After days of waiting for Iran’s response to Israel’s killing of Hezbollah Secretary General and idolized Islamic Resistance leader Hassan Nasrallah in the ongoing bombing campaign of the southern suburbs of the Lebanese capital on September 27th, Tehran launched a barrage of over 180 ballistic missiles towards Israel on the eve of the first day of the Jewish holiday of Rosh Hashanah. While the only two main elements differentiating the October 1st events from the unprecedented direct Iranian attack against Israel on April 14th were the lack of prior notification to Washington and the amount and type of missiles launched, the context in which the attack took place raises a series of questions about what is to come. This adds a layer of complexity to the examination of how Iran’s regional and international foreign policy changed since October 7, 2023.
The two concepts that are necessary to bear in mind in order to understand Iranian foreign policy both at the regional and international level are those of “forward defense” and “plausible deniability”. The relation between these two core concepts of Iranian foreign policy can be defined by the notion that through reliance on third parties, militias and surrogate forces, such as Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza, the Houthis in Yemen and a plethora of Shiite militias in Iraq, Iran carves out the possibility to conduct military activities in the region through proxy warfare, while allowing itself to maintain a degree of deniability in its attempt to confront potential threats before they reach Iranian territory. By maintaining a network of allied non-state actors across the Middle East, Iran aims to strategically advance its geopolitical goals: deter its adversaries, particularly the US and Israel, while expanding what the regime refers to as the Islamic Republic’s “strategic depth” in the region.
Forward defense and the axis of resistance
Building on Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s description of the Islamic Resistance as Iran’s “strategic depth” in the Middle East, it can be argued that the strength of the Axis of Resistance is a barometer Tehran can use to evaluate the success of its “forward defense” strategy. In light of this notion, this past year can be divided into two periods. The first, spanning from October 7th to the Iranian attack on Israel on April 14th, is characterized by Tehran and its proxies feeling emboldened by the actions of Hamas, and the Israeli vulnerability they demonstrated, and the impact of Tel Aviv’s subsequent relentless attacks on Gaza on the normalization of relations between Israel and Persian Gulf countries. This period is dotted with inflammatory rhetoric on Tehran’s part and strong demonstrations of support for the numerous attacks launched by its proxies either against Israel or US positions in Iraq and Syria.
During this stretch of time, Israel responded to Iran and its proxies by engaging in a tit-for-tat with Hezbollah in Lebanon and striking Iranian positions in Syria. In early April, Israel struck the consular section of the Iranian embassy in Damascus, killing seven members of the IRGC, including Brigadier General Mohammad Reza Zahedi, the head of the Quds Force (IRGC-QF) in Syria and Lebanon. Since that attack, Iranian leaders and officials repeatedly vowed to retaliate, ultimately doing so on April 14th, when Iran launched over 300 projectiles, including drones, cruise and ballistic missiles, toward Israel in a massive direct aerial assault on the country. While the attack was described by experts as being largely symbolic – also due to the fact that it was practically signaled in advance – its significance lies in Iran’s intention to demonstrate its capability of striking Israel. This marks a shift away from Iran’s traditional reliance on proxy actors, reflecting Tehran’s increased appetite for risk, which resulted in considerations related to plausible deniability being pushed aside in favor of a demonstration of strength.
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The second period in the Iranian strategy in this past year, starting from the Israeli retaliation against Iran five days after Tehran’s direct attack in April, and extending until the present moment, is characterized by Iran’s reassessment of the strengths and vulnerabilities of its Axis of Resistance following crushing blows inflicted on its proxies by Israel. The main turning points of this second phase of Israeli-Iranian confrontation are the killing of Hamas Political Chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran days after the assassination of Hezbollah commander Fuad Shukr in Beirut, and the recent killing of Hezbollah historical leader Hassan Nasrallah in an intense Israeli bombing campaign on Beirut.
