Why UNIFIL does not work: an Israeli view
A year has passed since the barbaric terrorist attack by Hamas on the citizens of Israel. A few days following the onset of the “Iron Swords” war, the Lebanon based terrorist organization Hezbollah, led by its secretary-general Hassan Nasrallah, joined the fighting. Under the supervision and support of Iran, Nasrallah formed a linkage between Gaza and Lebanon.
On the evening of September 30th, 2024, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) launched a ground operation in southern Lebanon. This operation comes after months of relentless attacks by Hezbollah, primarily targeting northern Israel, resulting in the evacuation of tens of thousands of residents along the Israeli Lebanese border. While the number of casualties may appear low given the scale of the attacks, this can be attributed to the effectiveness of the active defense systems in place, though they are not infallible. The damage to homes and infrastructure is substantial, and, regrettably, casualties include both civilians and security personnel.
Since the ground operation began, the IDF has achieved significant tactical successes in the fighting. The substantial disruption of the Hezbollah operations started with a series of explosions targeting hundreds of its operatives, damaging its command structure, culminating in the elimination of Hezbollah’s Secretary-General in Beirut on September 27, 2024. The stated objective of the Israeli ground operation is to undermine Hezbollah’s offensive infrastructure along the border and to create conditions for the return of all residents in northern Israel to their homes.
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The covert activities of the IDF that preceded the open operation aimed to neutralize underground infrastructures, disrupt the organization’s launch capabilities, and gather intelligence. Findings from these operations revealed the depth of Hezbollah’s preparedness to execute the “Galilee Conquest Plan,” which has repeatedly been described by senior Hezbollah officials as the organization’s flagship initiative and on which they have trained for about 15 years. It is noteworthy that the plan bears striking similarities to the strategy implemented by Hamas in October 2023.
Let’s set aside the events of recent weeks and return to July 2006, the time Hezbollah launched an attack on IDF forces in an incident that resulted in the abduction of two soldiers and the deaths of three others. After 34 days of warfare, a ceasefire agreement was reached, marking the end of the Second Lebanon War. The United Nations Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1701, which included a significant increase of 15,000 armed UNIFIL peacekeepers with the authority to operate. The main points of the resolution can be summarized as follows: it calls for a complete cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah, the withdrawal of Hezbollah and other forces from southern Lebanon, the disarmament of Hezbollah and other armed groups, and the withdrawal of Israeli forces from Lebanon, ensuring that no armed forces other than UNIFIL and the Lebanese military remain south of the Litani River, which flows about 29 km north of the border.
Let us now return to the IDF’s operation in southern Lebanon. The intense fighting reveals how the UN resolution has remained a dead letter. Moreover, it exposes UNIFIL’s inability, and perhaps reluctance, to enforce the resolution. As this is being written, it can already be stated with certainty that UNIFIL has not only failed to fulfill its mission but has, in a broader sense, become a factor that has blinded the international community and the Israeli government, which did not do enough to prevent the Hezbollah’s strengthening along its northern border.
In recent weeks, fortified tunnels spanning hundreds of meters have gradually been uncovered, along with vast quantities of ammunition, including anti-tank missiles, anti-helicopter missiles, shells, rockets, all-terrain vehicles, and motorcycles, among others. Some of this equipment has been stored just meters from the international border, while others are located within civilian neighborhoods. Equally concerning is that some are in proximity to UNIFIL positions. The quantities of weapons and the manner of their storage and readiness indicate the organization’s capacity to operate as a fully-fledged army and its aspiration to conduct aggressive operations. Had these plans been executed in conjunction with the Hamas attack, Israel would have faced an even more complex challenge than the one it currently confronts.
While Israel has achieved significant tactical successes in both major theaters, it seems that Benjamin Netanyahu’s government is not taking the obvious steps to translate tactical achievements into strategic change in the region. However, despite the fundamental voices within the current Israeli government, the outcome of the war will largely depend on the backing that the United States grants Israel. Nothing is expected to change until the elections in November, but afterward, a shift is anticipated that will compel Israel, as well as other members of the international community—including countries that have supported UNIFIL for many years—to make serious decisions.
The day after the fighting in Lebanon and Gaza, will not resemble the summer of 2006. Turning a blind eye will not be tolerated again in the troubled region of southern Lebanon, Gaza, and Israel. The United Nations Security Council, which has lost its credibility in the eyes of many, along with UNIFIL, must implement significant changes, or this organization will lose its last credit points. The primary mission of the international community is to restore the sovereignty of the State of Lebanon, which has been grappling with a malign state within it, controlled and funded by Iran. This is the challenge of the post-conflict era. The upheaval Iran has experienced over the past year will not divert it from its fanatical path, and it would be naĂŻve to believe that the Iranian people, who are suffering under severe repression, will turn against the regime of the Ayatollahs in the coming years. Only a resolute stance from the West can help diminish (though not eliminate) Iran’s capacity to carry out destabilizing actions in the Middle East.
UNIFIL has not fulfilled its mission. Since the adoption of UN Resolution 425 in 1978, when the organization was established, through interim resolutions and changes to its mandate, as well as the limitations that have prevented it from effectively stabilizing Lebanon and the region, all these factors present a mirror of truth for those involved. The future of the region will be primarily influenced by Iran’s actions. The disagreements between the official State of Lebanon and Israel are minor and are certainly not expected to lead to further escalation in the region (once again, it was Iran that chose to ignite the area). All of this brings us one step closer to a decisive moment regarding the future of UNIFIL, which has chosen to run away from the truth, much like the protagonist in David Grossman’s novel To the End of the Land, thereby becoming a factor that has weakened Lebanon’s institutions and strengthened regional instability.
We received this article from the former Israeli Ambassador to Italy, and offer it as a useful contribution to an open discussion.
