Turkey, the new Syrian arrangement and the wider regional balance
The year 2024 proved to be challenging for the Middle East. As the international community focused on Israel’s efforts to reshape the regional map through a series of military operations, Ankara quietly positioned itself to seize opportunities. Specifically, Turkey sought to challenge the Assad dictatorship in neighboring Syria to secure a more favorable balance of power along its borders.
This shift in Turkish strategy was catalyzed by the failure of bilateral negotiations in November 2024 regarding the repatriation of the five million Syrian refugees hosted in Turkey since the 2011 uprisings. Following this breakdown, Ankara concluded that Assad was an untrustworthy partner and had no intention of facilitating the return of refugees, many of whom were eager to see the regime overturned.
Initially, Turkey favored the Syrian National Army as the main opposition to Assad, but over time, it came to realize that only Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), a jihadi group, had the military capability and cohesion to bring about meaningful change in Syria. Despite the HTS’s early opposition to Turkish interests—particularly between 2011 and 2016, when it was known as Jabhat al-Nusra and affiliated with al-Qaeda—Turkey ultimately adjusted its stance. During this period, al-Qaeda was responsible for several terrorist attacks within Turkey itself, including bombings of synagogues and Western institutions in Istanbul in 2013. However, after severing ties with al-Qaeda in 2016 and rebranding itself in 2017 as the HTS, the group shifted its focus to a more nationalist agenda, which aligned more closely with Turkish interests in Syria.
Turkey, which had maintained a military presence in Syria since its occupation of areas like Afrin, Tal Abyad and Ras al-Ain, and had established numerous military posts and local governance structures, closely monitored the HTS’s nationalist reorientation. The HTS’s focus on toppling the Assad regime and expelling Iranian militias from Syria turned it into a strategic asset for Ankara, particularly as it sought to leverage the “rebel” province of Idlib to counter the increasingly weakened Assad regime. Turkey’s relationship with the HTS gradually evolved from a neutral stance to cautious support, providing logistical and military aid, including drones.
In 2018, Turkey and the HTS reached a deal whereby the latter would assist in combating the Kurdish People’s Defense Units (YPG), the largest militia within the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), in exchange for Turkey’s tolerance of the HTS’s de facto control over Idlib. However, this partnership should not be mistaken for a Turkish masterminding of the December 2024 HTS coup that ultimately overthrew Assad, as Ankara’s role was instrumental, but not decisive, in bringing it about. In fact, while Erdogan and the ruling AKP party have emphasized Turkey’s key role in toppling the Assad regime, secular parties such as the Republican People’s Party (CHP) have downplayed Turkey’s imperialist intentions, asserting that Ankara does not seek to establish a neo-colonial or neo-Ottoman order in Syria.
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Turkey’s support for the HTS and deeper involvement in Syria can be understood through a single strategic lens: to counter the YPG-led SDF and potentially install a pro-Turkish, anti-Kurdish government in Damascus. The primary concern for Ankara is preventing Syrian Kurds from expanding their territorial control, particularly as the SDF now controls a substantial portion of northern Syria, including more than 80% of the country’s oil production facilities. Since 1984, Turkey has been engaged in an ongoing conflict with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), with which the YPG shares ideological and strategic ties. This longstanding conflict escalated following failed peace talks in 2015, leading Turkey to launch military offensives against Kurdish groups both in Turkey and Iraq. The presence of autonomous Kurdish groups on Syria’s southern border is viewed as a significant military and existential threat to Turkey, especially as the PYD—the political wing of the YPG—seeks Kurdish independence, which Turkey fears could spill over into its own Kurdish-majority regions. Consequently, Turkey is willing to offer substantial support to the HTS, including aid, training, and reconstruction assistance, if it helps contain or eliminate the SDF’s influence.
