Moscow, Tehran, Ankara: Syria’s new dawn or another storm?
As thousands watched with hope as the dust settled over Beirut following the implementation of the much-anticipated – and, since its inception, much-violated – Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement brokered by the United States and France, Syria’s second-largest city, Aleppo, the City of Jasmine, was overrun by rebels led by the Islamist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS). In just 12 days, the Idlib-based group mounted a lightning offensive that stripped Syrian government forces of one major city after another. By December 8th, the rebels had reached the gates of Damascus, prompting Bashar al-Assad, the heir to the last Cold War-era Ba’athist dictatorship, to flee to Moscow. HTS, previously known as Jabhat al-Nusra, is the former Syrian branch of al-Qaeda, which it swore allegiance to after having split from ISIS, and which it severed its ties with in 2017.
In fewer days than the years that have passed since the words “Your turn next, doctor” appeared on the walls of a school in Daraa, marking the beginning of the Syrian revolution within the wider context of the Arab Spring in 2011, anti-Assad rebels retook control of Aleppo, Hama and Homs, all strategic points that ultimately led to the regime’s collapse. While Syria observers were not surprised by the renewed boldness of Syrian rebel factions given the geopolitical context of this moment in time, the pace at which HTS and the Syrian National Army (SNA), the second-largest faction in the rebel movement, swiftly advanced through the country – and the relative lack of bloodshed that accompanied their progress – shocked nearly everybody and raised lingering doubts and unanswered questions.
Today, Syria’s neighbors on all sides, Assad’s patrons in Moscow and Tehran, Syrians of all ethnic backgrounds both inside and outside the country, a politically transitioning Washington, a Tel Aviv in turmoil, and an international community strained by conflicts in Gaza and Ukraine are all closely watching every move of HTS leader Ahmad al-Sharaa, also known as Mohammed al-Jolani. With many seeking to decipher what Syria will look like in the post-Assad era for citizens traumatized by decades of dictatorship and 13 years of war, and others more pressed with what it will mean for the region as a whole, one thing is sure: Assad may be gone, but the path to a truly free Syria is still long and dotted with obstacles at every turn.
Why now?
Following four years of largely static conflict lines crystallized by a ceasefire negotiated by Russia and Turkey in 2020, a cascade of events stemming from the October 7th Hamas attack and Israel’s ensuing war of annihilation against Gaza, created the perfect storm for HTS to exploit. Aware of the fact that Assad’s key allies—Russia, Iran and the crown jewel of the latter’s Axis of Resistance, Hezbollah—were distracted in Ukraine, Gaza and Lebanon respectively, al-Jolani made a gamble, one that, two weeks later, when even the US-backed Kurdish-led forces in Northeastern Syria (NES) have raised the flag of Jolani’s Syrian Salvation Government, proved fruitful.
After the initial years of the Syrian rebellion, which saw the opposition forces gaining ground and threatening the stability of the regime, the equation in Syria changed dramatically with Russia’s arrival onto the battlefield. In 2015, Russia intervened militarily in support of Assad, unleashing a brutal bombing campaign that led to the fall of Aleppo, after which the regime managed to reclaim key territories in the south. Moscow did not only provide military, but also diplomatic support to Assad, acting as a mediator in a series of circumstances with different actors, chief among them, Ankara, a long-time enemy of the regime, which has been supporting rebel groups since the beginning of the Syrian uprising.
Since 2022, however, Russia has been forced to divert its attention and resources from Syria to Ukraine, in what ended up being a much more drawn-out war than what the Kremlin had hoped for. Similarly, Iran and Hezbollah, which have been pivotal in supporting Assad financially and militarily, are currently preoccupied with the high-intensity combat with Israel in Lebanon as a result of Israel’s continued war on Gaza. Moscow and Tehran’s distractions left Assad more vulnerable than ever, providing HTS with the perfect time to strike.
What is at stake for Moscow and Tehran?
