The region we continue to call the Middle East (despite its evolving role in world affairs) has long been defined by deep-seated instability and conflict. Today, however, it is being reshaped by volatile dynamics and sweeping changes that force us to view it through an entirely new lens—one starkly different from the past, and certainly from how the Trump administration envisioned and described it.
Trump’s grand wager in the Middle East, launched during his first term and anchored by the “Abraham Accords,” was built on a calculated triangulation between Israel and Saudi Arabia, underpinned by a special, privileged relationship with Washington.
The rationale was twofold: deputize the Israeli-Saudi axis to manage the region as regional “proconsuls,” thereby freeing up vital American resources to pivot toward the Indo-Pacific—the theater Washington deems paramount in the face of China’s rise. Israel would serve as the diplomatic and military heavyweight, boasting a formidable army, advanced intelligence, and the region’s sole nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia would act as the financial and energy superpower. The linchpin of this grand bargain was the containment and isolation of Iran, which—via a convenient logical leap—was supposed to simultaneously spell the end of the Palestinian question through widespread Arab recognition of Israel.
When strategy hits the ground
Yet, the two pillars of this American strategy have wobbled significantly. Since then, Israel has rained fire and fury on nearly all its neighbors, yet achieved results that fall woefully short of its stated objectives. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia has bogged itself down in trying to manage two deeply problematic regional adversaries: Iran and Yemen.
The dynamic is profoundly asymmetric: Jerusalem has acted with striking autonomy, practically dragging Washington past Trump’s initial positions, while Riyadh has tried—unsuccessfully—to put the brakes on the president’s most belligerent impulses. On both fronts, the sky-high expectations have fallen flat.
Furthermore, Trump built his strategy heavily around personalized relationships—on one side with Benjamin Netanyahu, and on the other with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS)—betting heavily on their assertive leadership styles. In Netanyahu’s case, Washington may have suffered from an “excess” of alignment: an aggressiveness and itch for war that seemingly dragged the US into striking Tehran on premises detached from reality. In MbS’s case, the trouble was a “deficit” of assertiveness: an overabundance of caution, with the Saudis laser-focused on avoiding a genuine war with Iran and preventing a resurgence of the conflict with the Houthis.
However one dissects this triangular dynamic, the overwhelming impression is that nearly everything went sideways. In the meantime, no rapprochement has materialized between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Instead, Riyadh has launched a fresh diplomatic initiative with Turkey and Pakistan that completely bypasses the Abrahamic framework. It is worth noting that Turkey has operated as a free agent for years, while Pakistan remains one of the few nations China views as a trusted junior partner.
The illusion of “victory”
One could argue, of course, that much still hinges on the ultimate outcome of the broad-spectrum showdown with Iran. If the Islamic Republic were to “capitulate” — though expecting an “unconditional surrender” at any time is a stretch — history books might ultimately judge Trump’s strategy a success.
Yet, how, when, and by what metric do we define “success”? And specifically — even though Trump has declared wars over dozens of times — when will this actually end so we can tally the score? No one can afford to reason as strategically as then Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai when asked about the French Revolution in 1972, famously remarking that “it is too soon to say.” Especially when the negative fallout of the ongoing conflict is already glaringly obvious.
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The Gulf monarchies in the trap of regional instability
Within this regional framework, the most striking element is Saudi Arabia’s newfound weakness and reluctance. The Kingdom has shifted from aspiring to be the Gulf’s visionary, innovative leader to living in mortal dread of being squeezed between diverse yet equally perilous enemies along its borders, abandoned to an unpredictable and unreliable American ally.
What is staggering is not just this geopolitical encirclement, but the sudden pivot in Riyadh’s role. For years, Saudi Arabia projected itself as the ultimate anchor of regional stability and gradual modernization, leveraging massive fossil fuel revenues to build a genuine financial, logistical, tourism, and cultural hub.
Instead, it has become painfully clear that all these ambitions are now hostages to the cheap missiles and drones that Iran and its active proxies can launch at a moment’s notice. The government of bin Salman was once seen as an indispensable guarantor of the regional networks meant to underpin mega-projects like the IMEC corridor, alongside steady oil and gas prices. Today, all of this is cast into deep doubt, carrying implications that stretch far beyond the Middle East — the very region that serves as the most logical geographical bridge between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans.
A dead end in the Gulf and the Red Sea
The evolution of Saudi posturing is living proof that the Abraham Accords are trapped in a dead end. Iran’s de facto dominance over the Strait of Hormuz is complete — meaning any future multilateral security framework will have to include Tehran whether Washington likes it or not.
The US has shown itself incapable of reversing this reality or shielding its allies (including Saudi Arabia and Israel) from Tehran’s bombardments. The two supposed “proconsuls” are utterly incapable of managing the Middle East. Worse still, to counter Iranian retaliation, the US has been forced to pull aircraft carriers, radar systems, and interceptors away from the Indo-Pacific, burning through precious resources in the Middle Eastern theater once more —doing precisely the opposite of what the Abraham Accords set out to achieve.
Meanwhile, the Bab el-Mandeb strait has fallen under the near-total control of the Houthis, who have cemented their grip on Yemen’s Red Sea coastline. Not only was the Saudi counter-offensive ineffective, but the Houthis have repeatedly demonstrated their ability to strike Saudi Arabia’s strategic infrastructure — such as the East-West pipeline linking the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea — and disrupt its maritime oil exports. Driven into a corner by a war manufactured by the US and Israel, Riyadh has found itself in an unprecedented strategic checkmate.
This fundamentally exposes the failure of the other core objective: isolating Iran. On the contrary, Tehran must now be brought to the table to manage the region’s vital straits and lucrative commercial traffic.
The unraveling of Netanyahu’s architecture
Yet the failures do not stop there. The endless wars unleashed by Benjamin Netanyahu have failed to deliver the security promised to Israelis — so much so that citizens are leaving the country in rising numbers. He has failed to “eradicate” (to use the Prime Minister’s favorite verb) Hamas, Hezbollah, the Houthis, or the regime in Tehran.
What these wars have successfully done, however, is grind the expansion of the Abraham Accords to a halt — ironically, achieving precisely what Hamas wanted. They have also frayed the fabric of Israeli-Saudi normalization.
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Consider the recent bombshell report published in Haaretz revealing that Netanyahu was reportedly warned ahead of October 7th yet allegedly ignored the intelligence, letting the worst attack in Israeli history unfold. The leak originated from the highest echelons of the United Arab Emirates. It is a striking testament to how the UAE — until recently Israel’s closest strategic partner in the region — has turned its back on the Israeli Prime Minister. Understandably, Abu Dhabi likely failed to appreciate the Iranian missiles raining down on Dubai’s ports, industries, oil fields, and data centers in retaliation for Netanyahu’s chosen escalation.
A pluralistic future
Confirming that the region’s new balance of power will not be run by an Israeli-Saudi duopoly is the recent pact signed by Riyadh, Pakistan, and Turkey. This marks the definitive return of an actor the Abraham Accords sought to sideline: Turkey.
It was Ankara that engineered Bashar al-Assad’s downfall in Syria, successfully closing a multi-year crisis and bringing the country closer to Western allies. It was also Ankara that rejected Saudi pressure to launch an all-out war against the Houthis, helping avert a catastrophic wider conflict and containing the crisis around Bab el-Mandeb.
These stabilization moves were undoubtedly welcomed by a United States bogged down by its own miscalculations and weighed down by the strategic blunders of Jerusalem and Riyadh. Ultimately, the architecture of the new Middle East will be far more pluralistic and interdependent than the Trump White House ever bargained for.
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