How a new Middle East could emerge: an Israeli view
In the early 1990s, Shimon Peres, Peace Nobel Peace Prize laureate, authored one of his well-known books: “The New Middle East: A Framework and Process Towards an Era of Peace”. In this book, Peres outlines his vision for a Middle East at peace, with potential flourishing in agriculture, trade, tourism, and industry—prosperity that would distance the region from an era of violence. The book also provides a behind-the-scenes look at the Oslo Accords of August 1993, filled with optimism and vision. Today’s Middle East seems far removed from this vision, but could it be that, precisely from the deep crisis we find ourselves in today, a new hope might emerge?
More than 14 months have passed since that terrible day when Hamas leader Yehya Sinwar led the Nukhba militants in a brutal and savage terror attack, resulting in the deaths of over 1,200 children, the elderly, women, men, and soldiers, most of whom were Israeli civilians. It is highly doubtful that, in his violent and merciless vision, he foresaw the radical changes that would unfold across the entire region.
Two weeks have passed since the ceasefire agreement between Hezbollah and Israel, brokered through the efforts of the Biden administration, came into effect. This agreement followed several months of intense fighting, which left southern Lebanon devastated. The Shiite villages along the border area near Israel were largely reduced to rubble, highlighting the deep infiltration of the terrorist organization into civilian population centers. Even now, the IDF’s efforts to destroy terrorist infrastructure continue, before the IDF withdraws and is replaced by the Lebanese Army and UNIFIL II.
On the other side of the border, the damage is extensive and significant. Residents of northern Israel are gradually beginning to return to their homes. Some of the infrastructure has been destroyed, thousands of homes were damaged, businesses were closed, and the ability to recover economically is unclear for the time being. Families with children will not return before the start of the next school year, and not before they will have the certainty and security required for the continuation of normal life.
Despite the heavy toll in northern Israel, many of the mayors and local leaders, as well as numerous residents, opposed the ceasefire agreement out of a genuine fear of Hezbollah militants returning to the proximity of the border. The findings uncovered by IDF forces near the border, including bunkers, weapons, vehicles, water, food, and more, are evidence of Hezbollah’s high level of preparedness to execute their doomsday scenario. The residents now understand how close they were to a murderous terrorist attack similar to the October 7th events in southern Israel. A sense of security is not an absolute concept; it is a subjective feeling, and the events of the past year were nothing short of traumatic for the residents of northern Israel. It is not something that can be guaranteed by any agreement, whether this one or another. The wound from the October 7th events remains open in northern Israel as well. Criticism of Prime Minister Netanyahu came from residents of the area, his coalition partners, and the opposition. The military and tactical success has not been translated into a shared understanding that it is time to return to normalcy.
The IDF, under the guidance of the political leadership, was careful not to target Lebanese symbols of authority and sought to distinguish between the terrorist organization and the state of Lebanon. This largely artificial separation is complicated by Hezbollah’s role as part of the Lebanese parliament and its deep integration into the country’s political system. Despite criticism from within, Prime Minister Netanyahu managed to secure a majority in his coalition government for the ceasefire agreement.
Even within Israel’s most right-wing government, there was an understanding that the military could not maintain such a high level of engagement indefinitely, and that time was needed for reorganization and for replenishing the depleted resources of soldiers and emergency stockpiles. The IDF’s achievements are indisputable – complete elimination of the organization’s leadership, damage to the physical infrastructure near the border, which neutralized the immediate threat of invasion, strikes on production facilities in Lebanon and Syria, as well as on command centers across Lebanon, including in the capital, Beirut.
Politically, the agreement brings the United States back to the region after many years, with the US set to lead the enforcement mechanism of the agreement’s most delicate clauses. France will also return to Lebanon, not necessarily because Israel wanted it, but because the Lebanese government expects a “balanced” mechanism. It is doubtful whether French influence will be significant, but it is likely to be, at best, a form of benign support.
Until just a few days ago, it could be assumed that the incoming administration in Washington, which is expected to be less critical of Israel’s policies, would focus on countering Hezbollah’s violations. However, the volatile Middle East had other plans. As President Trump returns to the White House in January, he will encounter a Middle East that is radically different from the one he knew four years ago, and different from what top experts had predicted.
The severe blow to Hezbollah, coupled with the weakening of Iran and Russia, awakened the Sunni rebels in Syria from their long dormancy. Encouraged by Turkey, they advanced almost unopposed all the way to Damascus. Over 50 years of tyranny under the “Lion” of Damascus (Assad in Arabic meaning “lion”) came to an end. Without the support of Hezbollah, Russia, and Iran, the Syrian army stood no chance. What began in March 2011 as one of the most brutal civil wars between a leader and his people, resulting in the deaths of over 600,000 civilians and a refugee crisis that dramatically impacted Europe, concluded with political asylum in Moscow.
It is too early to predict what will happen in Syria, a country composed of Alawite, Druze, Kurdish, Sunni, and other minority groups, with very little that unites them. This complexity is further compounded by the various rebel factions, some of which have ties to the most violent jihadist sects seen in the region, such as Al-Qaeda and others. There is no expectation that Syria will transform into an enlightened democracy in the foreseeable future. The likelihood of a civil war and blood feuds is high, and the stability of the country, whose economic situation is precarious, remains shrouded in uncertainty. At the time of writing, it appears that the rebels are trying to avoid escalating the region into violence. However, assuming authority is very different from taking responsibility.
The Iranian-Shiite axis, which for years has supported Hezbollah and helped keep Assad’s brutal regime in power, now finds itself facing a new reality. The destabilizing and terrorist strategy of the Ayatollahs’ government is left without its key assets. Does this mean that Iran has given up control over Syria? It is probably too early to say. However, it seems that the once simple transfer of militants and arms to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria will no longer be as effortless. The loss of Tehran’s strategic assets, including the disbandment of Hamas, could lead to a major upheaval and transformation in the region – whether through an acceleration of Iran’s nuclear program and the beginning of a regional nuclear arms race, or a shift in focus of Iran’s efforts to Iraq and Yemen. The United States and its allies will soon face difficult dilemmas.
The IDF has taken commanding positions along the border within what is defined as the buffer zone according to the 1973 ceasefire agreement. This border, which for over half a century has been one of the quietest, may suddenly become a new point of friction. Even if not immediately, it could become a real challenge for Israel. In recent days, the IDF forces in collaboration with US troops, have been targeting Syrian military assets to reduce the likelihood of strategic assets falling into the wrong hands. The lesson learned from the falls of Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi is that militants involved in the distribution and profit from weapon sales in the region are waiting for an opportunity. The IDF and US forces are working to prevent this from happening. This is a broad and significant move, taking advantage of an opportunity, however, it goes without saying that this move is not without risks in the short or medium term.
The October 7th terrorist attack triggered a series of far-reaching events that are still underway (and certainly will not end until all 100 hostages, both alive and dead, are returned to Israel from Gaza). Much will depend on the decisiveness of the Iranian regime and its desire to maintain regional influence, the new US administration’s determination to create a new regional order, and, of course, Israel’s ability, under its far-right government, to make sustainable decisions.
Paradoxically, Shimon Peres’s book, which now seems like a distant fantasy, could, if the US, moderate Muslim states, and Israel act with determination, become a highly relevant vision. A strong political stance against Iran, preventing it from becoming a nuclear power, and curbing its destabilizing actions are key to this. Only time will tell if, from this great darkness, a path to renewal and prosperity will emerge.
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