In witnessing Turkish military involvement over the past few years – including in Syria, Libya and in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict – one thing was striking: the significant capabilities of its military drones. Speaking to this effect, was the fellow momentum of exports for these weapons systems that was subsequently generated. Turkey exported drones to Ukraine, Azerbaijan, Morocco, Poland, Turkmenistan, Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan and Tunisia. In addition, according to the Chief Technological Officer (CTO) of Baykar, the Turkish company which produces domestically the Bayraktar TB2 drones, Ankara was reported to be holding talks with 10 additional countries concerning the potential exports of these systems last August.
While Turkish defense exports are nothing new – the country being a long-time supplier of armored vehicles – two notable differences have been emphasized as of recently. On the one hand, the nature of the technology being exported has changed, now being spearheaded by advanced drone systems. On the other hand, the customer base has also evolved. In the past, traditional customers of Ankara’s defense platforms have to a large extent been Muslim, long-standing allies’ countries such as Qatar, Pakistan, Bahrain and Turkmenistan. As recently as 2019, authors Efstathiou and Waldwyn wrote that, “Turkey has yet to secure any significant defense exports to fellow NATO members.” Less than two years later, Ankara inked a significant billion-dollar deal with Poland for the export of military drones, the first sale to a NATO and EU member state. Both the recent expansion of Turkish defense exports, as well as its increased deployment of drones, are both reflective of its regional ambitions of imposing hard power through the projection of its influence across the MENA region using military means.
Drone diplomacy
In recent years, the sales of Turkish weapons have been directly linked to the country’s economic rise, as well as to its political advancements. This phenomenon having centered primarily around the exports of drones has been coined in some instances as “drone diplomacy”, which in essence is an integration of foreign and drone policy. Defense informs the country’s policy and decisions abroad allowing it to cement deeper diplomatic relations with other countries through security contracts. For example, following the trip of Polish President Andrzej Duda to Ankara, the two countries announced that alongside the deal to procure Warsaw with 24 TB2 drones, an additional four agreements had been signed. These were aimed at creating a new drive for bilateral relations and deepening the states’ strategic partnership – which Turkish foreign minister, Mevlut Cavusoglu, said will be “a guarantor of peace and prosperity for the region.”
Nonetheless, drone diplomacy is not only used by Turkey to necessarily establish good or deeper relations with other countries. In many instances, Ankara has largely deployed these platforms in order to insert itself in conflicts with the goal of establishing a military presence and be in a position of influence postwar. This was seen specifically within the Syrian conflict. Although drones are now an integral component of almost all Turkish military and counterterrorism missions in Syria, it only initially started using them in this context in 2018 as part of Operation Olive Branch. Its primary objectives were to prevent Washington from further cooperating with Kurdish forces in the creation of an autonomous entity, stopping refugees from crossing the Turkish-Syrian border while also attempting to give further credibility to Turkey’s army. Additionally, from a wider perspective, the successful use of drone in the conflict helped to ensure that Turkey was seen as an important player and had a seat at the negotiation table alongside Russia and the US.
Read also: Turkey’s dangerous game in Syria, between the Damascus regime and the return of ISIS
Throughout the Libyan conflict, Turkey’s use of its drones also served as a crucial tool in conducting an increasingly aggressive foreign policy. Furthermore, it was Turkish aerial firepower capabilities that proved to be critical in the outcome of the war and in supporting the Tripoli-based government against Haftar’s Libyan National Army.
In a similar manner, during the Azerbaijan-Armenia conflict, which represented the fifth war zone in which Turkish drones were deployed in recent years, the key ambitions behind the sale of the drones to the Azeris was linked with deepening military ties and safeguarding its stake as a key player in any future political settlement. While Ankara has traditionally supported Azerbaijan, its active assistance in this war was bolder than before. Recent reports emerged stating that Turkey was potentially considering building a military base in Azerbaijan, as Russia has one in Armenia. In part, this underpinned Turkey’s growing willingness to deploy weapons in order to achieve its regional interests, in this case related to the energy, security and economic sectors. Turkey has an important pipeline that passes through Azerbaijan, which is one of its closest political and cultural allies.
A unique component of Ankara’s involvement in these conflicts was the widespread broadcast of successful strikes conducted by Turkish drones in combat. The country employed this mechanism as a strategy to promote its capabilities in the modern battlefield, successfully striking armored vehicles, artillery and Russian-made anti-aircraft systems. This policy played a pivotal in increasing the marketing value of its unmanned platform, as well as bolstering the political status represented by its drones. The sales to the Ukraine and Poland, two countries feeling a greater Russian threat, are evidence of the power of this important tool.
Looking ahead: increasing Turkish interests in the Eastern Mediterranean
Last August, increasing concerns were expressed by several of Cyprus’ neighbors over the lasting presence of Turkish drones at a military airbase in the northern part of the country. Next month will mark one year since the drones were deployed in 2019 in the gas-rich Eastern Mediterranean area, which regional states fear is a sign of the growing instability and tensions on the island (which has historically suffered from pre-existing tensions among ethnic lines).
The deployment of the TB2 drones comes after over 20 years of absence of any Turkish military aircraft at the Gecitkale airbase. However, it is also happening while Turkey is in conflict with Greece, Cyprus, Israel, as well as Egypt regarding the exclusivity of economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean and hydrocarbon exploration activities.
Read also: Turkey’s moves in Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean: ambitions and interests
Recently, Libya made two deals with the Turkish government – one of which was fundamentally important given the current circumstances. As a result of their maritime agreement, Ankara is now in a position to protect both its rights and the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus in the region, without push back from regional states. The decision made by Ankara to send its platforms to Gecitkale – a move supported by the Northern Cyprus government – signal two important things. On the one hand, it was an initial step towards creating an airbase in the region and highlights that the country is moving forward with its intention of fortifying its military security interests through the increase of air and naval capabilities in the Eastern Mediterranean. On the other hand, it also indicates a shift in Turkish military requirements.
The drones protecting Turkish boats during regional drilling and seismic activities were in the past deployed from Dalaman (on the southwest coast of Turkey), which would take total flight time of eight hours before reaching the designed operation location. Now, as the drones are deployed within Cyprus itself, it provides several benefits and advantages for Turkey and the safety of its vessels in terms of cost and time saving, as well as allowing the systems to perform better.
As Turkey looks for new strategic partners, it could very well conduct drone diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean through the deployment of more drones in the near future to assert a stronger presence. This is likely to be a cause of worry for the region as the speed at which Ankara’s drone market and ambitions are expanding is, to say the least, rapid.
Considering that the response from the Cyprus government towards Turkey’s initial drone deployment was denouncing the country’s regional expansionist policies through military means, it remains to be seen what action it would take if Ankara were to increase the number of drones at the Gecitkale base.