The circumstances of these high-profile assassinations seem to hint at a level of Israeli infiltration and intelligence gathering that unveils severe vulnerabilities within Iran’s network. Moreover, this second phase of confrontation between Iran and Tel Aviv unfolded against the backdrop of a power transition in Iran following the death of former Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Hossein Amirabdollahian in a helicopter crash near Iran’s border with Azerbaijan in late May. The election of reformist President Masoud Pezeshkian in Iran led to a partial shift in Tehran’s rhetoric, with Pezeshkian’s focus on economic stability through sanction relief and diplomacy with the West signaling an attempt to de-escalate regional tensions and a different approach to foreign policy than that of late President Raisi.
When newly elected Pezeshkian made his debut on the international stage at the UN General Assembly at the end of September, he made a speech stressing Iran’s openness to diplomacy with the West. This was an element of the president’s electoral program that, together with the promises to tackle the economic crisis in Iran by working towards the removal of sanctions, would logically imply that Iran is reluctant to get involved in a military escalation in the region. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, on the other hand, gave a speech in which he stressed that “the long arm of Israel” can “reach the tyrants of Tehran” anywhere in Iran and the Middle East. Only days later Israel eliminated Hezbollah leader Nasrallah and launched a series of ground raids into southern Lebanon.
Israel’s continued offensive in Gaza and now in Lebanon, constitute an additional blow to the Axis of Resistance, one that Iran responded to on October 1st with a clear message intended to assert the Islamic Republic’s strength. On the one hand, the shift away from sole reliance on its proxies in its deterrence of Israel, first reflected in Iran’s unprecedented direct attack on April 14th and further consolidated by the October 1st attack, could have far-reaching implications for the region, as it challenges Iran’s traditional proxy warfare dynamics, and may prompt new calculations from Israel and the US regarding Iran’s next moves. On the other hand, it is imperative to note that albeit Iran’s choice to confront Israel directly does represent an escalation to the conflict, most experts agree that the Islamic Republic has nevertheless demonstrated restraint engaging in missile attacks that have not led to large scale Israeli casualties.
Iran’s diplomatic shift and its regional implications
Since October 7th, Iran has also sought to strengthen ties with its Arab neighbors, taking advantage of the stalled normalization process between Israel and the Gulf States. The 2020 Abraham Accords, which once promised to bring Israel closer to countries like Saudi Arabia and the UAE, have largely been put on hold as a result of Israel’s pounding of Gaza. In contrast, Tehran, with the aid of Beijing, has worked to mend relations with these same nations. It brokered a diplomatic rapprochement with Saudi Arabia earlier in the year, facilitated by China, and has since engaged in dialogue with other Gulf States. This effort underscores Iran’s intent to balance the uncompromising actions of its proxies with a pragmatic approach to regional diplomacy, leveraging the freezing of the rapprochement between Israel and its Arab neighbors.
As Iran recalibrates its strategy, the central question remains: What will Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu do next? With Israel facing the ongoing threat of Iranian missile strikes and the weakened state of the Axis of Resistance, Netanyahu is under pressure to act decisively. The possibility of an Israeli attack on Iranian nuclear facilities looms large, as tensions between the two nations escalate.
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In the aftermath of the attack of October 1st, the semi-official and IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency reported that the Chief of Staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, Major General Mohammad Hossein Baqeri, stated that, “if the Zionist regime, which has reached madness, was not controlled by the United States and Europe, and sought to either continue its atrocities or take action against our territorial integrity and sovereignty, tonight’s operation would be repeated with multiple magnitude and all of their infrastructures would be struck.”
The potential scenarios for the development of Israeli-Iranian tensions are multiple and bleak, with the two most discussed being protracted albeit limited high-intensity war, or, in case of an Israeli attack on nuclear facilities, a potential total war. In any case, as events over the past few months have made clear, it will very hard for the US, and possibly for the EU, to avoid various forms of direct involvement in the crisis.