Just as Russia was essential to the survival of the Assad regime until December 8th, Syria has been equally valuable to Russian President Vladimir Putin in the pursuit of his strategic interests in the region. Russian military presence in Syria, anchored by the naval base in Tartus and the Hmeimim airbase in Latakia, is a critical component of Moscow’s regional strategy. While both bases date back to the 1970s when Syria was firmly within the Soviet sphere of influence, they have now become emblematic of Russia’s military intervention in Syria in 2015. The Tartus base remains Russia’s only naval access point to the Mediterranean, a historical aspiration of the Kremlin, one that in light of the 49 year lease granted by Assad to Russia, President Putin will not let go of so easily.
Military presence in Syria allows Moscow to project power into NATO’s southern flank, deter the West, and bolster its intelligence-gathering capabilities against the US and its allies, in addition to strengthening its position in the Black Sea, and facilitating Russia’s growing influence in Libya, the Sahel and the Red Sea.
Despite Russia having partially pulled back from Northern Syria and the Alawite Mountains, its continued presence at Tartus and Hmeimim demonstrates Moscow’s determination to hold its ground. Russian state media, Interfax recently reported that Russia had established direct contact with HTS leadership in view of negotiating a continued Russian presence in Tartus and Latakia. Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov was quoted as saying that the negotiations were “proceeding in constructive fashion”.
While a sustained Russian naval presence in Tartus might prove economically beneficial to the new leaders, agreeing to let Russians stay in the Hmeimim air base, from which thousands of warplanes – that have traumatized the Syrian population and sowed destruction around the country – have taken off since 2015, might prove a harder sell, even for public relations master al-Jolani. Too favorable a deal with the Russians, coupled with the currently very disengaged stance of the HTS leader vis-à-vis Israel, despite Tel Aviv’s intensified bombings of Syria since the fall of Assad and its ongoing incursion in the Golan Heights, might prove to be too much too soon for a population that ardently craves peace but has learned the hard way not to trust either friends or foes.
If Russia has been a cornerstone of Assad’s survival, Tehran has been the regime’s lifeline, providing financial and military support in addition to ensuring a strong Hezbollah presence on the ground to protect the interests of the Alawite-held regime. Meanwhile, Iran leveraged its influence in southern Syria and along the Iraq-Syria border to secure its own regional interests, cultivating pro-Iranian groups, and establishing supply routes that form the so-called “Shia Crescent”. This corridor passing through Syria linked Tehran to Hezbollah in Lebanon, bolstering Iran’s ability to counter US and Israeli influence while pursuing regional hegemony, its main goal. Moreover, Southern Syria has also served as an important stage for Iran’s asymmetric attacks against Israel.
Hezbollah, Tehran’s most critical ally, has been instrumental in securing the Syria-Lebanon border in instances such as the battle of Qusayr in 2013 as well as in Aleppo and the Qalamoun Mountains, all turning points that contributed to consolidating Iranian influence in Syria. However, since the escalation of the conflict with Israel in Lebanon to high-intensity warfare stretched Hezbollah’s resources thin, a security/power vacuum emerged in Syria’s southern and eastern regions under HTS’s watchful eye.
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Hezbollah currently stands as the actor to have lost most since the ousting of Assad, with its leader Naim Qassem having acknowledged that the group had in fact lost its primary supply route through Syria following anti-Assad fighters’ takeover of the Iraq-Syria border on December 6th. This route, crucial for transporting weapons and military equipment from Iran to Lebanon via Iraq and Syria, might prove to be a fatal blow to the group. Despite this setback and following in the Hezbollah tradition of trivializing any defeat, Qassem downplayed the impact, suggesting that the route could be restored under a new regime or that alternative pathways might be established. Following Qassem expressing hope for continued cooperation between Lebanon and Syria, also in view of what the Hezbollah leader stressed as the priority of maintaining opposition to Israel, it appears that al-Jolani currently has the upper hand when it comes to deciding how to position himself towards south Lebanon and transitively, also Tehran.
