The US, Venezuela and the world’s hard reality
Maduro was a brutal dictator, and most Venezuelans are happy he is gone. Veni, Vidi, Vici, President Trump could boast (is my high-school Latin getting rusty?). The US might have acted for the wrong reasons, and there is no guarantee of what happens next. Leaving Maduro’s deputy Delcy Rodriguez in charge might be a pragmatic start to a slow transition back to democracy, or a cynical ploy to keep the regime in place while extorting a fistful of barrels of oil.
Read also: Rebuilding Venezuela’s oil industry: Economic, political, and social challenges
Critics argue the US has revealed itself as a rogue state, ignoring international law to kidnap a foreign country’s leader and seize its resources. It has consigned the world to the law of the jungle, freeing Russia and China to exert unrestrained power within their respective “spheres of influence” while turning its aggression to Colombia, Mexico and Greenland.
It is a pretty bleak view, but it is embraced by very serious people, and so it deserves to be taken seriously. In my mind, it raises three important questions:
Shining city, or Boot Hill?
The first question is whether the US has become a rogue state. Criticism of the US tends to center on President Trump, and there are plenty of reasons to dislike Trump: he is a brash, uncouth social media addict with authoritarian leanings. His behavior is as un-presidential it gets, from insulting people to attacking the Federal Reserve, to monetizing the presidency while still in office. Trump Derangement Syndrome is real, but it has real causes.
To go from hating Trump to damning the US, however, you have to believe one of two things: either that America’s institutions cannot stop an authoritarian turn, or that the majority of Americans sympathize with Trump’s attitudes and policies.
The latter seems unlikely. After all, most critics outside the US get their arguments from The New York Times, an American paper which mirrors the views of half the US population. As to the former, US institutions still seem able to ensure course-correction. My home city, Miami, elected the first Democratic mayor in 30 years in reaction to Trump’s harsh immigration measures. The November mid-term elections will give voters a chance to deprive Trump of his Congress majority. A large number of Trump’s executive and administrative actions are being challenged in court.
Institutions are not a magic ring fence. Over time the weakness of people can undermine the strength of institutions. But those who claim to have given up on the US should be clear on why: do you just hate Trump, or have you really given up on America?
Welcome to the real world
The second question is how we see the world, and how we would like the US to behave in it.
Since joining the WTO in 2001, China has built an economic empire with ruthless tactics including dumping and theft of intellectual property; it has leveraged it to secure natural resources and other assets around the world, intimidate neighboring countries through military force, and support assorted unsavory regimes. Russia invaded Georgia in 2008, annexed Crimea in 2014 and invaded Ukraine in 2022; it has carried out political assassinations abroad and interfered in foreign elections. Iran pursued nuclear weapons while vowing to destroy Israel and financing terrorism in the Middle East and beyond.
This is the world we live in. When Trump began his second term criticizing international institutions and globalization, everyone said that America’s retreat from the global scene would embolden rogue powers. As it has become clear that America is not disengaging from the world, the same people now say that America’s use of force will embolden rogue powers. Damned if you do, damned if you don’t…
In this world, I do not mind an America that uses military force to depose a hostile dictator and pushes back against the build-up of Chinese economic and strategic interests in Latin America. The communist regime in Venezuela caused nearly 9 million people to flee — one third of the current population — while building strong ties with China. I do not mind a display of military power and prowess that reminds our adversaries of US strength.
Venezuela might be the first of a series of misguided and corruption-ridden US interventions in Latin America. It wouldn’t be the first time — watch Woody Allen’s 1971 movie Bananas, in lieu of a history lesson. But in a world where countries like China, Russia and Iran are ruthlessly pushing their agendas, I prefer to see a US that pushes back with equal ruthlessness and greater force.
If you truly think the US has become as bad as Russia and China, you have a right to disagree. But do not delude yourself that a gentler, kinder US would lead other rogue powers to hold back.
(Hemi-) Spheres of influence
The third question is whether the world is being carved up in spheres of influence. In its much-criticized National Security Strategy published last November, the US embraced the “Trump corollary to the Monroe doctrine”, which essentially says, do not mess with us in our own backyard. From this, many observers have concluded that the US is happy to carve out the world in three spheres of influence, and they picture Trump, Xi and Putin sitting at the table drawing big crayon lines on a world map.
But the global economy is too interconnected today for any global power to ignore two-thirds of the world. China will not halt its efforts to exert influence in Latin America. The US National Security Strategy highlights the Western Hemisphere, but also sets out clear priorities for Asia, Europe, the Middle East and Africa. Asia is singled out for its economic and strategic importance:
the Indo-Pacific is already and will continue to be among the next century’s key economic and geopolitical battlegrounds. To thrive at home, we must successfully compete there—
and
the United States must execute robust diplomatic and private sector-led economic engagement in those countries where the majority of global economic growth is likely to occur over the coming decades.
This include a determination to defend freedom of commerce with Taiwan and in the South China Sea:
Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. […] We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. […] A related security challenge is the potential for any competitor to control the South China Sea.
The US will prioritize, but not retreat into its backyard. Neither will China.
What does it all mean?
A boisterous, vainglorious US President in the social media age makes it especially hard to understand what’s going on. However, it is equally true that the world has become a rougher place, dominated by the rivalry between China and the US. Both countries understand very well that geopolitical dominance is built on economic strength. And economic strength requires technology, natural resources, and access to markets and trade routes, so expect China and the US to compete with sharp elbows on these fronts.
Read also: How India looks at China: dealing with uncertainty
Both countries have shown they are not shy of using different forms of economic blackmail, including punitive tariffs and export restrictions. Both will deploy economic incentives and threats to safeguard their strategic interests, blandishing, cajoling and threatening other countries to obtain access to resources, investments, market opportunities.
This will include jostling over trade choke points and strategic areas, including the Suez Canal, the Panama Canal, the South China Sea, and, yes, Greenland. China has been investing in Panama and it has been investing in the Arctic, with its “Polar Silk Road” strategy. Russia is already a major power in the Arctic, and together they pose a clear security threat. Closer US attention to Greenland makes sense — though Trump is approaching it in the wrongest possible way.
In this geopolitical game, building strategic alliances is crucial. Here the US is squandering its enormous starting advantage. Shaking traditional allies out of their complacency was justified; persisting in ignoring or insulting them is self-defeating. The US seems to be copying China’s transactional and bullying approach – China is probably better placed to pull it off successfully.
It is not the world we would like, but this is the world we have, and these dynamics will shape political developments and economic opportunities. There is much in the current US approach that I do not like, and I hope to see a course-correction. But the underlying strategic posture is grounded in hard reality.
The original version of this article is published here.
