New borders, new memes: Russia’s territorial expansion and “popular geopolitics”
After three years of large-scale conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Moscow appears closer than ever to securing a partial victory. Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, along with the Ukrainian regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson, annexed in 2022 (under terms that most governments have deemed illegal), are likely to remain under Russian control. If the new US administration chooses to accommodate Putin’s demands to end the war, it would amount to a de facto international recognition of Russia’s new borders.
International context
Since 2014 – and especially since 2022 – the West and Russia have engaged in mutual demonization. Western politicians and mainstream media frequently resorted to simplistic reductio ad Hitlerum arguments, failing to acknowledge the West’s role in escalating tensions. Meanwhile, the Kremlin’s full-scale propaganda machine denied the emergence of a distinct Ukrainian national identity, while sacrificing hundreds of thousands of young lives for minimal territorial gains.
Support for Ukraine among its key Western supporters has waned over time, particularly among Republican voters in the US. The idealistic framing of the war as a struggle between “democracy and autocracy” holds less sway inside the Trump administration and amongst Trump supporters, who are more focused on socio-economic concerns and view the distant conflict as a drain on state resources. Surprised by the rapid shift in U.S. policy towards the war and unable to propose an own vision of a world order, the European Union struggles to find a place in the negotiation process.
Reflecting on public discourse and official borders since 2014 leaves a bitter sense of what could have been achieved with better policymaking. However, focusing solely on official narratives has a major flaw: It distances analysts from everyday people and risks reinforcing a simplistic “good vs. evil” dichotomy. The question “How could Russians support Putin-Hitler?” ignores the reality that public perception is shaped not just by elite discourse, but by deeply personal, everyday attachments to ideas, identities and cultural narratives.
Read also: Russia needs peace to maintain stability; Ukraine needs peace to survive
Geopolitics in Russia
Why focusing on geopolitics to shed a light on Russia’s popular culture and society? Because in Russia, geopolitics occupies a central place in public discourse and academic debates as well as in everyday life.
As academic Michail D. Suslov writes: “Geopolitics in Russia seems to be climbing the pedestal of toppled Marxism. Its gurus and pontifices claim it to be want it to be an all-explaining and all-embracing discipline […] for the whole corpus of social sciences, and a worldview supplying people with ready-made interpretations of the past and prognostications for the future.”
The ability of a state to project influence beyond its borders is not something we typically associate with our own identity in the West. Yet, in Russia “geopolitical ideas have more power to shape the community’s identity than classic political concepts such as republicanism, equality, solidarity, freedom and so on”, as Suslov puts it. The collapse of the Soviet Union had a profound impact on Russian identity. For many, the image of a powerful Russia represents a lost paradise, a source of pride to be reclaimed. In this context, Russia’s projection of power abroad often takes precedence over the actual benefits—or lack thereof—it brings to its people. As the poet Lermontov wrote in its Ismail-Bey: “Let me be a slave, if my Tsar rules the world.” This verse evokes a feeling describing the mindset of a part of Russian society.
This brings us to “popular geopolitics” – the way geopolitical ideas, narratives and power dynamics are represented and circulated in popular culture, including movies, TV shows, memes, video games and social media. Unlike formal geopolitics, which are shaped by policymakers and experts, popular geopolitics influence public perceptions of international relations and national identity through ordinary human interactions.
Russia’s territorial expansion has indeed been and continues to be absorbed and normalized within popular culture.
Why only Crimea when we can take Alaska?
In the early stages of Crimea’s annexation, Russian public rhetoric remained somewhat restrained. President Putin initially denied any Russian intervention, instead portraying Ukraine as a divided country incapable of maintaining its territorial integrity. According to this narrative, Russia was merely “welcoming home” Crimea’s population through referendums. While Russian special forces – often referred to as “little green men” – were spotted, officials denied their presence for months. Russia executed the annexation in a way that was both cunning and ambiguous, outmaneuvering the West in the process.