The latter has openly stated its desire to establish relations with the rebel government, noting that Syrian people have the right to determine who they want to be ruled by. Iran’s ambassador to Syria, Hossein Akbari, who has returned to Tehran since the ousting of Assad, told Iranian state media the embassy will soon resume its activities, praising rebels for not only not attacking the embassy building but ensuring it remained unscathed.
For Iran, political repression has already proven to be a time bomb of public discontent in the wave of protests that shook Iran following the murder of a Kurdish Iranian woman, Zhina Mahsa Amini, at the hands of the Ayatollah’s regime’s morality police in September 2022. The loss of a foothold in Syria could be severely destabilizing. Tehran’s support of Assad has proven both costly and, in light of recent events, unsuccessful, which could further undermine the regime’s domestic legitimacy. Additionally, the possibility of an Assad-free Syria, being a checkmate for Hezbollah, is a geopolitical setback that could weaken Iran’s position in the Middle East, making it more vulnerable to both internal and external pressures.
Ankara, the SNA and Kurdish autonomy
Of the three external protagonists in the Syrian war, only one has remained as vigilant as ever: Ankara. Since 2016, Turkey has become the political center determining developments in Northwest Syria (NWS), carefully weaving a network of security and economic dependencies within the de facto buffer zone it created in the area. The entrenchment of the NWS into Turkey’s security framework makes the latter the party that stands to gain the most from the toppling of Assad. The rebel offensive, which followed Assad’s recent rejection of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s overtures for rapprochement – meant to address the Syrian refugee issue – drove many to imply HTS and the SNA’s offensive was launched under the tacit approval of Ankara.
Through the years, Turkey’s involvement in NWS has taken different shapes. On one hand it was reflected in military operations like Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch, through which Ankara sought to secure its borders via mass displacement of Kurdish civilians and population engineering, counter the Democratic Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (DAANES), governed by the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), and establish a zone of influence in NWS. On the other, it took the form of the instrumentalization of border crossings to create economic dependence in the area. Within this context, the SNA has become a key tool in achieving these goals. The SNA emerged from the remnants of the Free Syrian Army refashioned into a new body through Turkish patronage, and came to effectively operates as a Turkish proxy, aligning with Turkey’s strategic objectives, the first of which is preventing the permanent establishment of a semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Syria on the model of the Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Ankara views the YPG, the political backbone of the SDF, as being linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), recognized by Turkey as a terrorist group and considered to be an existential threat to the country. The SNA depends on Turkey for its survival, both in financial and operational terms, making it an easily leverageable force.
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Following the toppling of Assad, a joint HTS and SNA endeavor, the SNA has been engaged in a heavy offensive in northern Syria, targeting the area from Afrin to Manbij. A key canton in NES, located northeast of Aleppo, Manbij serves as a vital crossroads between formerly regime-controlled areas, DAANES-administered Aleppo neighborhoods such as Sheikh Maqsoud and Ashrafiyeh, and the area of Shahba, now occupied by the SNA. Since the escalation of the SNA offensive on SDF-held territories in northern Syria, Manbij has come under heavy shelling, and was targeted by drone strikes, as well as attempted ground infiltrations by Turkish-backed forces. Two days prior to the fall of Assad, SDF Commander-in-Chief Mazloum Abdi reiterated the desire to resolve tensions with Turkey through dialogue while stressing the SDF would not falter when it came to self-defense. That same day, SNA factions declared the start of an operation to seize Manbij. Following US mediation, the leader of the SDF announced on 11 December that a ceasefire deal had been reached between the Kurdish-led force and the SNA. In the late hours of 16 December the Head of the SDF media center, Farhad Shami, announced that US mediation efforts between SNA and SDF in Manbij and Kobani failed to secure a permanent ceasefire, with The Wall Street Journal reporting that Washington fears a Turkish incursion into northern Syria is imminent.
