Serbia, between internal unrest and international ambiguity

Today, Serbia finds itself at the center of a profound phase of instability, driven by the convergence of internal, regional, and international factors. The recent mass protests shaking the country, which began in response to the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in November 2024 — resulting in 16 victims — reflect a deeper malaise: a growing frustration with a European path perceived as increasingly unattainable and a government that consolidates authoritarian practices, having as role model the Kremlin.

The mobilization, initially focused on demands for justice and administrative transparency, quickly evolved into a radical demand for democratization and institutional renewal. The government, led by Aleksandar Vučić, responded by criminalizing the demonstrations, using rhetoric that evokes “color revolutions” as a threat to internal stability and as a tool of foreign interference, aiming to consolidate a nationalist consensus rooted in Serbia’s historical narrative of being a victim of external aggression.

On the European front, Serbia’s accession path, formally opened in 2012, now appears increasingly tortuous, hindered by internal conditions that do not meet the Copenhagen criteria and, above all, by the unresolved issue of Kosovo, which serves as a de facto veto to the continuation of negotiations. The recurring tensions in Serb-majority areas in northern Kosovo, frequent episodes of violence, and growing international pressure consolidate the image of a Serbia unable to guarantee regional stability.

The United States, while formally supporting Western Balkan integration into the EU, exerts constant pressure on Belgrade to recognize Kosovo’s sovereignty, thereby fueling a state of strategic incompleteness that prevents Serbia from stabilizing and truly moving closer to the EU. Alongside the Kosovo dossier is the fracture with Montenegro, a historically close relationship now deeply compromised. After Montenegrin independence in 2006, tensions escalated in 2019 with the so-called law on religious property, perceived by Belgrade as a direct attack on the Serbian Orthodox Church and, by extension, on Serbian cultural sovereignty in the region.¹ This conflict has fueled internal religious nationalism and strengthened the rhetoric of the “Serb world” (srpski svet), a concept that promotes the idea of a transnational unity among Serb communities.

The problem is that the attitude now prevalent Belgrade is consolidating Serbia’s image as a destabilizing power in the Balkans and further reducing possibilities for regional cooperation and European convergence. Added to this is the Bosnia angle: Serbia’s support for separatist tendencies in Republika Srpska further exacerbates regional instability. The push to split Bosnia and Herzegovina undermines the fragile constitutional architecture established by the Dayton Agreement and represents yet another front in Serbia’s regional ambitions. Indeed, While not officially articulated as a government policy, Belgrade’s consistent political and financial backing of Republika Srpska’s leadership, combined with diplomatic efforts to weaken Bosnia’s central institutions, effectively amounts to a de facto strategy of promoting secessionist pressures.

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On the military front, NATO membership remains virtually impossible for Serbia, burdened by the historical memory of the 1999 bombings and by a declared military neutrality enshrined in 2007, which effectively translates into an ambiguous policy of engagement with Moscow and Beijing. This tactical neutrality is used as an internal tool of political legitimacy and as an argument to justify the lack of Atlantic integration. In this context, the American posture operates under a logic of containment, which has seen little change through the Biden and second Trump administrations, while formally supporting EU enlargement, Washington views a larger and potentially more autonomous EU with suspicion and tends to keep Serbia in an intermediate position — neither fully integrated nor completely external — thus exerting indirect control over Balkan dynamics.

One of the strongest reasons behind the ongoing demonstrations is the blatant corruption and nepotism of the government, which can be directly traced back to the same roots that led to the Novi Sad incident and that sustain a widespread system of crony power. Additionally, there is a growing sense of a small “axis of resistance” emerging among Serbia, North Macedonia, and Hungary — an informal alignment that the European Union will inevitably have to address.

Read also: Why the European Union needs to take charge in the Balkans

Against this complex backdrop, the EU itself appears uncertain whether to apply a strategy of “carrot” or “stick,” oscillating between threats of sanctions and offers of economic and political incentives. The protests in Serbia are thus not merely civic demonstrations but a clear expression of a systemic crisis encompassing domestic governance, regional tensions, and global strategic dilemmas.

The unresolved Kosovo conflict, entrenched authoritarian tendencies, military ambiguity, and the uncertain American posture together push Serbia’s European prospects further out of reach. Without bold leadership and a radical rethinking of its strategic priorities, Serbia risks cementing its role as a hinge country without firm anchoring — swinging between internal authoritarianism and Euro-Oriental rhetoric, unable to achieve genuine modernization and full Western integration.

¹ The 2019 Montenegrin law on religious property required religious communities to provide evidence of ownership for properties acquired before 1918. The Serbian Orthodox Church perceived this as an attempt by Podgorica to seize its monasteries and churches, sparking mass protests and worsening relations between Montenegro and Serbia.