At the time, I was living in Saint Petersburg – Russia’s most European city – and the general mood was rather relaxed. The annexation was widely seen as the rectification of an arbitrary territorial transfer from the 1950s and, at the same time, had little impact on daily life.[1] Crimea was home to predominantly Russian-speaking populations, and its takeover occurred with minimal resistance. The West’s relatively strong response, particularly the imposition of sanctions, took many by surprise. Many Russians viewed these measures as evidence of the West’s double standards and, to some extent, as a reflection of deep-seated Russophobia. While there may have been elements of truth to this within certain circles of the US and EU administrations, the Kremlin skillfully played the victim, reinforcing the idea of a “collective West” bent on weakening Russia.
In any case, sanctions proved ineffective, as they failed to target those truly responsible while simultaneously alienating like-minded Russians who might have opposed Putin’s actions. Some critics with more pro-European views condemned the Kremlin’s imperial ambitions, arguing that Russia should focus on improving its own citizens’ lives instead.
The annexation ultimately led to a mix of pride and indifference – a pragmatic acceptance of Moscow’s first geopolitical expansion since the 1940s. The timing also played a role in shaping public perception. Since Crimea was annexed on March 18th, just 10 days after International Women’s Day, the event was humorously framed as Putin misinterpreting his fiancée’s request. The most popular joke at the time, which circulated in various forms, featured Alina Kabaeva (the gymnast and Putin’s rumored partner) explaining the mix-up.
Alina Kabaeva (Putin’s partner) talks to a friend:
“I swear, I asked him for some cream (krem), not Crimea (Krim)! Now I’m afraid to ask him for a stroller (kalyaska sounding a lot like Alaska)!”[2]
Humor of this kind was widespread on the Internet.
Putin: “Yes, you’ll get Alaska.”
Alina: “Vova (a familiar nickname for Vladimir), I’m pregnant, I need a stroller!”
Since 2014, the popular Russian comedy TV show Kamedi Klab has incorporated numerous jokes about geopolitical events, particularly the annexation of Crimea. Before 2014, Crimea was never mentioned in the show’s stand-up routines, but after the annexation, it became a frequent subject of satire.
One notable sketch featured comedian Dmitry Grachev, famous for his uncanny resemblance to Vladimir Putin—a likeness so strong that he is rarely cast in any other roles on television or in movies. In this sketch, Grachev, impersonating Putin, is shown calmly shaving when his advisors enter the room. They inform him that all major Crimean cities, including Sevastopol, are ready to hold referendums on joining Russia. Without hesitation, Putin finishes shaving and then nonchalantly authorizes the referendums. The punchline comes as he applies aftershave (krem)—a play on words with Krim (Crimea in Russian).
This joke exemplifies how Kamedi Klab used humor to depict the annexation as a swift, effortless decision, aligning with the official Russian narrative of Crimea’s “peaceful return home”.
Read also: From anti-Kremlin satire to anti-Biden series: humor as a power tool in Putin’s Russia
Russians jokingly were accepting that Russia’s borders might be subjected to expansions. Why limiting oneself to Crimea (Krim)? The Anglo-Russian neologism Ice-Krim also hinted at a potential reconquest of Alaska. The following meme, along with the joke that accompanied it, was very popular:
Putin: “Do you know what I call Alaska now?”
Obama: “What do you call it?”
Putin: “Ice-Krim”
Obama: —–
Children of Russia, make your own chocolate annexation!
In September 2022, the Kremlin celebrated the annexation of four Ukrainian regions to Russia through referendums, that not only had dubious legitimacy but did not even define clearly which territory was being seized. Putin signed the annexation as the Ukrainian counteroffensive was partially liberating the territories, up to the city of Kherson in November 2022.
To cover up the military and geopolitical instability in which the referendum took place, Russia’s discourse was triumphalist. Rossiya zdes’ navsegda (Russia is here forever) was the slogan repeated by the official media.
