digitalization and energy security are now inseparable.

 

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Economically, security inevitably carries a price tag. Ensuring resilience requires investing in infrastructure redundancy, storage capacity, backup systems, common standards, and shared security protocols. Building out a future continental hydrogen network could require hundreds of billions of euros in cumulative investment by 2050 across production, transport, storage, and industrial conversion. A substantial share of that spending will go not into energy generation itself, but into protecting and stabilizing the system.

Often overlooked in this picture is that hydrogen shifts not only the center of gravity for infrastructure, but also for technological dependencies. Controlling supply chains for electrolyzers, advanced materials, carbon capture technologies, and digital energy-management systems is becoming a major arena of global competition.

Today, much of the world’s manufacturing capacity for critical electrolyzer components and advanced energy technologies is concentrated in Asia, particularly China. Beijing controls large shares of global refining for rare earths and strategic materials used in energy transition technologies—a dynamic that introduces a new kind of vulnerability: reliance not only on energy commodities, but also on the industrial supply chains needed to build the energy system itself.

Standards are equally consequential. Rules defining what counts as clean hydrogen, which emissions thresholds are acceptable, and how supply chains are certified will carry major economic weight. Setting standards is not a neutral regulatory exercise; it is an instrument of economic power that shapes investment flows, market access, and international competitiveness.

This dynamic is especially sharp among the European Union, the United States, and China. If regulatory regimes evolve along incompatible lines—on emissions limits or certification rules for green and blue hydrogen, for example—the global hydrogen market risks fracturing into technologically and legally separate blocs. In that scenario, energy infrastructure would once again serve not just as an economic asset, but as an extension of geopolitical influence for major industrial powers.

Countries hosting critical nodes of the European network will therefore take on a systemic guarantor role. That position brings costs, responsibilities, and constraints, but also structural leverage capable of shaping the continent’s industrial and political balance.

Governance is thus the central challenge. Securing hydrogen infrastructure will demand much tighter coordination among member states, industrial operators, and EU institutions. Yet the hybrid nature of future networks—partly inherited from the gas system, partly built around new technologies—risks complicating decision-making even further.

Without that coordination, the main danger is not necessarily open conflict, but strategic fragmentation. Divergent standards, poorly interoperable networks, and misaligned industrial policies could turn hydrogen into a source of internal friction rather than shared strategic autonomy.

 

The European Union: high regulatory ambition, weak strategic coordination

The European Union has invested more than any other political actor in building a regulatory and strategic framework for hydrogen. The 2020 EU Hydrogen Strategy, the 2022 REPowerEU plan, and the creation of the European Hydrogen Bank point to an ambitious goal: using hydrogen simultaneously to decarbonize industry, strengthen energy security, and advance strategic autonomy.

Quantitative targets reflect that ambition. By 2030, REPowerEU aims for 10 million metric tons of domestic renewable hydrogen production and another 10 million metric tons of imports—volumes comparable to a significant share of Europe’s current natural gas consumption in hard-to-electrify industries.

On paper, the EU’s regulatory architecture looks fairly cohesive. Brussels is assembling an integrated ruleset covering hydrogen certification, permissible emissions, production incentives, infrastructure coordination, and industrial demand support. The “Fit for 55” package, rules for Renewable Fuels of Non-Biological Origin (RFNBOs), and the EU taxonomy all aim to steer public and private capital along the entire value chain.

Yet this ambition runs up against a structural limit the EU has never fully overcome: energy remains an area of strong national sovereignty. As various European Parliament reports acknowledge, member states still tend to treat energy infrastructure as a tool of national industrial policy and security rather than a truly shared strategic asset.

 

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This tension shows clearly in the clash between green and blue hydrogen strategies. Countries with abundant renewable potential – such as Spain and Portugal – tend to favor green hydrogen and power-grid expansion. Countries more deeply tied to natural gas – such as the Netherlands, parts of Germany, and partner Norway – often see blue hydrogen as a way to repurpose and get value out of existing assets. The result is a patchwork of national strategies that may align formally with EU goals on paper, but do not necessarily converge on a shared infrastructure map.

What emerges is a wave of projects that are European in label, yet largely national in substance. Dozens of hydrogen initiatives – including corridors, port terminals, storage sites, pipelines, and production plants – are listed or advancing under the EU’s Projects of Common Interest (PCI) framework. Still, many answer primarily to domestic industrial and logistics priorities.

