As the US-Israel war on Iran drags on, the Gulf monarchies stand at the core of regional instability, due to Iran’s attacks against military and civilian infrastructures. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain and Oman have opted for restraint so far: they did not want this conflict, and engaged in diplomatic efforts to prevent it, and to avoid security and economic fallouts on their countries.
Things have gone in the opposite direction, leaving Gulf leaderships with plenty of worries regarding current events and future scenarios. While the Iranian air and maritime threat persists and expands, the Gulf monarchies are affected by the war spiral but have very little or no influence on the military operations, nor on its main actors, starting from the US, their main ally and guarantor.
Nuanced words and intra-Arab cohesion
Official speeches reveal nuanced approaches among Gulf decision-makers on how to practically cope with the Iranian aggression, even though the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have been politically cohesive so far.
The UAE – the most heavily targeted country in terms of numbers of drones and ballistic missiles – is speaking louder than the others by referring to Iran’s regime officials as “terrorists”, and to the practical closure of the Strait of Hormuz as “economic terrorism”.
The Saudi foreign minister recently warned that the kingdom’s patience “is not unlimited”. Qatar repeated the war must end “through diplomatic means”. The UAE withdrew the ambassador from Tehran, while Qatar and Saudi Arabia declared some Iran’s diplomats persona non grata, ordering them to leave their countries.
The longer the war lasts, the higher is the possibility the GCC will work to articulate a shared political position on how to deal with Iranian attacks, blending ´pro-active` and ´restraint-centered` approaches. Regarding the Israel-US war on Iran, the Gulf monarchies support regional efforts for de-escalation, currently driven by Pakistan, Egypt and Turkey. They acknowledge Iran will always be their neighbour due to geography, and that only diplomacy can redefine and strengthen Gulf security through clear, sustainable and long-term guarantees. But the big question is still how to get there.
Involved but not influential
The war on Iran has quickly turned into a Gulf war, due to Tehran’s immediate reaction against neighbours. Therefore, the territories of the Gulf monarchies have become part of the operational theater. However, these countries’ agency in the trajectory of war, and on warring parties, have been marginal so far.
The US opted for waging war despite the well known fact that the Gulf monarchies backed a diplomatic solution, and Oman was actively mediating talks between the US and Iran until Tel Aviv and Washington decided to attack. Furthermore, the Gulf monarchies promised and invested billion dollars in US economy, and vice versa, building upon excellent relations between the White House, local royal families and entrepreneurs. However, this did not prevent the Trump administration’s choice to go at war, indirectly undermining the pro-business stable environment which characterized the Gulf.
At the same time, Iran has been launching drones and ballistic missiles on the Gulf monarchies even though their governments told Tehran they would not allow the US to use their territories to strike Iran. Moreover, Iran has continued to target the Arab capitals of the Gulf even though they urged Tehran to refrain from attacking their territories, and especially civilian infrastructures and residential areas.
Air and maritime threats persist
One month since the start of the war, the number of drones and ballistic missiles Iran launches against Gulf monarchies’ territories has decreased, although it has not stopped. The large majority of these are allegedly intercepted by local air defense systems, which have displayed high interception rates so far. However, just one drone a day, and its debris, can do harm and produce damages, prolonging a sense of insecurity for which Gulf economic models are not built for.
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In parallel, commercial navigation in the Hormuz Strait and, to a lesser extent, in the Gulf of Oman is still obstructed by Tehran. The export-oriented Gulf monarchies fear Iran’s attempt to institutionalize a ´Houthi-style` block in Hormuz, in which the Islamic Republic chooses who can transit, and which is the financial price to be paid, similarly to what Yemen’s Houthis did in the Bab el-Mandeb during the Gaza war. The possibility that the Houthis might restart attacks on ships in the Red Sea, after having resumed missile launches against Israel, would especially harm Saudi Arabia’s oil export, whose western coast represents an alternative to Hormuz through the East-West pipeline conveying oil to the Yanbu terminal.
Dealing with the consequences of Israeli and American war(s)
Against this background, the strategic worries of the Gulf monarchies regarding Gulf security increase as the US intervention undergoes difficulties in significantly degrading the Iranian offensive capabilities, with an end to the war still not in sight. Still under attack by Iranian drones and missiles, the GCC states need the American security umbrella as never before. At the same time, the choices of the Trump administration have put Gulf monarchies’ security and economies at risk. This adds to the resilience of the Islamic Republic, whose regime structure looks to be still standing – especially its security, military and intelligence apparatus – despite the killing of several top officers and leaders, including the Supreme Guide Ali Khamenei, and the top security official Ali Larijani.
In a regional perspective, the gradual destabilization of Iraq is closely monitored by the Gulf monarchies: Baghdad is militarily caught between Iran and the US, with pro-Iran militias launching drones even against neighbours. This is an additional source of concern for the GCC states, which have invested in the relaunch of the Iraqi economy to secure their neighbourhood, trying to reduce the Iranian influence and to prevent an ISIS resurgence.
In Lebanon, Israel’s invasion to expand a “security zone” close to its borders is framed by the Gulf monarchies as the latest sign of the Israeli government’s expansionism: the Saudi foreign minister stated that “the absence of accountability and punishment” of Israel’s conduct “encourages further escalation”. While the GCC states are now even more aware of the threat coming from Iranian missiles, they are also increasingly uncomfortable with the way Tel Aviv uses hard power to redesign the region.
The Realpolitik of geography, and diplomacy
The Gulf monarchies acknowledge that Iran’s attacks represent a “turning-point” in the relationship with their Perian neighbour, although they continue to support a diplomatic solution to bring the crisis to an end, as the secretary-general of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) recently stated.
The geographical factor emphasizes Gulf leaders’ worries on the risks Iran may still pose to their security, even after a ceasefire is signed, or if the US should find an exit-strategy from the conflict without a clear political accomplishment. In the meantime, if the US should opt for a limited ground operation in the South of Iran and/or on its islands in the Persian Gulf, trying to restore freedom of navigation in Hormuz, the UAE and Kuwait would be particularly at risk of retaliation.
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In the case of Kuwait, the island of Kharg, which is Iran’s oil export hub, is just in front of the emirate, which has been also targeted by pro-Iran Iraqi militias under the banner of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq (IRI). Regarding the UAE, the historically disputed islands between the federation and Iran (Abu Musa; Greater and Lesser Tunb), are Iranian military outposts and the Islamic Republic could strike back to the UAE if the US should attack these islands.
Because of geography, the Gulf monarchies will have to find a modus vivendi with their neighbour Iran, regardless of who is in charge in Tehran. This explains why the GCC states aim to join negotiations on Gulf security as soon as attacks stop. Stakes are too high for the Gulf monarchies, who want to be at the table to defend their interests and rewrite regional security arrangements.
Differently from what occurred in 2015, when the Vienna talks led to the signing of the nuclear deal with Iran (Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action-JCPOA), the Gulf monarchies cannot accept to be excluded from formal talks, aspiring to a lasting and comprehensive agreement addressing all the issues related to the Iranian threat: nuclear, drones and missiles proliferation, support for non-state allies and proxies, and maritime security.
But as the confrontation enters its fifth week, the fog of war still hides the path towards a real diplomatic process, leaving Gulf leaderships, central but not influential, alone in the storm amid worrisome questions.