However, while Turkey has a lot to gain, namely the expansion of its buffer zone and the weakening of the SDF, another challenge on the horizon jeopardizes this goal, ensuring, albeit temporarily, Washington’s continued focus on containment of Turkey in the North: threat of ISIS resurgence. ISIS remnants have exploited the chaos, regaining footholds in central desert areas like Deir ez-Zor and Homs. Recently, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken met with Erdogan in Ankara to discuss recent developments in Syria. Blinken called on Turkey to ensure its continuous engagement in preventing an ISIS resurgence in Syria, to which Ankara responded by reassuring Washington that it would not ease up in the fight against ISIS. Nevertheless, Erdogan asserted that Turkey preserved the entitlement to take “preventive” measures against Kurdish forces, which Ankara sees as an extension of the PKK.
Washington is set to maintain its support for the SDF, at least for the last days of the Biden administration. However, a potential shift in US policy under Donald Trump could reshape these dynamics. Trump’s 2019 decision to withdraw support from Kurdish allies demonstrated that Washington’s commitment to its Kurdish partners is not ironclad like that towards Israel. In this uncertain landscape, Turkey is faced with a choice its military buildup at the border with Syria seems to indicate might have already been taken. This being said, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan’s visit to Damascus, where he was spotted sipping tea with al-Jolani on Mount Qasioun, between a vow to support the new Syria and a statement of concern for the threat of PKK terrorism, betrays a 360 degree approach by Ankara, one made not only of sticks but also of very alluring carrots for a country in transition in need of as many friends as it can get. Washington knows that a weaker and betrayed SDF means a stronger ISIS. What will it be ready to risk to prevent it?
What does tomorrow hold?
Amid international concerns about Syria’s future, numerous questions remain unanswered, but a few will be pivotal in determining the country’s trajectory. HTS’s pragmatic approach to governance, which has until now only been applied to the Greater Idlib area, leaves uncertainties about how it will attempt to govern the entire country, especially when 40% of it, including the most resource-rich areas in the northeast, remains under SDF control. While Syria may finally be free of Assad, it is far from free of neighboring powers eager for influence, and its minorities, long deprived of representation and freedom under 50 years of tyranny, remain starved for rights and representation.
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Chief among them are the Kurds, who, after leading the fight against ISIS, have experienced semi-autonomy for several years. HTS leader al-Jolani has made several statements suggesting Kurds will be an essential part of the political transition of Syria, but it remains to be seen how, and the risk of there not being space for Rojava on the map of the new Syria is high. Against the backdrop of the burning of a Christmas tree in Suqaylabiyah, a Christian-majority town in central Syria on Christmas eve, protesters took to the streets, reminding HTS that their current popularity can easily be lost if they do not maintain their promises.
One of HTS’s first critical tests with the international community will be demonstrating a commitment towards transitional governance and constitutional amendments are not mere talk and publicity, which will likely determine how many capitals drop the “terrorist” label. Another pressing issue is how HTS will handle historically pro-Assad strongholds and minorities, many members of which, skeptical of unfulfilled promises, are migrating toward Lebanon, while many Syrians in Lebanon and Jordan rush to return. Syria, however, is ill-prepared for mass returns, and how al-Jolani addresses this will also be a major determinant of his group’s sustained legitimacy domestically. The ambush led by Assad loyalists in the Tartous countryside, which resulted in the killing of fourteen Syrian policemen, and the new administration’s ensuing security crackdown on Tartous, threaten to rock the relative calm that has characterized the post-Assad transition in areas considered to be bastions of regime power.
When it comes to foreign policy considerations, al-Jolani, whose moniker references his family’s displacement from the Golan Heights, has refrained from responding to Israel’s relentless strikes targeting Syrian military weapons depots, air defenses and other military infrastructure, stating that Syria is not interested in another war. Meanwhile, Israel has also made advances into the previously UN-patrolled zone in the Golan Heights, with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s cabinet approving the plan to double the settler population in the area. Might this show of restraint by al-Jolani, whose response to Israel’s provocations has been to plead with the UN, be a bargaining strategy in HTS’s bid for international recognition? And if Turkey proceeds with its incursion into Syria, how would the Salvation Government respond?