However, Turkey’s ambitions in Syria and the broader region are more constrained than often perceived. While Erdogan has pushed for deeper military engagement, claiming territory in northern Syria and seeking to topple Assad, Turkey’s long-term goal has not been the fragmentation of Syria, but rather the restoration of a strong, unified Syrian state. This approach aligns with Turkey’s broader strategy of regional stabilization.
Iran, a key regional player despite some recent setbacks, is much more invested in the revisionist efforts to reshape the Middle East. Despite growing economic cooperation between Turkey and Iran in recent years, the two nations remain at odds over geopolitical matters, particularly in Syria and the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Iran has opposed Turkey’s increasing involvement in Syria and called for the withdrawal of foreign forces. Additionally, Ankara perceives Iran’s nuclear program as a destabilizing threat to the region, potentially triggering a nuclear arms race. Despite these tensions, Turkey has sought to act as a stabilizing force, advocating for multilateral diplomacy rather than confrontation and “maximum pressure” with Tehran: a strategy that will put it in conflict on this point with the current Trump administration.
In a notable shift, Turkey has also shown the intention of seeking some form of reconciliation with Kurdish groups. In November 2024, the People’s Alliance proposed initiating new peace talks with pro-PKK parties, contingent on the cessation of hostilities by Abdullah Öcalan, leader of the PKK, and the dissolution of his party. If successful, this peace process could also pave the way for integrating the YPG forces into the Syrian army and contribute to Syria’s reconstruction, fostering multiethnic coexistence. Some analysts suggest that Erdogan’s motivations for reconciliation may be tied to his political future, as he seeks to amend the Turkish Constitution to extend his presidency beyond 2028 and he would need the votes of the opposition’s pro-PKK Equality and Democracy Party (DEM) to this end. Regardless of his personal motivations, such a move would reduce internal and external tensions, potentially contributing to regional stability.
Additionally, Turkey has sought to strengthen relations with Iraq, particularly under the current leadership of Prime Minister Mohammed Shia’ al-Sudani. Both countries are pursuing the “Iraqi Development Road Project”, an alternative route to the IMEC (India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor), which aims to revive Iraq’s historical role as a transit hub connecting the al-Faw Iraqi Port to the Turkish border and the Mediterranean Sea. While the project faces numerous obstacles, including the upcoming 2026 Iraqi elections that could bring a new pro-Iranian candidate, it holds the potential to reintegrate Iraq into the international trade network, benefiting the entire region.
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Looking ahead, one key relationship to monitor is Turkey’s interaction with Israel in the evolving Syrian and Middle Eastern landscape. While some Israeli officials have raised concerns overall about Turkey’s growing influence in the region, a special Commission for Evaluating the Security Budget and Force Buildup, established by the Prime Minister’s office to formulate security-related recommendations and led by former National Security Council head Yaakov Nagel, had surprisingly issued a strong warning about the potential for conflict with Turkey in 2025, viewing it as a potential challenger to Israeli political and military regional dominance. Yet, the reality is more complex. Despite occasional tensions, such as Turkey’s vocal criticism of Israel’s actions in Gaza and close competition in the sale of advanced military equipment on the global market, Turkey is no clear threat to Israel. On the contrary, it has not been standing in the way of the extension of the 2020 Abraham Accords (to this day, still largely on paper), and it has given a blow to the Axis of Resistance in Syria, which proved highly beneficial to Israel too. Therefore, thus far Ankara has not jeopardized any vital Israeli interest and, moreover, its role in rebuilding Syria could contribute to regional stability and prevent the further fragmentation of the country, which could be beneficial to broader regional security.
So, why is there an alarm bell from the Israeli establishment now? Because Turkey’s actions in the region could undermine Jerusalem’s expansionary ambitions, potentially contributing to the reconstruction of a stronger and more independent Syria, which could host new Palestinian refugees, provide a platform for their claims and foster a renewed pro-Palestinian sentiment, opening up a new front in the diaspora: a scenario that Israel fears even more than the Iranian nuclear bomb.
