Israel’s aerial attack in Qatar against the leadership of Hamas (9 September) heavily impacted security relations in the Middle East, accelerating realignments and, most of all, counter-alignments. The emirate received wide solidarity from within and without the region, but Doha and the GCC states are “lonely in the crowd”, since no one can practically compensate the perceived declining American influence and protection. The attack has three levels of implications: for Middle Eastern balances, for GCC states’ security, and for the GCC states-US alliance.
Back to the past
Israel’s attack in Qatar brings the Middle East back in time. With Doha’s sovereignty violated, officially without the US approval, leaders in the region, especially Arab ones, have returned to perceive Israel as a direct threat to their security. This awareness echoes in countries that normalized relations with Israel a long time ago, such as Egypt and Jordan, as well as in countries which were close to establish diplomatic relations, such as Saudi Arabia.
The Gaza nightmare is part of this perception. Not only are the Arab states upset by the ongoing famine and the ground offensive’s consequences: they also fear now that the limitless destruction in the Strip, the annexations in the West Bank and the rejection of a Palestinian state by the Israeli government (even as a longer term prospect) will ultimately affect their own security, from refugees’ displacement and financial burden to terrorism.
This occurs as the Arab States have openly distanced themselves from Hamas after the October 7th massacre. This trajectory has resulted into the approval of the French-Saudi “New York Declaration” at the UN General Assembly (12 September), asking for Hamas’ disarmament and exclusion from future governance in the Strip. But recent events, including the attack in Doha have increased Israel’s isolation in the Middle East. Arab and Muslim leaders’ harsh speeches against Israel at the emergency summit hosted by the Al Thani’s emirate (15 September, with members of the Arab League and the Organization for Islamic Cooperation), echoed the rhetoric that had characterized Arab-Israeli relations since 1948, but had somewhat subsided in recent years.
Ironically, Iran also expressed solidarity to Qatar for the Israeli attack, with president Masoud Pezeshkian joining the summit in Doha: Tehran was responsible for a previous violation of Qatar’s sovereignty, striking in June 2025 at the US base in Al Udeid. But Iran’s posture in this case is part of the geopolitical game: Iran just seized the occasion, offered on a silver plate by the Israeli government, to prove its point with the GCC states that Israel in the major threat to regional stability. The visit by Ali Larijani, the powerful Iranian politician who currently heads the Supreme National Security Council, in Riyadh (16 September), where he met the crown prince Mohammed bin Salman, highlights the current convergence of interests. Moreover, the growing Middle East states’ alignment against Israel helps Iran to overcome its diplomatic isolation, despite having been militarily weakened and internally divided.
Between security concerns and push for normalization
For the GCC states, the attack in Qatar has been shocking. For them, the Middle Eastern turmoil is no longer about regional politics only: what happened in Doha is a matter of national and internal security. Israel’s twelve-days war on Iran had started to worry Gulf leaders regarding the goals of the Israeli government in the region, with Jordan’s king acutely saying that “there is no telling where the boundaries of this battleground will end”. During the Israel-US-led attack on Iran, the knowingly defense-deprived GCC states understood that regional confrontation had become too dangerous, and the indirect geopolitical gains they have earned because of Iran and Iranian allies’ weakening could backfire. The attack by Tehran at Al Udeid, although likely announced in advance, was the first confirmation of these fears.
The normalization process, that was being openly pursued by the Gulf States with Israel since 2020, cannot survive in the absence of a minimum degree of trust: for the first time since October 7th, the Abraham Accords are at risk, and even previous normalizations, like those of Egypt and Jordan. Lana Nusseibeh, the Emirati Assistant Minister for Political Affairs and Envoy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that “annexation by Israel of Palestinian land, if pursued, would not only close the door to peace and integration, it would betray the very spirit of the Abraham Accords”.
Emirati officials now directly suggest that the Accords have been practically rescinded because of the Israeli government decisions. The UAE had repeatedly stressed, after the Gaza war began, that the Abraham Accords are a strategic choice “and strategic decisions are long-term”.
The GCC States-US alliance in crisis
The two attacks on Qatari soil in three months, by Iran in June, and by Israel in September are clear signs that the US deterrence guarantee is declining. The trend emerged in 2019 when Iran, with a “grey operation” officially denied by Tehran, attacked Saudi Aramco’s plants with drones and missiles, without reaction from the Trump administration in Washington. For the GCC states, the Israeli attack in Doha simply means the US is no longer able to deter not only its enemies (Iran), but even its friends (Israel) from targeting the Arab capitals of the Gulf.
Furthermore, by reaffirming the “unwavering support” for the Israeli government, Washington openly prizes Israel’s war-driven strategy over the economy-driven strategy of the GCC states. And as in a short circuit, this occurs despite American interests in the Gulf economy, and the around three trillion dollars Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Qatari recently pledged to invest in the US economy over ten years.
The GCC states leaders’ sense of urgency transpires from the Final Issue Statement of the GCC Supreme Council, the leaders’ summit held in Doha (15 September), on the sideline of the broader gathering of Arab and Islamic leaders. With no Arab plan to contain Israel in sight, the Gulf states stressed that the Israeli attack in Doha constitutes “a direct threat to joint Gulf security”, asking to the GCC’s Joint Defence Council and Unified Military Command, respectively, “to assess the defence posture” and to “take the necessary executive measures to activate joint defence mechanisms”.
But these are only symbolic words: the GCC states do not have a joint defence structure ready to shield them. They have not achieved defense integration to protect themselves from external threats, since coordination and intelligence sharing have been kept at a minimum so far. For too long, the GCC states have prioritized bilateral relations with the US over the building of joint capabilities, due to subtle – when not open – rivalries, disagreements and distrust. They could start to intensively work on this now, but it will take time.
The GCC states will thus continue to pivot on the US, also trying to diversify defense partnerships, in order to maximize local capabilities and Gulf deterrence (just as the Saudi Arabia joint strategic agreement signed with Pakistan on 17 September).
The alliance with the US, however, has entered a period of profound crisis, since its foundations, i.e. Washington’s external guarantees, have been put into question. This time, the American pledge to deliver more sophisticated weapons to kingdoms and emirates will not be enough to patch up the Gulf-US alliance.
The growingly interdependent Middle East stands at the onset of a major regional reshuffle For the GCC states, this will imply a delicate and uncertain renegotiation of the political alliance with the US. In the meantime, the Arab capitals of the Gulf will focus on upgrading their own (national) security to be able to navigate regional insecurity.