The October 7, 2023 attack on Israel and Gaza’s political earthquake have not significantly altered the politics of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states. Their political posture is the same as before and this is news given the sensitivity of the Israeli-Palestinian issue in Middle Eastern history and popular sentiment. However, nuances and perceptions in the Gulf – more generally the mood – have changed.
The current scenario
The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain are still part of the Abraham Accords signed with Israel in 2020, and Saudi Arabia has suspended, but not erased, the normalization plan with the Israeli state. Qatar continues to be the mediator between warring parties, however with increased effort as Hamas (already designated as a terrorist organization by the US, by all G7 countries, and by the EU) has become and even more unacceptable counterpart to Western audiences since the October 7th attack.
The Abraham Accords have lost much of their transformative force since the war started. The Accords are still considered strategic by ruling classes in the Gulf: they must be pursued in spite of difficulties (the UAE; Bahrain) or achieved (Saudi Arabia) for national ambitions, also with the goal of regional stability through integration. Yet, large projects like IMEC, the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor, are seen today as bright hypotheses for the future, rather than feasible plans in the short and medium-term.
The Saudi Crown Prince and de facto ruler Mohammed bin Salman Al Saud seems stuck in a political labyrinth. He knows that normalizing relations with Israel is politically unfeasible for the Saudi and Islamic public as long as the war in Gaza goes on; but he is also aware that a strengthened defense pact with the US, which is part of a package, cannot be formalized without the Israeli leg.
In this context, diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran, officially restored in March 2023, have survived the October 7th, the Israel-Hamas war, and the Iranian-related attacks in the region. This should not be taken for granted, since Hamas unmistakably belongs to the pro-Tehran camp. Riyadh has kept the dialogue alive with Tehran, especially in the most perilous phases like the Iranian direct attacks on Israel or the killing of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in the Iranian capital (July 2024). This choice is probably limiting the possibility of a regional war in the Middle East.
In the southern Red Sea, the Bab el-Mandeb and the Gulf of Aden, things have significantly changed. The opening of a maritime front by Yemen’s Houthis, with attacks against commercial and military vessels since November 2023 in “solidarity with Gaza”, has globalized a security risk the GCC states already knew very well. Regarding the Houthi offensive, Saudi Arabia and the UAE have opted for a very low profile in the maritime crisis as they are concerned about possible security fallouts against their own territories, and the return of wide-scale violence in Yemen.
Read also: The US, Yemen, and the Houthi challenge in the Gulf
A new awareness
Te GCC states seem to be elaborating new political strategies on the basis of a few updated assessments. Iran has so far turned out to be militarily weaker than expected, and it seems unwilling to engage in direct war. After October 7th, the deployment of American military assets in the region has successfully deterred Tehran, minimizing the risk of a classic, “state vs state” and “army vs army” conflict in the Middle East – at least until very recently. Conversely, the strengthening of the US military presence has not deterred Iranian allies and proxies from performing attacks against bases hosting American soldiers (in Iraq, Syria and Jordan), and to disrupt navigation in the Red Sea.
Rising American military-political involvement in the Middle East is bringing heightened activism by Russia. The GCC states understand that this can alter the current balance of forces, even in the Gulf. Strengthened military cooperation and procurement between Russia and Iran can be a game changer, especially if Moscow provides direct support, or indirect via Tehran, to pro-Iranian armed groups in the region, including the Houthis, due to a shared anti-Western sentiment. Such a perspective would also hamper Saudi and Emirati security.
Read also: Le vie dell’impero iraniano
The Gulf monarchies have also come to realize how much the “axis of resistance” led by Iran is not only varied, but internally fragmented. Beyond transnational links, the Gaza war has exposed the increasing national identity of these non-state actors who often prioritize – from Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Popular Mobilization Forces in Iraq – their local goals and interests over Iran’s. Although sympathetic with the Palestinians cause, Iranian allies and proxies also aim to take care of their domestic affairs and sub-regional dynamics.
For the GCC states, it is now extremely clear they can no longer avoid addressing the Palestinian sovereignty issue or considering it as something to somehow be pursued at some point in the future. Stakes have become too high for regional stability, while Turkey has taken the banner of main Palestinian defendant in the Sunni camp. Gulf Arab capitals are also aware that neighboring Jordan (who hosts more than 2.3 million registered Palestinian refugees) needs to be supported, more than before, to insulate Amman from the fallouts of the Israeli military operations across the region, in a country whose security is essential for Gulf security.
Finally, the post-October 7th world has taught an important lesson to the GCC states about China in the Middle East. The time is still not ripe for Beijing to effectively play the problem-solver role in the region, in the Israeli-Palestinian issue, in Iran or in the Red Sea. Surely, China has provided a stage to Saudi Arabia and Iran to announce the restart of bilateral relations, as the output of a long Arab mediation. However, when crises are in flame, the Chinese still look more skilled at capitalizing, rather than at defusing. For the Gulf monarchies, this means having weaker tools than expected to indirectly pressure Iran, while simultaneously constraining Israel’s military options.