Economically, as the European Court of Auditors and industry groups have noted, this fragmentation raises the risk of overlapping assets, permitting bottlenecks, and inefficient capital allocation. In a sector requiring heavy upfront spending and multi-decade payback periods, regulatory and geographic uncertainty can also hold back private investment.

The European Hydrogen Bank is a meaningful effort to lower that uncertainty on both the supply and demand sides. The European Commission has earmarked several billion euros for its initial phase through auctions and price-support mechanisms for renewable hydrogen. Even so, its reach is modest relative to the scale of capital required: European hydrogen infrastructure alone could demand more than €400–500 billion in cumulative investment by 2050.

More importantly, the European Hydrogen Bank does not map out Europe’s future energy routes. Choices over strategic infrastructure still depend heavily on member states, energy utilities, and political balances between core and peripheral EU countries. That creates a persistent structural tension running through Europe’s hydrogen push: strong regulatory ambition paired with incomplete infrastructure and industrial coordination.

The challenge goes beyond laying pipes and cables. Coordination must also cover technical standards, certification schemes, grid compatibility, and emissions rules. Without enough harmonization, Europe risks ending up with parallel, poorly interconnected energy markets inside the single market.

Here, the main risk is less technological than strategic and chronological. While competitors – notably the United States, China, and several Gulf economies – pair strong industrial policy with tight infrastructure planning, the EU risks losing time navigating difficult internal compromises.

In the United States, the Inflation Reduction Act created powerful financial incentives for hydrogen, though long-term policy continuity will also depend on shifting domestic politics. China, meanwhile, ties industrial growth, supply-chain control, and energy planning into a centralized, long-term strategy. Gulf monarchies, for their part, are pouring tens of billions of dollars into major export hubs aimed at Asian and European markets.

Europe’s hydrogen map could therefore take shape not through a fully shared political decision, but through the gradual buildup of national advantages – in other words, through the momentum of early moves rather than a cohesive common strategy.

 

Italy: a hub to be built, an opportunity not to miss

Within Europe’s energy transition, Italy brings together a relatively rare mix of geography, industry, and infrastructure. Its Mediterranean location, extensive gas network, port system, and substantial industrial demand make it one of the most credible candidates to serve as a continental hydrogen hub.

That potential looks different depending on the pathway. For green hydrogen, Italy’s geography positions it as a link between mainland Europe and sun- and wind-rich areas around the southern Mediterranean, particularly North Africa and the Middle East. For blue hydrogen, its edge comes from long-standing gas links with Algeria, Libya, and Azerbaijan, alongside established transport and storage assets.

In this light, Italy holds a distinctive position: it could act at once as a transit hub, an industrial demand market, and a platform for infrastructure conversion.

The national grid, operated largely by Snam S.p.A., is a major technical asset here. Italy has roughly 33,000 kilometers of high-pressure gas pipelines and some of Europe’s largest underground storage capacity. Much of that existing infrastructure could gradually be adapted for hydrogen or gas-hydrogen blends, potentially trimming costs compared with building a dedicated continental network from scratch.

Infrastructure continuity is not automatic, however. Retrofitting networks requires targeted upgrades, technical adjustments, common standards, and heavy capital outlays. Moreover, green and blue pathways do not fully align: some routes would reinforce Italy’s traditional role as a Mediterranean gas corridor, while others would call for new port facilities, ammonia or liquid hydrogen import capacity, and tighter links to European electricity grids.

Italy’s ports could also take on an industrial role, not just a logistical one. Hubs such as Trieste, Genoa, Taranto, Gioia Tauro, and Ravenna could become entry, conversion, and distribution points for energy. Turning ports into true hubs, however, will depend on connecting them to industrial inland terminals, rail lines, storage systems, and local manufacturing demand.

 

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What is at stake goes beyond energy to Europe’s industrial map. Whoever controls hydrogen entry, conversion, and distribution points will also shape future value chains in steel, glass, cement, ceramics, chemicals, fertilizers, heavy freight, and power-hungry data centers.

On the demand side, Italy has an industrial base well suited to hydrogen’s potential applications. Hard-to-abate sectors – steel, chemicals, ceramics, refining, glass, and heavy transport – account for a large share of Italian industrial energy use and difficult-to-electrify emissions. Italy is also Europe’s second-largest manufacturer after Germany, setting it apart from hub contenders that lack strong domestic industrial off-take.