Read also: “La maggioranza mondiale”: la de-occidentalizzazione vista dal Cremlino
For ordinary Russians there was no doubt. Russia once again was becoming bigger, liberating and incorporating “historically Russian territories” and that was forever. New maps, in public buildings, websites and schools were proof of this. A law was approved by the Duma,[3] threatening individuals distributing maps that challenge Russia’s territorial integrity with a fine of up to one million rubles or detention of up to 15 days. The banned maps, considered “extremist”, are those that do not depict the new official borders and fail to include Crimea, the Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics (DNR and LNR), the Zaporizhzhya and Kherson regions, or the Kuril Islands.
Supposing they learnt the lesson at school, children get a special treat, to approach the new geography of Russia in a playful way.
A famous Russian company commercialized chocolates in the shape of the new annexed territories, for children to play with, learn and eat. Young Russians are thus invited to literally “swallow” the new territories. The box contains a map of Russia, two packets of liquid chocolate, and molds shaped like the eastern regions of Ukraine (Crimea, Luhansk, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson). The family is supposed to pour the liquid chocolate into the molds, wait for it to cool down and then eat it. The box also includes the lyrics of the Russian national anthem, just in case the family wants to sing along while the chocolate cools. After all, there’s no such thing as too much patriotism when education is involved.
Article 67.4 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation (2020 Amendment) states that “Children are a fundamental priority of state policy in Russia. The state shall create conditions leading to the all-round spiritual, moral, intellectual and physical development of children and reinforce in them patriotism, citizenship and respect for elders […]”
As children swallow chunks of Ukraine, adults are encouraged to move there with concrete economic benefits. To attract settlers, Russian banks offer subsidized mortgage programs with significantly reduced interest rates for properties in the occupied regions of Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia. Since 2023, major banks like VTB and Sberbank have provided 2% mortgage rates for newly built homes in these areas[4] – far lower than Russia’s national mortgage rates, which can approach 30%.
Pop stars, famous comedians have been paid to have concerts and shows in the annexed regions, and many other supported the war in their performances. While performing his song Ya russkii (“I Am Russian”) singer Shaman theatrically pressed a red button housed within a black suitcase, symbolizing the launch of nuclear missiles.
The list of popular geopolitics notable facts is infinite, from “anti-sanctions” menus in restaurants to Putin-Trump t-shirts sold in Moscow’s metro kiosks. It also includes all the unrecorded, everyday exchanges through which people integrate change, and try to cope with the new world they live in.
The appeal of “popular geopolitics”
Popular geopolitics provide a crucial lens for examining how ordinary people gradually normalize and accept political and territorial change in their daily lives. Unlike the rigid and often sterile narratives of political elites – both in the West and in Russia – popular culture, humor and routine interactions reveal how such shifts take root in society. The elite discourse remains locked in mutual demonization: on one side, Russia portrays “the collective West” as decadent and hostile; on the other, Western politicians and analysts often fall into the trap of reducing Russia to a monolithic “collective Putin”, ignoring internal nuances and alternative perspectives.
Focusing on everyday life – how people joke, invest, adapt and rationalize political changes – moves beyond abstract policy debates to reveal how power, identity and territory are experienced, making it an essential approach for anyone seeking to grasp the true impact of global events.
Notes:
[1] In 1954, Nikita Chrushev decided the handover of Crimea to the Soviet Socialist Republic of Ukraine. A merely administrative and symbolic decision within the common borders of the Soviet Union.
[2] This joke requires a linguistic explanation: Krim (“Crimea”) sounds very similar to krem (“cream”), and Alyaska closely resembles kalyaska (“stroller”).
[3] This is an amendment to Article 20.29 of the Code of Administrative Offenses (KOAP) concerning the production and distribution of extremist material. https://tass.com/politics/1560341?utm_source=t.co&utm_medium=referral&utm_campaign=t.co&utm_referrer=t.co).
[4] https://meduza.io/en/news/2024/10/30/russia-s-second-largest-state-controlled-bank-unveils-new-preferential-mortgage-loans-in-occupied-ukraine
