Asia’s challenges for the new Trump administration
Donald Trump’s notoriously unpredictable emphatic victory in this year’s US elections has, quite predictably, sent shockwaves across the world – and for good reason. Trump’s return could upend the geopolitical map in various regions of the world. Aside from reconsidering massive American defense aid to Ukraine, the next US administration will likely press Kyiv to explore a peace settlement with the Kremlin. Meanwhile, Iran could face a new ‘maximum pressure’ campaign targeting both its oil exports to China and its key defense industries.
In Asia, however, the reception to a second Trump presidency has been generally mixed. If anything, there was a surreal level of insouciance ahead of the elections. The received wisdom in most Asian capitals was simple: “We have been here before”. After all, there will be the predictable ‘transactionalism’, with Trump pressing key allies, such as Japan and South Korea, to expand their defense spending and more directly contribute to regional security. Multilateralism and calibrated diplomacy, a hallmark of the outgoing Biden administration’s foreign policy, will likely give way to triumphalist “Make America Great Again” unilateralism. Trump officials will more unabashedly prioritize narrow American national interest over the preservation of a rules-based international order.
Nevertheless, there is also an anxious recognition that Trump 2.0 could prove far more strident, if not unhinged, in its foreign policy. Aside from threatening to impose a 60% tariff on Chinese products, the next US administration could also squeeze imports from allies and strategic partners from Japan to Vietnam and Thailand. This could torpedo regional supply chains and trigger retaliatory measures by no less than the world’s second largest economy, China. Furthermore, bereft of ‘adults in the room’, namely veteran defense experts and traditionally-minded Republicans (with very few exceptions among the nominations), a second Trump administration could also sleepwalk into major conflicts with dire consequences for Asia.
The ties that bind
In fairness, Asian leaders have reasons not to panic over a second Trump presidency. Despite all his “Art of the Deal” bluster, Trump was notoriously ineffective in bullying allies and rivals into submission. South Korea deftly managed to preserve its free trade agreement with America despite repeated threats by Trump, while Iran refused to renegotiate a new nuclear deal with the US after Washington withdrew from the 2015 JCPOA.
His trade war with Beijing was a spectacular failure, leading to neither a significant and sustained drop in Chinese exports to America nor a major increase in imports of American products. Closer to home, Trump also failed to radically alter the fundamentals of the North America Free Trade Agreement despite signing the brand new USMCA. As for his quixotic negotiations with the North Korean regime, the two historic meetings between Trump and Kim Jung-un produced little substance.
In particular, Asian leaders also found little challenge in handling celebrity politicians such as Donald Trump, who is easily given to flattery and personalistic charm offensive. From the late Japanese leader Shinzo Abe to former Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak, ‘golf diplomacy’ proved extremely successful in winning Trump’s affection. Not to mention, strongman Asian leaders, including the notoriously anti-Western Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte, found natural affinity with the controversial US president, who never failed to praise authoritarian leaders from Vladimir Putin to Xi Jinping and Viktor Orbán.
If anything, many Asian leaders were particularly irked by the Biden administration’s ‘values-based’ foreign policy, including the annual Summit for Democracy, which excluded some of America’s closest strategic partners in the Indo-Pacific. Trump’s transactionalist streak, therefore, is much closer to the realpolitik instincts of countless Asian leaders, who, with a few exceptions, are overseeing undemocratic regimes.
Former US President Richard Nixon reportedly relied on the ‘madman theory’ – namely, the calibrated usage of aggression and unpredictability – to press America’s advantage at the height of the Cold War with the Soviet Union. Upon closer examination, Trump, a global celebrity through the decades, is an extremely predictable ‘madman’, since practically all other world leaders have become deeply familiar with his quixotic behavior and personal frailties throughout the decades.
The mist of uncertainty
However, given the peculiar characteristics of a second Trump presidency, few Asian leaders can afford the luxury of strategic complacency. To begin with, the incoming US President has made it clear – most notably in his hours-long interview with podcaster Joe Rogan – that he will do things radically differently in his second stint in office.
His new cabinet largely features a gallery of diehard loyalists, defense policy amateurs, and television anchors. There is no trace of the veteran generals, who checked Trump’s worst instincts and played the role of the ‘steady state’ throughout his first term in office.
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Key members of the presidential entourage such as billionaire Elon Musk, who has waged an informational war on mainstream liberal media, and Vice President JD Vance, who has favored a more protectionist economic vision, will also likely inject an unprecedented degree of ideological fervor to the second Trump presidency. The notable exception is Senator Marco Rubio who is set to lead the State Department, but it remains to be seen how much influence he will actually yield in shaping Trump 2.0’s global policy. Not to mention, he is also known as a China hawk, who will likely support more decisive measures against the Asian superpower.
Accordingly, there are three major implications for Asia. First, it is highly unlikely that Trump 2.0 will offer any major economic initiatives in the Indo-Pacific region. Having scuttled President Barack Obama’s Transpacific Partnership Agreement during his first term, Trump has vowed to nix Biden’s Indo-Pacific Economic Framework as soon as he assumes office.
As if that were not enough, he will likely impose a new round of punitive sanctions against China as well as other major Asian exporting nations, including key allies and partners, who currently enjoy a massive trade surplus with America. However, China is far more powerful today than during Trump’s first term and, accordingly, it is in a better position to retaliate in meaningful terms – setting off a chain of events that could undermine high-integrated supply chains in Asia. A more aggressive American economic policy could also alienate partners and fence sitters, from Vietnam to Singapore and Malaysia, who have welcomed expanded economic ties with China.
Second, even Asian allies could face stark choices. A second Trump presidency will likely be more aggressive in pressuring key allies to ramp up their defense spending, if not strategic rents. Likely in an attempt to please the incoming US President, frontline states such as Taiwan and the Philippines have already announced their plans to purchase big-ticket American weapons systems. The problem, however, is that Asian allies could face a suboptimal scenario, whereby they are simultaneously pressured to toe America’s line against China while fearing the prospect of a Trump ‘grand bargain’ with the Asian superpower.
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Third, the greatest fear is the possibility of a major conflict under a second Trump presidency. In fairness, Washington and Beijing could conceivably calibrate their New Cold War in ways that prevent direct confrontation. However, that does not preclude the possibility that, for instance, frontline treaty allies such as the Philippines may flirt with direct confrontation with China in the hotly-contested South China Sea amid constant encouragement by China hawks in Washington.
An even more likely scenario is Trump sleepwalking into a major conflict in other key theatres, namely the Middle East. Back in 2020, Washington came dangerously close to direct war with Tehran after years of escalating tensions. The ongoing Gaza conflict, and the tit-for-tat missile exchange between Iran and Israel in recent months, provides a particularly combustible geopolitical landscape – which may become even more complicated after the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. After all, Trump may press ahead with a more confrontational policy towards Tehran in tandem with a more adventurist and hawkish government in Tel Aviv.
Any conflagration in the Middle East, however, will have stark implications for East Asia, since it could heavily disrupt global energy markets, inflame anti-US sentiments in Muslim-majority nations, such as Indonesia and Malaysia, and distract the US from its strategic competition with China. In short, a second Trump presidency could end up as simultaneously more strident and distracted at the expense of playing a more constructive and proactive role in preserving a rules-based order in Asia.