There is another often-overlooked factor: hydrogen could help sustain the competitiveness of Italy’s industrial base, not just its energy security. Without relatively stable and competitive energy options, energy-intensive sectors risk losing ground to the United States, the Middle East, and Asia, where energy costs and industrial policies are often more advantageous.

Even with these assets, Italy’s strategy remains fragmented. Industrial plans, policy papers, and pilot projects outline plenty of activity, yet they still do not add up to a clear choice of role within Europe’s future energy map. Public debate often swings between a purely technological view of the transition and a purely environmental one, leaving out the geopolitical and industrial dimensions.

The main risk, then, is not being shut out of European hydrogen flows altogether, but sliding into functional marginalization. Italy could remain plugged into continental networks without exercising real logistical, industrial, or strategic coordination power.

Timing is decisive. Europe’s main hydrogen trunk lines will be mapped out and financed over the next decade. Once corridors, technical standards, and industrial balances lock in, room to maneuver will narrow quickly – making the cost of indecision cumulative.

By 2030, investment needs in Italian energy transition infrastructure alone – spanning pipelines, ports, storage, and industrial conversions – could reach tens of billions of euros. The challenge is not just raising capital, but directing it consistently along a recognizable strategic path.

Becoming a hub requires more than attracting infrastructure; it means accepting deeper European integration of national energy policy. That calls for regulatory alignment, technical interoperability, and long-term planning. Rather than surrendering energy sovereignty, Italy would be transforming it – from formal autonomy into systemic weight within Europe’s transition networks.

 

Decisions that can no longer be deferred

According to major assessments by the International Energy Agency, the European Commission, and the International Renewable Energy Agency, hydrogen is not the finish line of the energy transition, but a phase of infrastructural, industrial, and geopolitical realignment in Europe’s energy system. The decisive test is not just technological readiness, but building coherent networks, standards, and industrial supply chains on a realistic timetable.

Over the coming decade, the European Union will shape not only new supply channels, but a new continental industrial geography. Hydrogen infrastructure – trunk lines, port terminals, storage systems, electrolyzers, reforming plants, and integrated power grids – will create lasting, cumulative effects. Once locked in, those corridors will be hard to alter.

A core economic question remains: how quickly will industrial demand grow enough to justify continental-scale infrastructure spending? Without steady, predictable consumption in hard-to-abate sectors, parts of the planned system could sit underused or financially fragile in the early years of the transition.

For European policymakers, the first strategic priority is setting infrastructure priorities. Trying to keep every option open at once risks spreading capital thin, slowing investment, and deepening market fragmentation. Building a hydrogen economy will require a clear ranking of strategic routes, backed by interoperable technical standards and stronger, more binding coordination among member states.

The second priority is aligning energy policy with industrial policy. Hydrogen can scale only if energy-intensive industries – steel, chemicals, fertilizers, refining, heavy transport, and data centers – generate steady manufacturing demand capable of underwriting infrastructure investments. Without a coherent industrial strategy, Europe risks building energy networks that lack sufficient off-take.

Technological and industrial security is a third pillar. The EU will need to curb external reliance not only on energy commodities, but also on supply chains for electrolyzers, critical materials, digital control systems, and carbon capture technologies. Without a sufficiently autonomous industrial base, part of Europe’s energy sovereignty would simply shift from fossil fuels to transition supply chains.

For Italy, the stakes are even more concrete. Geography, the existing gas grid, ports, and proximity to North Africa offer a strategic opening that few other European countries can match. Yet geographic advantage does not automatically translate into industrial or political centrality. To avoid functional marginalization, Italy needs a clearer role in Europe’s future energy network, tying together industrial policy, infrastructure, port logistics, and Mediterranean outreach.

That also requires a shift in how policy is executed. Building a European hub will take long-term planning, public-private coordination, and closer alignment between national and EU energy policy. The biggest cost is not the upfront investment itself, but hesitation at a moment when Europe’s infrastructure corridors are starting to solidify.

Hydrogen will not do away with energy geopolitics. Instead, it will reshape them around new infrastructure, new technological dependencies, and new links between power generation, industry, and logistics control. As in past energy transitions, competitive advantage will come down not just to resource endowment, but to turning infrastructure, industry, and geography into systemic power.

 

 

EUsecurityenergyindustryhydrogenenergy transitiongeoeconomicsItalyEuropeeconomy