The unlearned lessons of war: Four years since the invasion of Ukraine

On February 24, 2022, few would have predicted that the war ignited by the Russian invasion of Ukraine would still be in full swing four years later. Not only is it ongoing, but it remains far from any conceivable conclusion. These forty-eight months have proven a windfall for geopolitical analysts, military strategists, populist politicians, and those trafficking in arms and energy. We have learned to view the conflict through the lens of rationalized figures within a strategic framework: troop counts, sanctions, supply chains, alliances, and resources. Everything is quantified.

Yet, the primary lesson of this conflict—one that, like poor students, we consistently fail to learn—is not concrete, but abstract. It is moral rather than material: war is inherently unpredictable. It rarely follows the blueprints of those who conceived it or the illusions of those who prepared for it. Often, its outcomes diverge sharply from the goals set on the day the roar of artillery replaced the voice of diplomacy.

Miscalculations all across

This is a lesson for the Russians. The Kremlin’s propaganda, emphasizing Ukraine’s place within Moscow’s “sphere of influence” due to shared culture and history, is a smokescreen for Vladimir Putin’s true objective: the total subjugation of Ukraine. The goal was to transform it into a compliant “second Belarus,” one that would never again dare to look Westward. It is difficult to argue the invasion was merely about protecting Russian-speaking communities or securing strategic resources when, on February 24, tanks were sent directly toward Kyiv. That ambition dissolved against the unexpected wall of Ukrainian resistance. Whatever the final outcome, the Ukrainian nation forged in this fire will never align itself with Russian dictates.

The lesson also applies to Ukraine’s Western allies. The surge in American support, which began under the first Trump administration in 2017 with the delivery of Javelins, was based on the premise that Russia would never seriously oppose Ukraine’s transformation into a NATO outpost. The leverage of economic sanctions and the threat of exclusion from global payment systems were supposed to bring Moscow to heel.

Instead, a surprise awaited: in the eight years following the 2014 conflict, the Russian financial and industrial systems had built a parachute. While sanctions have weakened Russia, they have not crippled its war machine. Moscow withstood the failure to take Kyiv and the subsequent Ukrainian counter-offensives, adapting to the new reality without unsustainable domestic shocks. A second surprise for the West was the refusal of the “Global South” to join the sanctions regime, effectively shifting the economic burden onto Europe—especially since the U.S. economy was already largely decoupled from Russia’s.

Broken promises of 2025

Finally, there is a lesson for the Ukrainian leadership, who chose to fight on the conviction that Western support would be enduring and reliable. Instead, the West found itself militarily unable to supply enough weaponry to match Russian production levels. Economically, the United States “turned off the tap” following Donald Trump’s re-election, leaving Europe—much like with the sanctions—to shoulder the burden of preventing Ukrainian bankruptcy.

Politically, 2025 opened with the humiliation of Volodymyr Zelensky at the White House by the U.S. President and Vice President. This was followed by Washington’s ambiguous overtures toward Vladimir Putin (notably the Trump-Putin summit in Alaska), which yielded no tangible progress toward ending hostilities.

As the fourth winter of war sets in, Ukrainian cities face daily bombardments, the national power grid is largely crippled, and diplomats seem to have accepted the inevitability of future territorial concessions. Russia remains internally stable, despite the long-term depletion of resources. Continued Chinese support—with trade between Moscow and Beijing tripling since 2019—allows the Kremlin to stonewall peace talks while eyeing the capture of Odesa.

War of inertia

Whether this is a Russian delusion remains to be seen. Both sides are now gambling on time. Some in the West argue for continued support just to prevent a total collapse, hoping the open wound will eventually bleed Russia dry. Conversely, the Kremlin believes that Ukrainians and their allies will fatigue first under the weight of colossal costs and unsustainable losses.

This strategy is shrouded in political and diplomatic ambiguity. No one in Europe or the U.S. is currently prepared to guarantee the level of protection Ukraine needs to remain independent post-ceasefire. In Moscow, no one is willing to accept such a guarantee as the price for peace. Meanwhile, Washington—facing the failure of the “peace in 24 hours” promise—appears distracted by other theaters, seemingly content to leave Kyiv to its fate.

After four years, we have reached a war not just of attrition, but of inertia. It is a scenario that the involved great powers seem to view without much regret, each seeking to extract maximum political or economic rent. It is a rent paid for by the body of Ukraine, which continues to suffer the most direct and devastating consequences.

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